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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Global warming has gradually become a serious threat to our world. Voices of climatol-
ogists making anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions responsible for the rise in global
temperatures cannot be ignored any longer. If the world’s leaders are willing to change
climate policy there is a chance of avoiding the worst consequences, however.
Without a different policy regarding climate change mankind will be confronted with dire
consequences. For instance, the report of Stern (2007) predicts that rising sea levels and
more extreme weather such as storms, floods and droughts will displace millions of peo-
ple. Europe might face dramatic changes in the weather if the Gulf Stream will change its
course due to melting icebergs in the Arctic. Melting glaciers in many parts of the world
might lead to a shortage of drinking water and growing deserts to diminishing areas of
cultivable land. Climate scientists argue that the worst consequences of global warming
can be avoided by reducing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Cost-benefit analy-
ses of Stern (2007) and McKinsey & Company (2009) show that the measures required
to prevent global temperatures from rising too high will be affordable. Politicians can
achieve a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by implementing suitable instruments.
In other words, policymakers have to control pollutions. Desired characteristics of the
policy response to the pollution control problem are
1. Effectiveness
Policy instruments should ensure that the targeted pollution level is achieved.
1
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2. Manageable control effort
The control authority should be able to measure emissions or to estimate them
correctly at reasonable costs.
3. Minimal costs from a macroeconomic perspective
The policy instrument ensures that emitters with the lowest emission reduction costs
per unit of emission (marginal abatement costs) reduce their emissions at first.
In principle, possible policy responses to the pollution control problem include
1. Emission standards (“Command-and-Control”)
Legal limits on the amount of pollutants an individual source is allowed to emit.
2. Taxes
(a) Emission charges
Polluter has to pay a fee for each unit of pollutant emitted.
(b) Product charges
Control authority taxes the commodity that is responsible for the pollution
instead of the pollutant.
3. Subsidy
Control authority incentivizes polluters to emit less by offering them a subsidy per
unit of reduced emission.
4. Emissions trading
Generally speaking, emissions trading consists of three major steps:
(a) Allocation: Control authority allocates emission allowances to the emitters.
The total number of allowances, also known as cap, is chosen by the control
authority according to its reduction target. An emission allowance gives the
holder the right to emit one unit during a pre-specified period of time, also
called compliance period. The most popular allocation methods are grandfa-
thering and auctioning. Grandfathering means that allowances are allocated
for free and that the number of allowances is related to the emissions of each
emitter in the baseline year.
(b) Trading: The allowances are freely tradeable.
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(c) Compliance: At the end of the compliance period emitters have to hand in one
allowance per unit of emission. To enforce the cap, a penalty is levied for each
unit of pollutant emitted outside the limits of a given compliance period.
The emissions trading scheme with grandfathering as described above is referred to
as ordinary scheme in the following in order to distinguish it from the so-called
hybrid schemes (cf. page 4).
The thesis mainly focuses on emissions trading because with the launch of the European
Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005, marketable permits have become the
cornerstone of the policy of the European Union towards climate change.
Moreover, the introduction of a cap-and-trade system is being discussed in several coun-
tries all over the world. The official launch of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) in January 2009 which was signed by 10 north-eastern US States was the begin-
ning of the carbon market era in North America. A plan to introduce a US-wide cap-
and-trade scheme has recently been proposed by the new U.S. administration. Canada
demonstrated its interest in linking up with the US scheme, abandoning its own plans
for developing an efficiency-based system. Schemes in the Pacific area, such as Aus-
tralia’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) and New Zealand’s Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme (NZ ETS) are in different stages of development. Finally, Japan is timidly
considering different options for the development of a market for emission permits.
The work of Coase (1960) on externalities laid the basis for the theory of marketable per-
mits. Coase sees undefined property rights as the root of the problem with externalities
such as greenhouse gas emissions. According to his theory a society will reduce exter-
nalities to a socially acceptable level by legal and by market mechanisms in the presence
of defined property rights such as rights for clean air, clean drinking water, etc. Dales
(1968) was the first to propose the introduction of marketable permits.
A few years later Montgomery (1972) developed the first theoretical model for permit
prices in a cap-and-trade-system. He formally demonstrated that emissions trading re-
duces emissions at minimal costs, i.e. emissions trading satisfies the third desired char-
acteristic of a pollution control instrument. The rationale behind this result is that in a
cap-and-trade system firms may either reduce their own pollution or purchase emission
permits in order to ensure compliance. Firms that can easily reduce emissions will do so,
whereas those firms unable to reduce emissions will buy permits.
Due to its construction a cap-and-trade system ensures that the required emission level
is not exceeded and thereby effectively ensures the reduction target (first desired charac-
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teristic of the policy instrument). For this reason, emissions trading is called a quantity
instrument in contrast to price instruments such as a tax or a subsidy that reduce emissions
indirectly. When focusing on the largest emitters only, control efforts of cap-and-trade
systems are manageable (second characteristic in the list).
This explains the popularity of cap-and-trade systems among policymakers.
A clear understanding of the carbon pricing mechanism is necessary because of the preva-
lence of cap-and-trade schemes. The EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme)
is by far the largest CO2 emissions trading system in the world covering about 50% of all
CO2 emissions in the European Union. Permit markets of other CO2 emissions trading
schemes are still relatively illiquid.
Permit prices of the EU ETS showed the following peculiarities:
• Jumpy behaviour
• Spot price converged to zero at the end of the first compliance period.
This price behaviour led to discussions about acceptable price ranges for emission per-
mits. There are proposals suggesting the introduction of specific mechanisms to keep the
permit price from rising too high or falling too low. These modified ordinary schemes are
called hybrid schemes.
1.2 Aim of the thesis
The aim of this PhD thesis is to provide a theoretical explanation of those two permit
price characteristics in an ordinary scheme and to check whether the proposed hybrid
schemes are able to avoid the two characteristics (jumpy behaviour and convergence of
the spot price to zero at the end of the compliance period).
Before performing these analyses it is necessary to investigate deterministic equilibrium
models and two classes of models that have been developed recently, namely stochastic
equilibrium models and reduced-form models. Special attention is paid to stochastic
equilibrium models as permit price dynamics cannot be captured by deterministic models.
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1.3 Contribution of the thesis
1. Investigation of deterministic and stochastic equilibrium models and reduced-form
models
(a) Show how the two concepts of marginal abatement costs and the probability
of permit shortage are related to each other (cf. Section 3.4)
(b) Develop a new stochastic equilibrium model (cf. Section 3.2d)
(c) Show how stochastic equilibrium models and reduced-form models are related
to each other (cf. Section 3.5)
Table 1.1 (page 6) contains a compilation of permit price models.
2. Analysis of the price dynamics in an ordinary scheme
(a) Provide a theoretical explanation for the observed jumpy permit price be-
haviour (cf. Section 4.1)
(b) Explain why the spot price converged to zero at the end of the first compliance
period (cf. Section 3.2 and 4.2)
(c) Discuss estimation methods for stochastic equilibrium models and reduced-
form models (cf. Section 4.3)
3. Analysis of the permit prices in the proposed hybrid schemes (cf. Chapter 5)
(a) Analyze the relationship between an ordinary scheme and hybrid schemes
(b) Determine the effectiveness of price bounds in hybrid schemes
(c) Investigate permit price volatility in hybrid schemes
(d) Analyze enforcement costs and environmental targets in hybrid schemes
Figure 1.1 (page 7) provides a survey on the structure of the thesis.
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Permit price model Section
Deterministic equilibrium model
Montgomery (1972) 3.1a
Rubin (1996) 3.1b
Kling and Rubin (1997) 3.1c
Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) 3.1d
Stochastic equilibrium model
Seifert et al. (2008) 3.2a
Carmona et al. (2009b) 3.2b
Chesney and Taschini (2008) 3.2c
Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) 3.2d
Reduced-form model
Carmona et al. (2009a) 3.3a
Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009) 3.3b
Table 1.1: Overview of the permit price models (deterministic and stochastic equilibrium
models and reduced-form models).
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Chapter 2
Regulatory Framework
2.1 Kyoto Protocol
2.1a Introduction
The first international agreement in reaction to increasing worldwide changes in climate
was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It came
into force on 21 March 1994 after having been ratified by 192 nations. With the rati-
fication of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
the world’s political leaders admitted that anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases do have a significant impact on the climate change. Greenhouse
gases (GHG) besides carbon dioxide ( CO2 ) are methane ( CH4 ), nitrous oxide ( N2O ),
sulphur hexafluoride ( SF6 ), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs).
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) encourages
developed countries to stabilize their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) but there is
no legal obligation to do so.
The first international agreement with a binding obligation to reduce the emissions of
greenhouse gases is the Kyoto Protocol. It was adopted on 11 December 1997 and came
into force on 16 February 2005. Not all the countries that had ratified the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), also ratified the Kyoto Protocol,
however, as this agreement is not non-committal any longer. The United States of America
signed it but refused to ratify it in the end. The Kyoto Protocol obliges Annex-I countries
to reduce their collective annual greenhouse gas emissions in the period between 2008 and
2012 by 5.2% compared to the emission level of the year 1990. In other words, Annex-I
8
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countries on average have an emission reduction target of 5.2% compared to the base-
line year 1990. Annex-I countries are Western industrialized nations such as the member
states of the European Union, the United States of America, Canada, Japan, Australia
and New Zealand. Moreover, countries having emerged from the decaying Soviet bloc be-
long to the list of Annex-I countries. Those former Communist nations are referred to as
Economies in Transition (EIT). The Non-Annex-I countries that have ratified the Kyoto
Protocol have not committed themselves to any emission reduction. Nevertheless, the
Kyoto Protocol is a joint agreement between Annex-I and Non-Annex-I countries. This
has to do with the agreement that Annex-I countries are allowed to achieve parts of their
emission reduction commitment in form of emission reduction projects in Non-Annex-I
countries. This mechanisms is called Clean Development Mechanism and it is one of the
flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol that are described later on (Section 2.1c). The
list of Non-Annex-I countries comprises both, the poorest nations which are referred to by
Least Developed Countries (LDC) and emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil
and also the wealthy Gulf nations and South Korea1.
The emissions in the baseline year 1990 determine the Assigned Amount, i.e. the total
number of emission allowances that an Annex-I country receives for the first compliance
period between 2008 and 2012. One AAU (Assigned Amount Unit) gives the holder the
right to emit one ton of CO2-e during the compliance period. At the end of the compli-
ance period an Annex-I country has to hand in one AAU per unit of emission (one ton of
CO2-e ). If an Annex-I country fails to do so it faces the following penalty for each unit of
emission that is not covered by an AAU. A non-compliant Annex-I country is not released
from the obligation to hand in the lacking permit in the second compliance period (after
2012). Furthermore, it has to hand in 0.3 additional permits in the course of the second
compliance period.
The penalty will only affect non-compliant countries if there is a second compliance period.
However, political leaders failed to negotiate a Post-Kyoto Protocol so far. Therefore, it
is uncertain at the moment whether there will be a second compliance period.
Under the assumption that there will be a penalty, the Kyoto Protocol incentivizes coun-
tries to hold an AAU for every unit of emission. This means that Annex-I countries have
to either reduce their emissions or to increase the number of emission allowances with the
help of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol.
Annex-I countries are obliged to achieve compliance mainly by reducing national emis-
sions. National measures include emission reduction projects in the industry and emission
reductions in the private sector, e.g. emissions from transportation could be reduced by
1A full list of Annex-I, EIT, Annex-II, Non-Annex-I and LDC countries can be found in Section 2.3a.
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levying higher taxes on fuel. Moreover, Annex-I countries are allowed to use a limited
amount of permits for compliance that result from domestic LULUCF activities (Land
Use, Land Use Change and Forestry) such as afforestation and reforestation. LULUCF
activities do not necessarily reduce emissions. The reason why they are eligible for com-
pliance is that sinks such as a newly planted forest do not reduce emissions but capture
parts of the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
In addition to the national measures, Annex-I countries can increase the number of per-
mits that are functional for compliance2 by making use of the following three flexible
market-based instruments of the Kyoto Protocol:
• Emissions Trading
• Joint Implementation (JI)
• Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
Emissions trading in the context of the Kyoto Protocol means that Annex-I countries can
trade emission permits among each other. In contrast to the other two mechanisms, the
permits transferred from one country to another do not necessarily result from an emission
reduction project. A country that was generously awarded permits (i.e. countries that
have negotiated a favourable baseline) might sell those permits to other countries even
though the permits might simply originate from overallocation. Especially, countries of
the former Soviet bloc (EIT countries) have profited from the fact that the year 1990 had
been agreed on as baseline year. Economies of the EIT countries collapsed around 1990
and as a result of this collapse emissions dropped significantly and have never rebounded
since then. Therefore, the Emissions Trading mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol has been
criticized for creating “Hot Air” in the EIT countries.
Both Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allow
Annex-I countries to carry out emission reduction projects in other countries and to use
the resulting permits for compliance. Depending on the location of the project, it is either
referred to as JI project or CDM project. A JI project is located in an Annex-I country.
A CDM project is located in a Non-Annex-I country. The most popular host of CDM
projects is China. The basic idea behind those flexible mechanisms is to help Annex-I
countries in achieving their reduction target and in promoting technology transfer and
foreign investment in developing countries and nations under transition.
2Section 2.1c provides a detailed survey on the different permits that are functional for compliance with
the Kyoto Protocol.
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World leaders discussed a possible Post-Kyoto Protocol at the United Nations Climate
Change Conference in Copenhagen between 7 December 2009 and 19 December 2009.
The negotiations did not result in an international agreement. Therefore, it is uncertain
at the moment whether there will be an international agreement with binding reduction
targets for the years after 2012.
The UNFCCC Secretariat is responsible for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
in practice. The UNFCCC Secretariat is part of the United Nations. Its headquarter is
located in Bonn and its 200 employees have the following tasks:
• Prepare the annual Convention of the Parties (COP).
COP-15 took place in Copenhagen in December 2009 and is better known as Copen-
hagen Conference. The next Convention will take place in Mexico at the end of 2010.
• Monitor emissions (collection and analysis of GHG emissions data)
• Administer the International Transaction Log (ITL).
Similar to a bank, the ITL documents the number of permits that the different
Annex-I countries hold in their national registries.
2.1b Emissions of Greenhouse Gases (GHG)
Definition of GHG emissions
The emissions of the different greenhouse gases (GHG) are converted into the unit of so-
called carbon dioxide equivalent (denoted by CO2-e ) because each greenhouse gas (GHG)
has a different effect on global warming. The carbon dioxide equivalent of a specific gas
describes the amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming potential over 100
years (GWP) as one unit of the gas. Table 2.1 summarizes the different carbon dioxide
equivalents in the report of Forster et al. (2007) which is part of the fourth assessment
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC is the
leading scientific and governmental body that assesses climate change and its potential
socio-economic consequences. Al Gore and the IPCC were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
in 2007.
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Greenhouse gases Carbon dioxide equivalent of one unit
Carbon dioxide 1
Methane 21
Nitrous oxide 310
Hydrofluorocarbons 140 - 11,700
Perfluorocarbons 6,500 - 9,200
Sulphur hexafluoride 23,900
Table 2.1: Global warming potential of different greenhouse gases.
Source: Forster et al. (2007).
Annex A emissions include the emissions of the following sectors: energy industry,
manufacturing and construction, transport, industrial processes, solvents and other prod-
uct use, agriculture and waste3. It is important to note that emissions associated with
land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) do not belong to the group of Annex
A emissions. LULUCF activities include afforestation, reforestation and deforestation.
Baseline and reduction target
The Kyoto Protocol obliges Annex-I countries to reduce their collective annual Annex A
emissions in the first compliance period (2008-2012) by 5.2% compared to the emission
level of the year 1990. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the individual reduction targets.
Both the choice of the baseline year and the reduction target are the result of political
negotiations during the Kyoto Conference in 1997. It is remarkable that the baseline year
1990 coincides with the fall of the former Soviet bloc. Some of those former Communist
nations (called EIT countries) agreed on limiting their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
They are the only economies in transition with binding targets. When the Kyoto Protocol
was negotiated it was already obvious that the GHG emissions of EIT countries were
approximately 40% below the level of 1990. This shows that the commitment of the EIT
countries is not contributing to a real reduction of GHG emissions. Some EIT countries
even succeeded in achieving a more favourable baseline. The following countries have a
baseline prior to 1990: Bulgaria (1988), Hungary (the average of annual emissions in the
years 1985-1987), Poland (1988), Romania (1989) and Slovenia (1986).
3A detailed list of Annex A emissions can be found in UNFCCC (2008).
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Country Reduction target in 2008-2012
compared to 1990 level
EU-15, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, -8.0%
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland
US4 -7.0%
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland -6.0%
Average of all Annex-I countries -5.2%
Croatia -5.0%
New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine 0
Norway +1.0%
Australia +8.0%
Iceland +10.0%
Table 2.2: Emission targets of countries included in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol.
Source: UNFCCC (2008).
The reduction target of the European Union is of special interest as the European Union
is a pioneer in the field of environmental economics. The countries of the European Union
committed themselves to an ambitious reduction target of the Kyoto Protocol. In 2005
the European Union launched the world’s largest CO2 emission trading scheme in order
to achieve its reduction targets. Covering approximately 40% of the GHG emissions in
the European Union, emissions trading has become a key instrument of environmental
politics in Europe. In 1998 the common target of the member states of the European
Union has been split up into individual targets for each member state according to the
Burden Sharing Agreement. When ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on 31 May 2002, the
European Union reaffirmed the validity of the Burden Sharing Agreement. Table 2.3 lists
the reduction targets of the EU-15 countries.
4The United States of America have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
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Country Reduction target in 2008-2012
compared to 1990 level
Luxembourg -28.0%
Denmark, Germany -21.0%
Austria -13.0%
United Kingdom -12.5%
EU-15 -8.0%
Belgium - 7.5%
Italy -6.5%
Netherlands -6.0%
Finland, France 0%
Sweden +4.0%
Ireland +13.0%
Spain +15.0%
Greece +25.0%
Portugal +27.0%
Table 2.3: GHG reduction targets of EU-15 countries under the European Burden Sharing
Agreement.
Source: Carbontrust (2009).
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National Systems and GHG data
The following subsection provides a short survey on the reporting requirements of Annex-I
countries and describes the development of GHG emissions in the last 20 years.
In order to record the level of GHG emissions, each Annex-I country must set up a national
system and report its GHG data to the UNFCCC Secretariat. The initial report contains
information on the GHG data of the baseline year 1990. Reports on the emissions of
the years up to 2007 are on a voluntary basis. However, most Annex-I countries have
compiled them. Reporting the GHG emissions of the years 2008-2012 is compulsory and
the deadlines for the first and the last annual report are April 2010 and April 2014,
respectively. After having evaluated all the reports the UNFCCC will publish the so-
called true-up report. Due to the relatively complex reporting process the compliance
date (31 March 2015) is more than two years after the end of the first commitment period
of the Kyoto Protocol (2008 – 2012).
The quality of the GHG data on the emissions of Annex-I countries is relatively good (cf.
Figure 2.1) because data has to be reported to the UNFCCC annually. Annex-I countries
slightly reduced their emissions by roughly 4% between 1990 and 2007 and it looks as if
Annex-I countries could manage to meet their overall reduction obligation of -5.2%. If
GHG emissions are broken down into emissions of EIT Parties (with a reduction of about
40%) and into emissions of the remaining Annex-I countries (with an increase of about
10%) it can be shown that the overall reduction is clearly related to the collapse of the
Soviet Union.
The effect of LULUCF (emissions/removals from land use, land-use change and forestry)
is minor in the context of the Annex-I group. For some countries, however, the change in
GHG levels is heavily affected by LULUCF. The most obvious reduction in GHG levels
due to LULUCF effects can be observed for the Baltic nations, whereas Australia’s GHG
emissions are significantly increased when taking LULUCF into account.
Annex-I Parties slightly reduced their GHG emissions excluding LULUCF (also known
as Annex A emissions) between 1990 and 2007 from 18.85 bn tons of CO2-e to 18.11
bn tons of CO2-e . Carbon dioxide has by far the largest share in total GHG emissions
of Annex-I countries (more than 80%). Moreover, the CO2 emissions nearly remained
the same between 1990 and 2007. The overall reduction in GHG emissions is caused by
reductions in CH4 and N2O emissions of more than 20%
5.
5See UNFCCC (2009).
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Figure 2.1: Annex-I greenhouse gas emissions excluding LULUCF between 1990 and 2007.
Source: UNFCCC (2009).
Data on GHG emissions of Non-Annex-I countries is also available. However, most coun-
tries are reporting difficulties in measuring their greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, it
is not possible to obtain exact numbers for a specific year. The latest UNFCCC report of
2005 addresses this issue and presents numbers for “1994 or the closest year reported”6.
GHG emissions of Non-Annex-I countries amount to approximately 11.74 bn tons of
CO2-e which corresponds to a share of about 40% in global GHG emissions. Moreover,
the GHG emissions of Non-Annex-I countries have steadily increased. Nevertheless, the
Kyoto Protocol only obliges Annex-I countries to reduce their GHG emissions. The ra-
tionale behind this is twofold.
First, the contribution of Non-Annex-I countries to the cumulative GHG emissions since
the beginning of the Industrial Revolution is still relatively small. Second, Non-Annex-I
countries argue that even today their emission level is low when taking into account that
the population of Non-Annex-I countries is approximately four times larger than that of
Annex-I countries. This means that the per capita emissions of Annex-I countries are
roughly four times higher than the per capita emissions of Non-Annex-I countries.
6See UNFCCC (2005).
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2.1c Permits for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol
The following section provides a survey on the different types of permits that are func-
tional for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.
Annex-I countries are obliged to establish a national registry recording the number of per-
mits that a country holds. The UNFCCC Secretariat aggregates the data of the different
national registries. The central registry for permits is called International Transaction
Log (ITL).
The most important permit type is AAU (Assigned Amount Unit): The emissions in the
baseline year 1990 determine the Assigned Amount, i.e. the total number of emission
allowances that an Annex-I country receives for the compliance period (2008-2012). The
Assigned Amount is equal to the emissions in the baseline year 1990 multiplied by a re-
duction factor and by five, the length of the compliance period in years. The reduction
factor is equal to one minus the reduction target in per cent (e.g. the reduction factor for
the aggregate Annex-I emissions is 100%− 5.2% = 94.8% = 0.948 ). One AAU (Assigned
Amount Unit) gives the holder the right to emit one ton of CO2-e during the compliance
period. At the end of the compliance period an Annex-I country has to hand in one
AAU per unit of emission (one ton of CO2-e ) to the regulator. Alternatively, an Annex-I
country can also use permits from the flexible mechanisms up to a certain amount. If an
Annex-I country fails to hand in a sufficient number of valid permits it faces a penalty
for each unit of emission that is not covered by a permit.
The total number of AAU is fixed and cannot be altered. But the Emissions Trading
mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol allows Annex-I countries to trade AAU among each
other and thereby change the distribution of the AAU between the different national
registries. Emissions trading of AAUs is subject to restrictions. Annex-I countries have
to hold the so-called commitment period reserve (CPR) in their national registry. AAU
can only be sold to other countries if after the transaction the selling nation still holds
more AAUs in its national registry than the Commitment Period Reserve (CPR). For
most developed countries the Commitment Period Reserve (CPR) is given by
CPR = 90 % of Assigned Amount.
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The traded AAU might result from
1. Emission reduction efforts on a national level
A country successful in reducing emissions below its Assigned Amount can consider
selling parts of its AAU to other Annex-I countries. Conversely, an Annex-I country
might realize that it is unable to achieve its reduction target solely by national
measures. In such a case it might decide to buy AAU from other Annex-I countries.
2. Initial overallocation
A country that was generously awarded permits (i.e. countries that have negotiated
a favourable baseline) might sell those permits to other countries even though the
permits simply originate from overallocation in this case. Especially, countries of
the former Soviet bloc (EIT countries) have profited from the choice of the base-
line year 1990. Economies of the EIT countries collapsed around 1990 and as a
result of this collapse emissions dropped significantly and have not rebounded since
then. Therefore, the Emissions Trading mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol has been
criticized for creating “Hot Air” in the EIT countries.
Like the Emissions Trading mechanism, the JI mechanism (Joint Implementation) and
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) do not alter the total number of AAU. But the
JI mechanism and the CDM increase the total number of permits that are functional for
compliance. Trading of permits from JI or CDM projects is also allowed. Those permits
always result from an emission reduction project:
1. JI (Joint Implemenation)
Emission reductions achieved by JI projects yield permits called ERU (Emission
Reduction Unit). A JI project is an emission reduction project in an Annex-I
country.
2. CDM (Clean Development Mechanism)
Emission reductions achieved by CDM projects yield permits called CER (Certifi-
cates of emission reduction). A CDM project is an emission reduction project in a
Non-Annex-I country, i.e. mainly in developing countries.
Furthermore, the number of permits in the national registry can be changed by LULUCF
activities such as afforestation, reforestation and deforestation. LULUCF activities yield
so-called Removal Units (RMU). Depending on the region where the LULUCF project is
carried out the removal unit is referred to by a different name:
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1. Domestic LULUCF projects in Annex-I countries yield RMU
2. LULUCF projects mainly in EIT countries yield ERU-RMU.
3. LULUCF activities in Non-Annex-I countries yield
• tCER (temporary CER) or
• lCER (long-term CER).
The difference between tCER and lCER is due to the different project length and
the way in which removals are accounted for. Annex-I countries are only allowed to
use a limited number of tCER and lCER for compliance (up to 1% of their Assigned
Amount).
Therefore, the number of permits in the national registry that are functional for compli-
ance can be calculated as:
Number of permits in the national registry that are functional for compliance
= Assigned Amount
± AAU bought from/sold to other Annex-I countries
± ERU from JI projects carried out between 2008 and 2012
+ CER from CDM projects carried out between 2001 and 2012
± RMU, ERU-RMU, tCER and lCER from LULUCF activities
The above formula allows us to determine whether an Annex-I country complies with its
emission limits under the Kyoto Protocol. We have to compare the number of permits held
in the national registry at the end of the compliance period with the emissions between
2008 and 2012. A country has achieved its reduction target if and only if
Number of permits in the national registry
on 31 March 2015
≥ National Annex A emissions
between 2008 and 2012.
Due to the relatively complex reporting process the compliance date (31 March 2015) is
more than two years after the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol
(2008 – 2012).
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Regulations of the following two cases are of special interest:
1. Non-compliance
The Annex-I country has not enough permits in the national registry
2. Over-compliance
The Annex-I country has more permits in the national registry than it needs for
compliance
In case of non-compliance, the Annex-I country faces a penalty. A non-compliant country
has to reduce emissions in the next compliance period by the additional amount of
1.3 ·max(Annex A emissions between 2008 and 2012 - Permits in the national registry; 0)
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. This means that the Annex-I country is not released
from the obligation to hand in the lacking permit in the second compliance period (after
2012). On the contrary, it has to hand in 0.3 additional permits in the course of the
second compliance period. However, the penalty will only affect non-compliant countries
if there is a second compliance period. As political leaders failed to negotiate a Post-Kyoto
Protocol so far, it is uncertain at the moment whether there will be a second compliance
period.
In case of over-compliance, the Kyoto Protocol regulates the bankability of permits from
the current Kyoto Protocol compliance period (2008-2012) to the next compliance period
(after 2012). This means that an Annex-I country is allowed to transfer surplus permits
of the current compliance period into the following compliance period. Table 2.4 provides
an overview of the permits that are functional for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol
and of the rules regarding the bankability of the permits.
The signatories to the Kyoto Protocol implicitly assumed that there will be a Post-Kyoto
Protocol with a second compliance period. The existence of a second compliance period
is crucial because otherwise there will be no penalty and Annex-I countries that reduced
emissions will not be able to profit from the possibility of banking permits. Twelve years
after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol optimistists expected that the Copenhagen
Conference in December 2009 would finally yield an agreement on the second compliance
period. However, the Copenhagen Conference ended without a binding result.
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Name of
permit
Reduction project Bankability of
permits
AAU Reduction of Annex A emissions7 Yes
in an Annex-I country
ERU Reduction of Annex A emissions Yes, but limited
in another Annex-I country
CER Reduction of Annex A emissions Yes, but limited
in a Non-Annex-I country
RMU and ERU-RMU LULUCF activity No
in an Annex-I country
lCER and tCER LULUCF activity No
in a Non-Annex-I country
Table 2.4: Overview of banking regulations for permits that are eligible for compliance
with the Kyoto Protocol.
2.1d Post-Kyoto Protocol
The negotiations during the Conference in Copenhagen (also known as COP-15) in De-
cember 2009 mainly focused on the following issues
• Target of limiting global warming to 2 ◦C compared to pre-industrial levels
• Reduction commitments of developed countries
• Commitment of emerging economies such as China and India to cut their emission
intensity8
• Monitoring of the GHG emissions in developing countries and emerging economies
by an international agency
• Financial assistance for developing countries in adapting to climate change
Participants of the Copenhagen Conference did not manage to reach a binding agreement
on any of the above items. A minor success of the Copenhagen Conference is that a
group of countries including China, India and Brazil recognize the need for limiting global
7The definition of Annex A emissions can be found in Section 2.1b.
8Emission intensity is defined as GHG emissions per unit of GDP (Gross Domestic Product).
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warming to 2 ◦C . However, this accord has a very weak legal status as pointed out by
China’s chief negotiator: “This is not an agreed accord, it is not an agreed document, it
is not formally endorsed or adopted”9.
According to the analysis of U.S. Energy Information Administration (2009), China and
the US are responsible for about 40% of today’s global GHG emissions (both China and
the US account for roughly 20%). The European Union is the third largest emitter with
a share of approximately 15%. During the Copenhagen Conference the three largest
emitters announced the targets listed in Table 2.5.
Emitter Reduction of Baseline year Reduction target
EU Emissions in 2020 1990 20%
US Emissions in 2020 2005 17%
China Emission intensity in 2020 2005 40-45%
Table 2.5: Reduction commitments of the three largest GHG emitters (announced in
December 2009). Source: Harvey (2009).
The European Union is the only emitter with an ambitious reduction target10. The EU
announced a target that reduces emissions both below the reduction target of the Kyoto
Protocol (-8% compared to the baseline year 1990) and below current emission levels. The
United States intend to reduce emissions below the current emission level. However, the
reduction target announced during the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009 is less
ambitious than the reduction target of the Kyoto Protocol (-7% compared to the baseline
year 1990) to which the US committed themselves in 1997. As the development of the
GDP has to be taken into account, China’s final reduction target might differ.
9 See Harvey et al. (2009).
10This follows from the emissions data and the estimates of Crooks and Romei (2009), Global Car-
bon Project (2008), Harvey (2009), Pew Center on Global Climate Change (2009), UNFCCC (2008),
UNFCCC (2009), U.S. Energy Information Administration (2009).
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2.2 EU ETS (EU Emissions Trading Scheme)
2.2a Introduction
With the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol the European Union committed themselves to
an ambitious reduction target. In 2005 the EU launched the first international CO2 emis-
sions trading system (in the following denoted by EU ETS) in order to achieve its reduction
target. The EU ETS covers more than 10,000 large installations in the energy sector and
in several industrial sectors which emit approximately half of the CO2 emissions of the
European Union. Covering roughly 40 per cent of all GHG emissions in the EU, the
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has become the cornerstone of environmental
politics in Europe. Since 2008 the EU ETS has covered all EU-27 countries11 plus Norway
and Liechtenstein.
The main difference between the EU ETS and the Emissions Trading mechanism of the
Kyoto Protocol is that trading takes place between companies and not between countries.
Furthermore, in contrast to the Emissions Trading mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, the
EU ETS is a very liquid market. Therefore, the majority of the academic papers focus
on the price dynamics of the EU ETS.
The EU ETS comprises several compliance periods:
• Phase I (2005-2007)
• Phase II (2008-2012)
It is important to note that the second phase of the EU ETS coincides with the first
compliance period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012).
• Phase III (2013-2020)
At the beginning of each phase the regulator hands out permits to the regulated compa-
nies. The number of permits for each installation is defined in the National Allocation
Plan (NAP) approved by the European Commission (EC). Permits of the EU ETS are
referred to by EUA (European Union Allowances). The owner of an EUA is allowed to
emit one ton of CO2-e .
The main method of allocation during both Phase I and Phase II has been grandfather-
ing which means that allowances are allocated free of charge. Furthermore, the number
11We refer to Section 2.3a for a list of all EU-27 countries.
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of allowances that the regulator allocates to the regulated companies is related to their
historical emissions. Member states of the European Union are only allowed to auction
up to 5% of all permits during Phase I and up to than 10% during Phase II.
Similar to the Emissions Trading mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, regulated companies
have to hand in one permit per emitted unit of carbon dioxide. In case of non-compliance
a company has to pay a penalty for every unit of emission that is not covered by an
emission permit. Moreover, the payment of the penalty does not release the regulated
company from the obligation to hand in the lacking permits. The penalty is 40 Euro per
ton of CO2-e during the first phase and 100 Euro per ton of CO2-e during the second
phase of the EU ETS12.
The legal framework for Phase I and II of the EU ETS is based on Directive 2003/87/EC.
The directive has been transformed into German law by the adoption of the “Treibhaus-
Emissionshandelsgesetz (TEHG)” on 8 July 2004 and the “Gesetz u¨ber den Nationalen
Zuteilungsplan fu¨r Treibhausgas-Emissionsberechtigungen in der Zuteilungsperiode 2005
bis 2007 – Zuteilungsgesetz 2007 (ZuG 2007)” on 26 August 2004. The German Bun-
destag adopted the German National Allocation Plan for Phase II by enacting the law
“Gesetz u¨ber den Nationalen Zuteilungsplan fu¨r Treibhausgas-Emissionsberechtigungen
in der Zuteilungsperiode 2008 bis 2012 – Zuteilungsgesetz 2012 (ZuG 2012)” on 7 August
2007.
Figure 2.2 and Table 2.6 provide a first insight into the structure of the European permit
market. Figure 2.2 shows that the EU ETS is mainly dominated by the combustion
sector and the three following industries: cement, iron and steel and refineries. The rest
of 5% consists of the following industries: paper (1.8%), coke ovens (1.1%), glass (1.1%),
ceramics (0.9%) and metal ore (0.4%). It is remarkable that installations with annual
emissions of more than 1 m tons CO2-e are responsible for roughly two thirds of the
overall emissions in the EU ETS whereas the aggregate emissions of small installations
(with emissions of less than 0.01 m tons CO2-e ) are negligible. Their share in total EU
ETS emissions amounts to less than 8% (cf. Table 2.6).
12A detailed description of the compliance regulations is to be found in Section 2.2c.
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Figure 2.2: Allowance allocation to different EU ETS sectors in the year 2006.
Source: Analysis of CITL data by Trotignon and Delbosc (2008).
2.2b Baseline
The following paragraph contains a more detailed survey on the procedure of setting the
emission cap for a compliance period. Member states of the European Union have to
compile a National Allocation Plan (NAP) for each compliance period consisting of a
macro plan and a micro plan. The NAP for the second phase of the EU ETS (2008-2012)
was due in summer 2006 and was approved by the EC at the end of 2006. The macro
plan defines a maximum amount of national emissions during the compliance period. This
Size of installation Share in total emissions
(emissions in 1,000 tons of CO2-e)
Less than 10 1%
10 – 100 7%
100 – 500 12%
500 – 1,000 12%
More than 1,000 68%
Table 2.6: Breakdown of EU ETS emissions according to the size of the installations
Source: Analysis of CITL data by Trotignon and Delbosc (2008).
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amount must be in line with the emission reduction obligation under the Kyoto Protocol
(Burden Sharing Agreement). Finally, the macro plan defines how the total emission
budget is distributed between installations covered by the EU ETS (cf. Figure 2.2 and
Table 2.6) and between the remaining emitters. The splitting up of the emission budget
is performed in four steps (cf. Figure 2.3):
1. Size of the total emission budget
is obtained by analyzing historical GHG emissions (nationwide data).
2. Size of CO2 emissions budget
The total emission budget is split up into CO2 emissions and non- CO2 emissions.
The EU ETS almost exclusively covers CO2 emissions. During the first phase (2005-
2007) the EU ETS only covered CO2 emissions. In Phase II (2008-2012), however,
some other greenhouse gases have been included, e.g. nitrous oxide emissions from
Dutch and Norwegian installations that produce nitric acid.
3. Size of CO2 emissions budget for the energy sector and the industry
According to a detailed analysis CO2 emissions are distributed among private house-
holds, traffic and the energy sector and the industry.
4. Cap in the EU ETS
The plan defines how much of the CO2 emissions budget of the energy sector and
of the industry is allocated to installations covered by the EU ETS. We refer to this
by German cap in the EU ETS.
The micro plan breaks the cap of the macro plan down to the level of installations and
specifies how many allowances are allocated to each installation.
The EC corrected the German emission cap in the EU ETS from 482 m tons CO2-e to
453 m tons CO2-e . This corresponds to a reduction of roughly 6 per cent. Germany was
not the only country whose NAP was modified by the EC. The analysis of Point Carbon
(2008) shows that the revised NAPs for Phase II allocate roughly 2,100 m tons CO2-e to
all installations covered by the EU ETS. In total these are 10.4 per cent fewer permits
than foreseen in the NAPs submitted to the EC. This means that the emission cap of
the revised NAPs is approximately 9% below the “business as usual” (BAU) scenario. In
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Figure 2.3: Breakdown of the German emission budget (in m tons CO2-e) according to
the macro plan in the NAP 2008-2012.
Source: Bundesministerium fu¨r Umwelt (2006).
other words, the NAPs submitted to the EC would have allowed regulated companies on
average even 1-2% more emissions than in the “business as usual” (BAU) scenario.
Annex II of Directive 2003/87/EC lists twelve criteria an NAP has to fulfil. It is upon the
EC to check the NAPs for validity and the EC has the right to modify the NAP if some
of the criteria are violated. Poland sued the EC for rejecting its NAP without providing
an explanation consistent with Annex II of Directive 2003/84/EC. The EC demanded a
reduction of Poland’s allowances by more than 25 per cent13. On 23 September 2009 the
Court of First Instance annulled the decision of the EU. This event immediately drove
the permit price four per cent lower because the overall cap of the EU ETS was expected
to be loosened. If Poland will finally succeed in being allocated a relatively large share of
permits to its installations covered by the EU ETS, the confidence in the EU ETS might
be reduced. Point Carbon, however, assesses the probability of significantly lower permit
prices in the wake of an approved Polish NAP to be low. They argue that the bankability
of permits between Phase II and Phase III together with a presumed permit shortage in
Phase III will prevent prices from falling too low14. The issue with the Polish NAP shows,
however, that emission trading systems are surrounded by regulatory uncertainty - even
in the course of a compliance period the number of allowances in the system could be
adjusted.
13See European Union (2007).
14See Morrison (2009).
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2.2c European Union Allowance (EUA)
In the following we provide a detailed survey on the main characteristics of European
Union Allowances (EUA). Taking into account that a permit is always related to a certain
compliance period we denote an EUA of the first phase by EUA1. Similarly, an EUA of the
second and of the third compliance period are denoted by EUA2 and EUA3, respectively.
National registries document changes in the number of allowances held by the installations.
On a European level data is aggregated by the Community Independent Transaction Log
(CITL).
EU ETS installations have an annual compliance obligation. Permits must be handed
in to the regulator by 30 April of the following year (e.g. the date for 2009 compliance
is 30 April 2010). In case of non-compliance a company has to pay a penalty for every
unit of emission that is not covered by an emission permit. Moreover, the payment of the
penalty does not release the regulated company from the obligation to hand in the lacking
permits in the following calendar year. The penalty is 40 Euro per ton of CO2-e during
the first phase and 100 Euro per ton of CO2-e during the second phase of the EU ETS.
Due to the permission of intra-phase banking and intra-phase borrowing it is unlikely that
a company will not be able to comply in a year prior to the final year of the compliance
period. In other words, the EU ETS is very similar to a system where there is a compliance
obligation only at the end of a compliance period.
Intra-phase banking means that a company can use certificates that it did not use up in
the year before for compliance in the following year. This might be the case if a company
emitted less CO2 than it was allowed to.
Conversely, a company that emitted more CO2 than it was allowed to might use emission
permits of the following year for compliance purposes in the current year. This process is
called intra-phase borrowing.
The design of the EU ETS strictly forbids inter-phase borrowing. Inter-phase banking
was not allowed from Phase I (2005-2007) to Phase II (2008-2012) but this regulation has
been changed and now inter-phase banking is allowed from Phase II (2008-2012) to Phase
III (2013-2020).
Inter-phase borrowing means that companies are allowed to use EUA of the following
phase for compliance in the current phase. The reason why inter-phase borrowing is not
allowed is that it would significantly reduce the incentives for emission reductions and
therefore put the environmental targets of the regulator at risk.
Inter-phase banking occurs when a company transfers permits from a previous compliance
period into the current compliance period. The permission of inter-phase banking does
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not put environmental targets at risk.
In case that there should be an over-allocation of permits in one phase, however, the
inter-phase banking would also effect the following periods. Over-allocation describes a
situation in which the regulator hands out more permits to the regulated companies than
they need. This might happen when an emission trading system is introduced (regulator
might not be able to estimate the baseline correctly or regulator does not want to scare
regulated companies and therefore allocates permits generously) or also during periods of
recession (when decision on NAPs for the coming period is taken during a recession and
regulator does not want to put further pressure on the industry). Table 2.7 summarizes
the main characteristics of Phase I (2005-2007) and Phase II (2008-2012) of the EU ETS.
Phase Name of Penalty Intra-phase Inter-phase Inter-phase
permit banking and banking borrowing
borrowing
Phase I EUA1 40 EUR Yes No No
(2005-2007)
Phase II EUA2 100 EUR Yes Yes No
(2008-2012)
Table 2.7: Survey on the first two phases of the EU ETS.
2.2d CER (Certificate of Emission Reduction) and ERU (Emis-
sion Reduction Unit)
Link between Kyoto Protocol and EU ETS
Directive 2004/101/EC (also known as linking directive) sets up the link between the
EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol. It is crucial to bear in mind that the Kyoto Protocol
establishes emission trading of AAU between different countries. Furthermore, the Kyoto
Protocol sets up the CDM and JI mechanisms which yield permits that can be traded by
countries and by private institutions.
However, the EU ETS focuses on emissions trading between regulated companies in the
European Union.
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In Phase I of the EU ETS regulated companies were not allowed to use CER and ERU for
compliance. This has changed in Phase II of the EU ETS. The only exception concerns
CER and ERU from LULUCF activities. tCER, lCER and ERU-RMU are not eligible for
compliance with the EU ETS. Table 2.8 provides an overview of the eligibility of permits
for compliance with both the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS.
Name of
permit
Eligible for compliance
with Kyoto Protocol
Eligible for compliance
with EU ETS
EUA No Yes
AAU Yes No
CER Yes Yes15
ERU Yes Yes15
RMU Yes No
tCER, lCER Yes No
ERU-RMU Yes No
Table 2.8: Survey on the eligibility of different permits for compliance with the Kyoto
Protocol and the EU ETS.
Detailed rules on the use of CER/ERU for compliance in the EU ETS
As in the case of EUA one has to distinguish between the different compliance periods16.
Therefore, the following notation is introduced: KP-1 CER and KP-1 ERU denote permits
that are functional for compliance in the first Kyoto Protocol compliance period, i.e. in the
second EU ETS compliance period. KP-2 CER and KP-2 ERU can be used for compliance
in the second Kyoto Protocol compliance period, i.e. the third EU ETS compliance
period. Due to possible delays in the verification process of emission reductions a KP-2
CER/ERU might also result from an emission reduction that took place before 2013.
Table 2.9 provides an overview of the different permits from CDM and JI projects.
It is important to understand the regulations on the use of CER and ERU for compliance
purposes with the EU ETS in detail. There is a formal difference between EUA and
15No in Phase I of the EU ETS (2005-2007).
16In the case of CER and ERU we refer to a Kyoto Protocol compliance period and not to an EU ETS
compliance period. The first Kyoto Protocol compliance period and the second EU ETS compliance
period are both 2008-2012.
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Name of certificate Compliance period Year of emission reduction
KP-1 CER 2008 – 2012 Nov 2001 – Dec 2012
KP-1 ERU 2008 – 2012 Jan 2008 – Dec 2012
KP-2 CER and KP-2 ERU 2013 – 2020 Jan 2008 – Dec 2012
from pre-2013 projects
KP-2 CER and KP-2 ERU 2013 – 2020 Jan 2013 – Dec 2020
from post-2013 projects
Table 2.9: Classification of certificates from CDM and JI projects.
Source: Curien and Lewis (2009).
CER/ERU regarding compliance. CER/ERU are only de facto compliance instruments
in Phase II of the EU ETS. CER/ERU, however, are not de iure compliance instruments.
This has to do with the specific procedure. When a CER/ERU is handed in for compliance
purposes the relevant member state immediately issues an EUA against this CER/ERU,
with the EUA then being subsequently cancelled. Thus the EUA effectively never comes
into circulation. Those subtle differences and the bankability regulations for EUA and
CER/ERU are summarized in Table 2.10.
Eligibility of permits for compliance in
Name of certificate Phase II of EU ETS Phase III of EU ETS
(2008-2012) (2013-2020)
EUA1 No (banking forbidden) No (banking forbidden)
EUA2 Yes - de iure Yes - de facto
KP-1 CER/ERU Yes - de facto Yes - de facto
EUA3 No (borrowing forbidden) Yes - de iure
KP-2 CER/ERU from No (borrowing forbidden) Yes - de facto
pre-2013 projects
KP-2 CER/ERU from No (borrowing forbidden) Yes - de facto but only if
post-2013 projects project is registered in a
Least Developed Country (LDC)
Table 2.10: Eligibility of different permits for compliance with the EU ETS in Phase II
and III. Source: Curien and Lewis (2009).
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There are restrictions on the use of CER/ERU for compliance purposes in the EU ETS.
The exact rules have been updated several times. The limits defined in the “Rulings of
the European Commission on Phase-2 NAPs of the member states” were tightened in the
ETS review process in January 2008 and finally relaxed again in December 2008 (cf. Table
2.11). EU ETS installations used 82 m tons CO2-e of CER and ERU
17 for compliance in
2008 which corresponds to a share of approximately 4% in the total number of permits
handed in for compliance. This amount is below the limit (cf. Table 2.11). This follows
immediately from
1638 m tons CO2-e/Length of Phase II and III = 1638 m tons CO2-e/13 years
= 126 m tons CO2-e per year
> 82 m tons CO2-e per year.
Name of the decision
defining the limit
Maximum amount of
CER/ERU (in m tons CO2-e )
eligible for compliance
Rulings of the European Commission on
Phase-2 NAPs of the member states
1390 for Phase II18
ETS review process of the European Com-
mission in January 2008
1390 for Phase II and III together
Revised ETS Directive agreed on at the EU
Heads of Government Summit in December
2008
1638–1885 for Phase II and III
together19
Table 2.11: Restrictions on the use of CER/ERU for compliance purposes in the EU ETS.
17See European Union (2009). The importance of ERUs is negligible - allowances for 0.04 m tons CO2-e
were handed in for compliance in 2008.
18This limit corresponds to 13.3% of the aggregate Phase-2 EUA allocation. However, the limit varies
from country to country ranging from 0% (Estonia) to 22% (Germany).
19Estimation of Curien and Lewis (2009) - the precise amounts will be decided under the ongoing Comi-
tology process.
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2.2e Verified emissions
Annex IV of Directive 2003/87/EC specifies the principles for monitoring and reporting
emissions. Regulated companies are either obliged to
• measure emissions of their installations or
• calculate emissions using activity data (fuel used, production rate, etc.), emission
factors and oxidation factors.
Data must be verified by an independent auditor and then be sent to the regulator. The
regulator checks and aggregates the data. Verified emissions are published by the EC in
May or June of the following year (cf. Table 2.12).
Press release Date Verified emissions of
IP/06/612 15 May 2006 2005
IP/07/776 7 June 2007 2005, 2006
IP/08/787 23 May 2008 2005, 2006, 2007
IP/09/794 15 May 2009 2008
Table 2.12: Press releases on verified EU ETS emissions.
Source: European Union (2006, 2007, 2008a, 2009).
Table 2.18 and 2.19 show that it was impossible to determine verified emissions for all
installations in 2005. The Czech Republic, France, the Slovak Republic and Spain were
reporting technical problems with their national registries. Moreover, data for Cyprus,
Luxembourg, Malta and Poland was completely missing. Reporting has been improved
since then. However, there are still updates on past verified emission data.
In addition to possible updates, one has to bear in mind that the number of covered
installations changes over time and therefore, data has to be interpreted carefully. There-
fore, one cannot use the numbers in Table 2.18 and 2.19 for assessing whether EU ETS
installations reduced their emissions.
Using verified emissions in 2005 as a baseline and adjusting for changes in the number of
installations covered by the EU ETS, the European Union comes to the conclusion that
emissions slightly increased by 0.7% during the first compliance period (2005-2007). The
number of installations in Phase II significantly differs from the number of installations
in Phase I. Therefore, it is not possible to assess the change in emissions from 2007 to
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2008. As long as there are significant changes in the baseline (i.e. in the set of installa-
tions covered by the EU ETS) it is very difficult to find out to which degree the EU ETS
incentivized regulated companies to reduce emissions.
2.2f Historical permit prices
There is both, a spot and a futures market for EUA and CER. However, the volume of
the futures market is by far larger than that of the spot market20.
In 2008 emission allowances were traded mostly over the counter (60%) and on several
exchanges (40%). The share of the exchange traded volume steadily increased since the
launch of the EU ETS21. Exchanges for EUA and CER:
• European Climate Exchange (ECX) in London
is by far the most important exchange with a market share of 87%
• Bluenext in Paris
• NordPool in Oslo
• EEX in Leipzig
• EXAA in Vienna
Permit prices in newspapers refer to either the spot price or to a trade-weighted average of
all trades on the futures market (denoted by Emissions Index). However, the most liquid
contracts are the futures contracts. A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell an
asset at a certain future time (referred to by maturity of the futures contract) for a certain
price. With entering into a long/short EUA-Dec10 futures contract on e.g. 30 November
2009 the party agrees to buy/sell one EUA in December 2010 at the EUA-Dec10 futures
price quoted on the exchange on 30 November 2009. The EUA-Dec10 contract is said to
mature in December 2010. On 30 November 2009, the following futures contracts were
traded on the ECX: EUA-Dec09, EUA-Dec10, EUA-Dec11 and EUA-Dec12. Among
those contracts, the EUA-Dec09 contract is the one that matures next and therefore, on
30 November 2009 it is called front contract. From January to December 2010, the front
contract will be EUA-Dec10.
20See ECX (2009).
21See Point Carbon (2008) and Point Carbon (2009).
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Figure 2.4 - 2.6 show that the front contract has always the largest market share. The only
exception is the year 2007 where the EUA-Dec08 futures contract (maturing in Phase II) is
leading instead of the EUA-Dec07 futures contract (maturing in Phase I). The significance
of the front contract is much more pronounced for EUA than for CER. The market share
of the EUA front contract was 60-90% compared to 30-60% for the CER front contract.
Permit prices exhibited the following characteristics:
• The spot permit price and also the EUA-Dec07 futures price converged to zero at
the end of the first compliance period (cf. Figure 2.7).
• The relationship between the spot price and prices of futures that mature in the
current compliance period can be described by a cost-of-carry relationship as shown
by Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007). This can also be observed graphically in
Figure 2.7 - 2.9.
• The price relationship between futures that mature in different compliance periods
is much more complex (cf. Figure 2.7). The bankability of permits from the current
to the next phase heavily influences this relationship. If banking of permits is not
allowed a completely different price behavior of those two futures contracts is most
likely (cf. Figure 2.7). Even if banking of permits is allowed prices might differ
significantly at the end of the compliance period. The reason is that the price of the
futures contract maturing in the current compliance period reflects expectations of a
permit shortage in the current compliance period. This information is not included
in the price of the futures contract maturing in the next compliance period.
• Permit prices are very volatile and exhibit a jumpy behaviour.
Futures contracts for CER were launched on the ECX in 2008. Some authors denote
this type of contract primary CER (pCER) in order to distinguish it from a so-called
secondary CER (sCER). pCER are mainly traded on an exchange and do not involve a
counter-party risk, i.e. the delivery of the emission allowance is ensured. sCER are mainly
traded over the counter and contain a counter-party risk. Therefore, sCER are cheaper
than pCER. In the following we focus on pCER and refer to them simply by CER.
The CER price is following the EUA price and CERs are always cheaper than EUAs (cf.
Figure 2.10 - 2.11). Possible explanations are that the costs for reducing emissions in
developing countries (yielding CER) are much lower than the abatement costs in Europe
(yielding EUA). Furthermore, one could argue that the EU ETS has a clear enforcement
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structure whereas developing countries have not committed themselves to any emission
reduction. Without the existence of emission trading systems such as the EU ETS permits
such as CERs are almost worthless. As the EU ETS dominates the global carbon market
most of the CER are used for compliance in the EU ETS and therefore the EUA price
should be an upper bound for the CER price.
2.2g Outlook on Phase III (2013-2020)
The third EU ETS phase is planned between 2013 and 2020. Directive 2009/29/EC of 23
April 2009 is the legal basis for the third phase. Its contents22 have been agreed on by EU
leaders and the European Parliament in December 2008. With the adoption of Directive
2009/29/EC the European Union commits itself to reduce its GHG emissions by 20%.
compared to the 1990 emission level. This aim should be achieved by 2020. In case there
should be a Post-Kyoto Protocol, the EU intends to reduce GHG emissions even by 30%.
In addition to the overall target, the EU also specified targets for the industries covered
by the EU ETS. These industries have to reduce their emissions by 21% compared to the
verified emissions of the year 2005. This corresponds to an additional reduction of 12%
compared to the level of 2012.
There are several changes in the regulations compared to those of Phase II:
First, in addition to the industries that are already covered by the EU ETS, the following
sectors will be included from Phase III on:
• Aviation, petrochemicals, ammonia, aluminium
• Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
Directive 2009/29/EC reserves 300 million allowances for twelve commercial scale
demonstrations of Carbon Capture and Storage, thus co-funding those CCS projects.
Moreover, there are changes in the regulations concerning the covered greenhouse gases
and the size of the regulated installations:
• Inclusion of N2O and perfluorocarbons emissions (mainly from the ammonia and
aluminium sector).
22We refer to European Union (2008b) and to the summary of the Department of Energy & Climate
Change in the UK (2008) for a comprehensive overview.
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• Exclusion of smaller installations.
An installation that emits less than 25,000 t of CO2-e per year or a combustion
installation with a capacity of less than 35 MW is defined as small.
Because of the changes described above, the baseline for Phase II and III cannot be
compared to each other directly. Especially, absolute figures on the amount of allowances
have to be treated carefully as one has to know about the set of sectors to which they
refer.
Second, an allocation plan on a European scale will replace National Allocation Plans.
This will reduce the regulatory uncertainty (cf. Section 2.2b).
Third, there will be a substantial increase in the amount of allowances that are auctioned.
In 2020 the minimum share of auctioned permits will be 60% compared to 3% in Phase II.
However, the rules of auctioning are not the same for the energy sector and the industrial
sectors. The energy sector straight through the European Union, with the exception of
some new member states, will have to cope with an auction level of 100%. The minimum
rate for the energy sector in the new member states will rise from 20% in 2013 to 70% in
2020.
Within the industrial sector the EC categorizes installations with respect to their risk of
carbon leakage. Carbon leakage describes the probable effect that industries emitting a
lot of carbon-dioxide and unable to reduce their emissions significantly will face huge costs
(being forced to buy permits from the other installations) and therefore might probably
transfer their production to countries without a GHG reduction obligation. 90% of all
industrial installations are categorized as having a “high risk of carbon leakage”. Indus-
tries without a high risk of carbon leakage will have auction levels between 20% (2013)
and 70% (2020).
Fourth, the regulator tightened the limits on the use of CER and ERU for compliance
purposes in Phase III. The maximum amount of permits originating from outside the EU
is equal to 50% of the required emission reductions in the EU.
Fifth, in case that permit prices are rising too high, the regulator will auction parts of
its New Entrants Reserve. The intention of the so-called allowance reserve mechanism is
to reduce permit prices - at least for a while. The upper price barrier that triggers the
regulator’s market intervention varies over time and is defined as the average permit price
of the preceding two years multiplied by three.
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To conclude, the designs of Phase II and Phase III of the EU ETS differ significantly and
the exact regulations for Phase III are still subject to changes until 2013. Phase III will
begin in 2013.
It is important to note that Phase III will be implemented even without the adoption of a
Post-Kyoto Protocol. However, the permit price drop of -10% on the day after the end of
the Copenhagen Conference highlights the fact that uncertainty about the future of the
Kyoto Protocol also affects the EU ETS. This can be explained as follows: The EU ETS
is the main instrument of the European Union to achieve its emission reduction target of
the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, uncertainty about future reduction targets of other large
emitters might decrease the willingness of the European Union to keep its own ambitious
reduction targets.
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2.3 Tables and graphs
2.3a Signatories of the Kyoto Protocol
• Annex-I countries include the industrialized countries that were members of the
OECD in 1992, plus the EIT countries. In other words the list of Annex II countries
plus the list of EIT countries is identical with the list of Annex-I countries. Annex-I
countries have emission-reduction targets. These targets are listed in Annex B to
the Kyoto Protocol.
• EIT countries (Economies In Transition) are 10 nations in mainly Eastern
Europe. An EIT country is also in the list of Annex-I countries.
• Annex-II countries are those Annex-I countries that were members of the OECD
in 1992.
• Non-Annex I countries are countries that are not in the Annex I list. Therefore,
those countries have no emission-reduction targets.
• LDC countries are considered by the United Nations as the least developed coun-
tries. Most of the LDC countries are located in Africa or Asia.
List of Annex-I countries
Australia Finland Lithuania Slovenia
Austria France Luxembourg Spain
Belarus Germany Monaco Sweden
Belgium Greece Netherlands Switzerland
Bulgaria Hungary New Zealand Turkey
Canada Iceland Norway Ukraine
Croatia Ireland Poland UK
Czech Republic Italy Portugal USA
Denmark Japan Romania
Estonia Latvia Russian Federation
European Commu-
nity
Liechtenstein Slovakia
Table 2.13: List of Annex-I countries. Source: UNFCCC.
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List of EIT countries
Belarus Estonia Romania Ukraine
Bulgaria Latvia Russian Federation
Croatia Lithuania Slovenia
Table 2.14: List of EIT countries. Source: OECD.
List of EU-15 countries
Austria France Italy Spain
Belgium Germany Luxembourg Sweden
Denmark Greece Netherlands UK
Finland Ireland Portugal
Table 2.15: List of EU-15 countries. Source: European Union.
List of EU-27 countries
Austria Finland Latvia Romania
Belgium France Lithuania Slovakia
Bulgaria Germany Luxembourg Slovenia
Cyprus Greece Malta Spain
Czech Republic Hungary Netherlands Sweden
Denmark Ireland Poland UK
Estonia Italy Portugal
Table 2.16: List of EU-27 countries. Source: European Union.
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List of LDC countries
Africa
Angola Eritrea Mauritania Uganda
Benin Ethiopia Mozambique United Republic of
Tanzania
Burkina Faso Gambia Niger Zambia
Burundi Guinea Rwanda
Central African
Republic
Guinea-Bissau Sa˜o Tome´ and
Principe
Chad Lesotho Senegal
Comoros Liberia Sierra Leone
Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo
Madagascar Somalia
Djibouti Malawi Sudan
Equatorial Guinea Mali Togo
Asia
Afghanistan Kiribati Nepal Tuvalu
Bangladesh Laos Samoa Vanuatu
Bhutan Maldives Solomon Islands Yemen
Cambodia Myanmar Timor-Leste
Latin America and the Caribbean
Haiti
Table 2.17: List of LDC countries. Source: UN-OHRLLS.
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2.3b Detailed analysis of EU ETS emissions data
Emissions 2005 2006 2007 2008
Press Release 06 07 08 07 08 08 09 09
Austria 33 33 33 32 32 32 32 32
Belgium 55 55 55 55 55 53 53 55
Cyprus - 5 5 5 5 5 5 6
Czech Republic 82 82 82 84 84 88 88 80
Denmark 26 26 26 34 34 29 29 27
Estonia 13 13 13 12 12 15 15 14
Finland 33 33 33 45 45 43 43 36
France 131 131 131 123 127 127 127 123
Germany 474 475 475 478 478 487 487 473
Greece 71 71 71 70 70 73 73 70
Hungary 26 26 26 26 26 27 27 27
Ireland 22 22 22 22 22 21 21 20
Italy 215 226 226 227 227 226 226 221
Latvia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Lithuania 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6
Luxembourg - 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
Malta - - - - - - 2 2
Netherlands 80 80 80 77 77 80 80 84
Poland - 202 203 209 210 210 210 204
Portugal 36 36 36 33 33 31 31 30
Romania - - - - - - 70 64
Slovak Republic 25 25 25 26 26 25 25 25
Slovenia 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Spain 181 184 184 179 180 186 187 163
Sweden 19 19 19 20 20 15 19 20
UK 242 242 243 251 251 257 257 265
Σ 1,785 2,011 2,012 2,027 2,034 2,050 2,126 2,060
Bulgaria - - - - - - - 38
Liechtenstein - - - - - - - -
Norway - - - - - - - 19
Table 2.18: Verified EU ETS emissions in m tons CO2-e according to the different press
releases. Source: European Union (2006, 2007, 2008a, 2009).
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Emissions 2005 2006 2007 2008
Press Release 06 07 08 07 08 08 09 09
Austria 199 199 199 197 197 210 210 216
Belgium 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 302
Cyprus 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Czech Republic 389 395 395 405 405 406 406 401
Denmark 380 380 380 388 388 383 383 378
Estonia 43 43 43 47 47 47 47 50
Finland 578 578 578 589 589 607 607 600
France 1,075 1,084 1,084 1,089 1,089 1,094 1,094 1,016
Germany 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,851 1,851 1,915 1,915 1,668
Greece 141 140 140 152 152 153 153 139
Hungary 229 229 229 239 239 245 245 237
Ireland 109 109 109 114 114 113 113 105
Italy 943 943 943 996 996 1,009 1,009 1,048
Latvia 92 93 93 101 101 93 93 86
Lithuania 93 93 93 99 99 101 101 111
Luxembourg 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Malta 2 2
Netherlands 209 210 210 211 211 213 213 375
Poland 817 817 817 817 869 869 858
Portugal 243 243 243 254 254 260 260 213
Romania 244 252
Slovak Republic 175 175 175 173 173 169 169 179
Slovenia 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 91
Spain 800 800 800 944 944 1,052 1,052 1,039
Sweden 705 705 705 730 730 755 755 770
UK 768 769 769 774 774 1,057 1,057 952
Σ 9,420 10,282 10,282 10,605 10,605 11,186 11,432 11,116
Bulgaria 128
Liechtenstein 2
Norway 113
Table 2.19: Number of installations covered by the EU ETS according to the different
press releases. Source: European Union (2006, 2007, 2008a, 2009).
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2.3c Trading volumes and permit prices of EUA futures
Figure 2.4: Breakdown of EUA futures trading volume by maturity of futures contract in
Phase I (Monthly volume on the ECX in the period of May 2005 - December 2007).
Figure 2.5: Breakdown of EUA futures trading volume by maturity of futures contract in
Phase II (Monthly volume on the ECX in the period of January 2008 - November 2009).
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Figure 2.6: Breakdown of CER futures trading volume by maturity of futures contract in
Phase II (Monthly volume on the ECX in the period of April 2008 - November 2009).
Figure 2.7: EUA futures prices between 22 April 2005 and 31 December 2007 (Phase I)
as quoted on the ECX.
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Figure 2.8: EUA futures prices between 2 January 2008 and 30 November 2009 (Phase
II) as quoted on the ECX.
Figure 2.9: CER futures prices between 14 March 2008 and 30 November 2009 (Phase II)
as quoted on the ECX.
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Figure 2.10: EUA-Dec12 and CER-Dec12 futures prices between 14 March 2008 and 30
November 2009 (Phase II) as quoted on the ECX.
Figure 2.11: EUA-CER-spread between 14 March 2008 - 30 November 2009 (Phase II).
Analysis based on ECX price quotes.
Chapter 3
Models
This chapter provides an overview of deterministic and stochastic equilibrium models and
of reduced-form models. Furthermore, the relationship between these classes of models is
analyzed. The notation of some models, as introduced in the original papers, has been
modified in order to reduce difficulties in comparing the different models. A summary of
the variable names in the deterministic and stochastic equilibrium models is to be found
in Section 3.4.
3.1 Deterministic equilibrium models
In the deterministic equilibrium models of this section it is assumed that regulated com-
panies are optimizing their profits/costs by choosing an optimal permit trading strategy
and an optimal emission level. Regulated companies are obliged to comply during the
modelled (compliance) period. The optimization problems of this section do not explicitly
take a possible penalty payment into account.
3.1a Model of Montgomery (1972)
Introduction
Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) proposed the introduction of marketable permits. How-
ever, Montgomery (1972) was the first to set up a model for permit prices. Within his
framework it is shown that emissions trading leads to a cost-optimal solution (third de-
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sired characteristic of a policy instrument - cf. Chapter 1). This means that a central
planner that jointly minimizes the costs of all polluters cannot reduce aggregate costs of
all polluters compared to the scenario of emissions trading.
The proof of cost-optimality in the model of Montgomery (1972) requires relatively little
knowledge on Operational Research. Proving cost-optimality in the more sophisticated
models (cf. Section 3.1 and 3.2) is much more difficult and involves many technicalities.
However, the basic idea of those proofs is similar to the one of Montgomery (1972). Cost-
optimality of emissions trading can be shown in six steps.
1. Define the market equilibrium as the situation where regulated companies minimize
their costs resulting from emitting and trading emission allowances subject to the
condition that each company complies with its emission target. Furthermore, trad-
ing volumes must satisfy so-called market clearing conditions. Especially, a company
can only sell allowances if another company is buying them.
2. Define the joint cost minimum as the situation where a central planner minimizes
aggregate costs of all companies subject to the condition that aggregated emissions
of all companies are less or equal than the total number of emission allowances.
3. Derive the conditions under which the market equilibrium exists.
4. Derive the conditions under which a joint cost minimum exists.
5. Show that a solution of the joint cost minimization problem satisfies the conditions
of a market equilibrium.
6. Show that the regulated companies’ emissions in a market equilibrium are a solution
of the joint cost minimization problem.
In the following we present the simplified and slightly modified version of the model of
Montgomery (1972).
The original model is simplified by neglecting the spatial dimension of the pollution prob-
lem. This is possible because we are interested in regulating greenhouse gas emissions
which belong to the class of global pollutants. The pollution level of global pollutants is
not influenced by the location of the pollution activity. Only in the case of local pollutants
the location matters. The model of Montgomery (1972) is the only equilibrium model
that takes the spatial dimension of the pollution problem into account (cf. Section 3.1
and 3.2).
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Having simplified the original model, we slightly modify the resulting model such that it
is comparable to the other equilibrium models given in Section 3.1 and 3.2. The original
model assumes that the location-dependent pollution concentration results from multi-
plying the dispersion factor with the corresponding emission quantities. Reducing the
analysis to one location and assuming that the dispersion factor is the same across all
locations (this is the case for global pollutants such as CO2 ) the pollution concentration
is the product of the constant dispersion factor and the emission quantity. The constant
dispersion factor allows us to formulate the optimization problem in terms of the emission
quantity instead of the pollution concentration.
Definitions
The model of Montgomery (1972) assumes that there are n regulated companies. In
the following the superscript i refers to company i. The time horizon of the model is
finite. Especially, it is a time-discrete model with only one time step where all variables
are modelled by deterministic functions. The model does not take discounting explicitly
into account. However, as it is a one-step model this might be easily incorporated by
multiplying the objective function with a discount factor. We use the following notation:
• Qi denotes the emission quantity
• N i is the number of emission allowances
• θi is the number of permits bought from or sold to other companies. Positive and
negative values correspond to buying and selling, respectively.
• S¯ denotes the permit price
• Ci(Qi) are the costs that firm i faces when adopting the emission level Qi . It is
defined as the difference between firm i’s maximum profit when it is not obliged
to achieve an emission target and its maximum profit when firm i must adopt the
emission level Qi .
Denote the price of good r by Gr and assume that firm i produces yi = (yi,1, . . . , yi,R)
of the goods 1, . . . , R . When adopting the emission level Qi , production costs are
equal to the twice differentiable and convex function Cigood(y
i, Qi) . Given yi and
Qi , firm i’s profit from producing goods are equal to
pii(yi, Qi) = Rigood(y
i)− Cigood(yi, Qi) =
R∑
r=1
Gryi,r − Cigood(yi, Qi).
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Therefore, we can write Ci(Qi) as
Ci(Qi) = max
yi,Qi
{
pii(yi, Qi)
}−max
yi
{
pii(yi, Qi)
}
.
Montgomery (1972) has shown that Ci(Qi) is a twice differentiable, decreasing and
convex function.
Definition 3.1.1 (Market equilibrium)
Let Q¯ = (Q¯1, . . . , Q¯n) ≥ 0 , θ¯ = (θ¯1, . . . , θ¯n) and S ≥ 0 . A market equilibrium is the
(2n+1)-tuple (Q¯, θ¯, S¯) such that Q¯ and θ¯ are the solution of the following n maximiza-
tion problems:
max
Qi,θi
{−Ci(Qi)− S¯θi}
subject to N i + θi −Qi ≥ 0
which also satisfy the market clearing conditions
n∑
i=1
θ¯i ≤ 0 and S¯
n∑
i=1
θ¯i = 0.
Remark:
(a) N i + θi −Qi ≥ 0 and Qi ≥ 0 imply θi ≥ −N i .
(b) The maximization problems are equivalent to the following minimization problems:
min
Qi,θi
{
Ci(Qi) + S¯θi
}
subject to N i + θi −Qi ≥ 0.
The formulation as a maximization problem is chosen to be able to compare it to the
other models in Section 3.1 and 3.2.
Definition 3.1.2 (Joint cost minimum)
A joint cost minimum is the n-tuple Q˜ = (Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n) ≥ 0 that is the solution of the
following maximization problem:
max
Q1,...,Qn
{
−
n∑
i=1
Ci(Qi)
}
(3.1)
subject to
n∑
i=1
(
N i −Qi) ≥ 0.
Remark:
(a) The maximization problem can be formulated as the following minimization problem:
min
Q1,...,Qn
{
n∑
i=1
Ci(Qi)
}
subject to
n∑
i=1
(
N i −Qi) ≥ 0.
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Solving static optimization problems
The maximization problems of the firms and the central planner are static linear optimiza-
tion problems. This subsection provides an overview of the techniques that are necessary
to solve these maximization problems.
Definition 3.1.3 (Lagrangian)
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn and let f(x), g1(x), . . . , gm(x) be functions.
Then the Lagrangian of the following static nonlinear optimization problem
min
x1,...,xn
{f(x)} subject to gj(x) ≤ 0 for j = 1, . . . ,m
is given by
L(x, u) = f(x) +
m∑
j=1
ujgj(x).
Definition 3.1.4 (Static convex optimization with non-negative control variables)
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn′ , xn′+1, . . . , xn) . Assume that f(x), g1(x), . . . , gm(x) are convex func-
tions that are continuously differentiable. Furthermore, assume that there exists x˜ ∈ Rn
such that gj(x˜) < 0 holds for all non-linear constraints. We consider the following opti-
mization problem:
min
x1,...,xn
{f(x)}
subject to gj(x) ≤ 0 for j = 1, . . . ,m and
xi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , n′ (n′ ≤ n).
Theorem 3.1.5 (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions)
x¯ = (x¯1, . . . , x¯n) is the optimal solution of the optimization problem of Definition 3.1.4
if and only if there exists u¯ ∈ Rm such that all the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
satisfied:
For i = 1, . . . , n′
∂L
∂xi
(x¯, u¯) =
∂f
∂xi
(x¯) +
m∑
j=1
u¯j
∂gj
∂xi
(x¯) ≥ 0, (3.2)
x¯i
∂L
∂xi
(x¯, u¯) = x¯i
[
∂f
∂xi
(x¯) +
m∑
j=1
u¯j
∂gj
∂xi
(x¯)
]
= 0, (3.3)
x¯i ≥ 0, (3.4)
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and for i = n′ + 1, . . . , n
∂L
∂xi
(x¯, u¯) =
∂f
∂xi
(x¯) +
m∑
j=1
u¯j
∂gj
∂xi
(x¯) = 0, (3.5)
and for j = 1, . . . ,m
∂L
∂uj
(x¯, u¯) = gj(x¯) ≤ 0, (3.6)
u¯j
∂L
∂uj
(x¯, u¯) = u¯jgj(x¯) = 0, (3.7)
u¯j ≥ 0. (3.8)
Remark:
Depending on the book (cf. Neumann and Morlock (1993) and Hillier and Liebermann
(1986)), the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are either derived for the following mini-
mization problem with convex f and g
min
x
{f(x)} subject to g(x) ≤ 0, x ≥ 0
or for the following maximization problem with concave f˜ and g˜
max
x
{
f˜(x)
}
subject to g˜(x) ≥ 0, x ≥ 0.
Setting f = −f˜ and g = −g˜ shows that both formulations are equivalent. Therefore,
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are the same for both optimization problems.
The following two optimization problems are also equivalent - the minimization problem
with convex f and concave g
min
x
{f(x)} subject to g(x) ≥ 0, x ≥ 0
and the maximization problem with concave f and convex g
max
x
{f(x)} subject to g(x) ≤ 0, x ≥ 0.
Table 3.1 lists the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions in those four cases. Most conditions
remain the same as in Theorem 3.1.5. Only Equation (3.2) and (3.8) are varying.
Models 54
Constraint
Convex g ≤ 0 Concave g ≥ 0
maximization ∂L
∂x
≤ 0 ∂L
∂x
≥ 0
of concave f u ≤ 0 u ≥ 0
minimization ∂L
∂x
≥ 0 ∂L
∂x
≤ 0
of convex f u ≥ 0 u ≤ 0
Table 3.1: Overview of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for convex or concave target
function and constraints.
Existence of market equilibrium and joint cost minimum
Theorem 3.1.6 (Existence of market equilibrium)
A market equilibrium (Q¯, θ¯, S¯) exists if and only if there exist u¯ = (u¯1, . . . , u¯n) ≥ 0 and
S¯ ≥ 0 such that (u¯, S¯) satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the n maximization
problems
−∂C
i
∂Qi
(Q¯i)− u¯i ≥ 0, Q¯i
[
∂Ci
∂Qi
(Q¯i) + u¯i
]
= 0, Q¯i ≥ 0, (3.9)
−S¯ + u¯i = 0, (3.10)
N i + θ¯i − Q¯i ≥ 0, u¯i
[
N i + θ¯i − Q¯i] = 0, u¯i ≥ 0, (3.11)
and the market clearing conditions
n∑
i=1
θ¯i ≤ 0, S¯∑ni=1 θ¯i = 0. (3.12)
Proof :
Ci(Qi) is a twice differentiable and convex function in Qi . S¯θi and N i+θi−Qi are linear
functions. It follows that both −Ci(Qi)− S¯θi and N i + θi −Qi are twice differentiable
and concave functions. Theorem 3.1.5 completes the proof. ♦
Remark:
Theorem 3.1.6 shows that in the market equilibrium the permit price S¯ is equal to the
marginal abatement costs −∂Ci
∂Qi
(Q¯i) if firms are emitting ( Q¯i > 0 ). This follows directly
from Equation (3.9) and (3.10).
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Theorem 3.1.7 (Existence of joint cost minimum)
A joint cost minimum Q˜ exists if and only if there exists u˜ ≥ 0 satisfying the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the maximization problem given in Equation (3.1):
−∂C
i
∂Qi
(Q˜i)− u˜ ≥ 0, ∑ni=1 Q˜i [∂Ci∂Qi (Q˜i) + u˜] = 0, Q¯i ≥ 0, (3.13)
n∑
i=1
(N i − Q˜i) ≥ 0, u˜
[∑n
i=1(N
i − Q˜i)
]
= 0, u˜ ≥ 0. (3.14)
Proof :
Ci(Qi) is a twice differentiable and convex function in Qi implies that −∑ni=1Ci(Qi)
is twice differentiable and concave. Furthermore, we have a linear constraint. Therefore,
Theorem 3.1.5 completes the proof. ♦
Relationship between optimality conditions
Lemma 3.1.8
A solution of the joint cost minimization problem satisfies the conditions of a market
equilibrium.
Proof :
Using the conditions given in (3.13) and (3.14) we show that
Q¯i = Q˜i, N i + θ¯i − Q˜i = 0, u¯i = u˜ = S¯
satisfy the conditions given in (3.9) - (3.12).
Conditions (3.13) and (3.14) imply Equation (3.9):
Since ∂C
i
∂Qi
(Q˜i) + u˜ ≤ 0 and Q˜i ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n , it follows from∑n
i=1 Q˜
i
[
∂Ci
∂Qi
(Q˜i) + u˜
]
= 0 that Q˜i
[
∂Ci
∂Qi
(Q˜i) + u˜
]
= 0 holds for all i = 1, . . . , n . There-
fore Q˜i and u˜ satisfy Equation (3.9) for all i = 1, . . . , n .
Conditions (3.13) and (3.14) imply Equation (3.10):
If u¯i = u˜ = S¯ , S¯ − u¯i = 0 is satisfied for all i = 1, . . . , n by any θ¯i .
Conditions (3.13) and (3.14) imply Equation (3.11):
By Q¯i = Q˜i and N i + θ¯i − Q˜i = 0 , Equation (3.11) is satisfied for any u¯i .
Conditions (3.13) and (3.14) imply Equation (3.12):
0
(3.14)
≤
n∑
i=1
(N i − Q˜i) N i+θ¯i−Q˜i=0= −
n∑
i=1
θ¯i,
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0
(3.14)
= u˜
[
n∑
i=1
(N i − Q˜i)
]
S¯=u˜
= S¯
[
n∑
i=1
(N i − Q˜i)
]
N i+θ¯i−Q˜i=0
= −S¯
n∑
i=1
θ¯i.
♦
Lemma 3.1.9
Any emission vector that satisfies the conditions of a market equilibrium is a solution of
the joint cost miminization problem.
Proof :
Using the conditions given in (3.9) - (3.12) we show that
Q˜i = Q¯i, u˜ = S¯
satisfy the conditions given in (3.13) and (3.14).
Conditions (3.9) - (3.12) imply Equation (3.13):
By Equation (3.10), u¯i = S¯ . Therefore,
−∂C
i
∂Qi
(Q¯i)− S¯ ≥ 0, Q¯i
[
∂Ci
∂Qi
(Q¯i) + S¯
]
= 0,
which implies
∑n
i=1 Q¯
i
[
∂Ci
∂Qi
(Q¯i) + S¯
]
= 0 . Therefore, Q¯i and u˜ = S¯ satisfy Equation
(3.13).
Conditions (3.9) - (3.12) imply Equation (3.14):
By Equation (3.11) and (3.12),
∑n
i=1(N
i − Q¯i) ≥ −∑ni=1 θ¯i ≥ 0 .
By Equation (3.10), Equation (3.11) becomes S¯
[
N i + θ¯i − Q¯i] = 0 . By Equation (3.12),
0 =
n∑
i=1
S¯
[
N i + θ¯i − Q¯i] = S¯ n∑
i=1
(N i − Q¯i) + S¯
n∑
i=1
θ¯i = S¯
n∑
i=1
(N i − Q¯i).
Therefore, Q¯i and u˜ = S¯ satisfy Equation (3.14). ♦
Results
In the model of Montgomery (1972)
• the permit price equals marginal abatement costs
• the market equilibrium is equivalent to the joint cost minimum
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3.1b Model of Rubin (1996)
Introduction
Rubin (1996) extends the work of Montgomery (1972) by proving cost-optimality of emis-
sions trading in a continuous-time framework. This setting allows the analysis of the per-
mit price evolution over time. Such an analyis is not possible in the discrete-time model
of Montgomery (1972) with one time-step. Apart from showing the cost-optimality of
emissions trading, the paper of Rubin (1996) is concerned with the effect of banking and
borrowing on the permit price. However, the following subsection focuses on the main
part of the proof of cost-optimality of emissions trading.
Definitions
The model assumes that there are n regulated companies. In the following the superscript
i refers to company i. The time horizon of the model is finite. Especially, it is a time-
continuous model in the interval [0, T ] where all variables are modelled by deterministic
functions.
We use the following notation - similar to the one used in Section 3.1a:
• Qit denotes the emission quantity at time t
• N it is the number of emission allowances that is allocated at time t
• θit is the number of permits bought from or sold to other companies at time t.
Positive and negative values correspond to buying and selling, respectively.
• S¯t denotes the permit price at time t
• Ci(Qit) are the costs that firm i faces when adopting the emission level Qit . The
twice differentiable, decreasing and convex function Ci(·) is defined like in the model
of Montgomery (1972).
• Bit models the number of permits that are available after the compliance com-
mitment at time t. Positive/Negative values for Bit mean that firm i is bank-
ing/borrowing permits at time t.
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Definition 3.1.10 (Market equilibrium)
A market equilibrium consists of the vectors Q¯t = (Q¯
1
t , . . . , Q¯
n
t ) ≥ 0 , θ¯t = (θ¯1t , . . . , θ¯nt )
and S¯t ≥ 0 such that Q¯t and θ¯t maximize the following optimization problem of each
firm given S¯t :
max
Qit,θ
i
t
{∫ T
0
e−rt
[−Ci(Qit)− S¯tθit]}
subject to the constraints of each firm for each t ∈ [0, T ]
B˙it :=
∂Bit
∂t
= N it + θ
i
t −Qit,
Bi0 = 0, B
i
t ≥ 0,
Qit ≥ 0,
which also satisfy the market clearing condition on permits and the terminal stock condi-
tion
n∑
i=1
θ¯it = 0,
S¯T
n∑
i=1
B¯iT = 0.
Remark:
(a) Furthermore, the following technical constraint must hold
−λit ≤ θit ≤ Λit, λit > 0, Λit > 0. (3.15)
(b) As in the model of Montgomery (1972), the abatement-cost function Ci(Qit) is a
twice differentiable, decreasing and convex function that models the difference between
the unconstrained profits and the profits when the regulated company is adopting the
emission level Qit .
(c) The constraint Bit ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] means that borrowing is always forbidden
and that banking is allowed if Bit > 0 .
Definition 3.1.11 (Joint cost minimum)
A joint cost minimum Q˜t = (Q˜
1
t , . . . , Q˜
n
t ) ≥ 0 is the solution of the following maximiza-
tion problem:
max
Q1t ,...,Q
n
t
{∫ T
0
e−rt
[
−
n∑
i=1
Ci(Qit)
]}
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subject to the constraints of each firm for each t ∈ [0, T ]
B˙t :=
∂Bt
∂t
=
n∑
i=1
(N it −Qit),
B0 = 0, Bt ≥ 0,
Qit ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Solving dynamic optimization problems
Theorem 3.1.12 (Dynamic optimization problem)
Let T < ∞ and let f and g be twice differentiable concave functions. Consider the
following dynamic, deterministic optimization problem
max
x(t)
{∫ T
0
f(s(t), x(t), t)dt
}
(3.16)
subject to s˙(t) :=
∂s
∂t
(t) = g(s(t), x(t), t) for t ∈ [0, T ] and (3.17)
s(0) = 0 and (3.18)
s(T ) ≥ 0. (3.19)
Then the Hamiltonian is defined as
H := H(s(t), x(t), t) = f(s(t), x(t), t) + u(t) · g(s(t), x(t), t) (3.20)
and the solution of the optimization problem must satisfy
∂H
∂x
= 0, (3.21)
−∂H
∂s
=
∂u
∂t
=: u˙, (3.22)
−∂H
∂u
=
∂s
∂t
=: s˙, (3.23)
u(T )s(T ) = 0. (3.24)
Remark:
(a) x(t) is called control variable. The state variable s(t) is influenced by the choice
of the control variable.However, the planner is not able to control it directly.
(b) Equation (3.21) is similar to the condition in a static non-linear optimization prob-
lem.
Models 60
(c) Equation (3.23) restates the condition on the state variable (cf. Equation (3.17)).
(d) Equation (3.24) is called transversality condition.
Proof (Idea):
A rigorous proof can be found in Pontryagin et al. (1962). The following proof is along
the lines of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
First, we rewrite the constraint as an integral and set up the Lagrangian function with
the continuum of multipliers u(t) for the dynamic constraint and the multiplier v for
the terminal condition of the state variable:
L =
∫ T
0
f(s(t), x(t), t)dt+
∫ T
0
u(t) · [g(s(t), x(t), t)− s˙(t)] dt+ vs(T ).
Second, integration by parts of∫ T
0
u(t)s˙(t)dt = [u(t)s(t)]T0 −
∫ T
0
u˙(t)s(t)dt = u(T )s(T )− u(0)s(0)−
∫ T
0
u˙(t)s(t)dt
= u(T )s(T )−
∫ T
0
u˙(t)s(t)dt
and using the definition of the Hamiltonian yields
L =
∫ T
0
[H(s(t), x(t), t) + u˙(t)s(t)] dt+ (v − u(T )) · s(T ). (3.25)
Third, solve the problem using perturbation analysis:
Let x¯(t) be the optimal path for the control variable. The constraint s˙(t) = g(s(t), x(t), t)
yields an optimal path for the state variable that we denote by s¯(t) . Define the pertur-
bations of the optimal paths by
x := x(t) = x¯(t) + εp(x)(t), s := s(t) = s¯(t) + εp(s)(t), s(T ) = s¯(T ) + εdS(T ),
where ε is a scalar and p(x) := p(x)(t) and p(s) := p(s)(t) are called perturbation func-
tions. The perturbation analysis is completed by using that near the optimum small
perturbations do not affect the maximum value of our optimization problem, i.e.
∂L
∂ε
(s¯(t), x¯(t), t) = 0. (3.26)
Applying the chain rule to Equation (3.25) yields
∂L
∂ε
=
∫ T
0
[
∂H
∂s
· ∂s
∂ε
+
∂H
∂x
· ∂x
∂ε
+ u˙ · ∂s
∂ε
]
dt+ (v − u(T )) · ∂s(T )
∂ε
=
∫ T
0
[
∂H
∂s
· p(s) + ∂H
∂x
· p(x) + u˙ · p(s)
]
dt+ (v − u(T )) · dS(T )
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=
∫ T
0
[
∂H
∂x
· p(x) +
(
∂H
∂s
+ u˙
)
· p(s)
]
dt+ (v − u(T )) · dS(T )
Since ∂L
∂ε
(s¯(t), x¯(t), t) = 0 must hold for any choice of perturbation functions, we obtain
∂H
∂x
= 0,
∂H
∂s
+ u˙ = 0, v = u(T ).
Combining v = u(T ) and v · s(T ) = 0 , the complementary slackness condition from the
terminal constraint, yields the so-called transversality condition
u(T )s(T ) = 0.
♦
Existence of market equilibrium and joint cost minimum
Theorem 3.1.13 (Existence of market equilibrium)
Under the assumption that regulated companies are not buying or selling at the minimum
or maximum rate (cf. Equation (3.15)), a market equilibrium (Q¯t, θ¯t, S¯t) exists if and
only if there exist for all t ∈ [0, T ] non-negative multipliers u¯t = (u¯1t , . . . , u¯nt ), β¯t =
(β¯1t , . . . , β¯
n
t ) and an optimal permit price S¯ ≥ 0 such that the following conditions hold
for all i = 1, . . . , n :
e−rt
∂Ci
∂Qit
(Q¯it)− u¯it ≥ 0, ∂u¯
i
t
∂t
= β¯t, e
−rtS¯t + u¯it = 0, (3.27)
Q¯it
[
e−rt
∂Ci
∂Qit
(Q¯it)− u¯it
]
= 0, B¯itβ¯
i
t = 0, B¯
i
T u¯
i
T = 0, (3.28)
Q¯it ≥ 0, B¯it ≥ 0,
∂Bit
∂t
= N it + θ¯
i
t − Q¯it, (3.29)
and the market clearing condition and the terminal stock condition
n∑
i=1
θ¯it = 0, S¯T
n∑
i=1
B¯iT = 0. (3.30)
Proof (Idea):
Forming the Langrangian of the corresponding minimization problem
Li = e−rt
(
Ci(Qit) + S¯tθ
i
t
)
+ uit(N
i
t + θ
i
t −Qit)− βitBit
and using both the conditions given in Equation (3.21) - (3.24) (cf. Theorem 3.1.12) and
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions completes the proof. The conditions can then be
retrieved from
∂Li
∂Qit
≥ 0, ∂u¯it
∂t
= − ∂Li
∂Bit
,
∂Li
∂θit
= 0,
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Q¯it
∂Li
∂Qit
= 0, B¯it
∂Li
∂Bit
= 0, B¯iT u¯
i
T = 0,
Q¯it ≥ 0, B¯it ≥ 0,
∂Li
∂uit
=
∂Bit
∂t
.
♦
Interpretation
(a) If Q¯it > 0 , then
u¯it = e
−rt∂C
i
∂Qit
(Q¯it), S¯t = −
∂Ci
∂Qit
(Q¯it).
This means that the permit price is equal to the marginal abatement costs. More-
over, the marginal value of a banked emission permit is equal to the discounted
marginal abatement costs.
(b) Rubin (1996) shows that the permit price is growing at the risk-free interest rate if
there are no restrictions on banking and borrowing. However, the permit price will
have a lower growth rate in case borrowing is forbidden but regulated companies
wish to do so.
(c) B¯iT u¯
i
T = 0 , also known as transversality condition, implies that if a company still
holds permits in the bank at time T , the value of those permits is zero.
Theorem 3.1.14 (Existence of joint cost minimum)
A joint cost minimum exists if and only if there exist for all t ∈ [0, T ] non-negative
multipliers u˜t, β˜t such that the following conditions hold for i = 1, . . . , n :
e−rt
∂Ci
∂Qit
(Q˜it)− u˜t ≥ 0, ∂u˜t∂t = β˜t,
∂Bt
∂t
=
n∑
i=1
(N it − Q˜it), (3.31)
Q˜it
[
e−rt
∂Ci
∂Qit
(Q˜it)− u˜t
]
= 0, B˜tβ˜t = 0, B˜T u˜T = 0, (3.32)
Q˜it ≥ 0, B˜t ≥ 0. (3.33)
Proof :
Similar to Theorem 3.1.13. The conditions can be retrieved from
∂L
∂Qit
≥ 0, ∂u˜t
∂t
= − ∂L
∂Bt
,
∂L
∂ut
=
∂Bt
∂t
,
Q˜it
∂L
∂Qit
= 0, B˜t
∂L
∂Bt
= 0, B˜T u˜T = 0,
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Q˜it ≥ 0, B˜t ≥ 0,
where the Lagrangian is given by
L = e−rt
n∑
i=1
Ci(Qit) + ut
n∑
i=1
(N it −Qit)− βtBt.
♦
Interpretation
(a) If Q˜it > 0 , then
−u˜t = −e−rt∂C
1
∂Q1t
(Q˜1t ) = . . . = −e−rt
∂Cn
∂Qnt
(Q˜nt ). (3.34)
This means that the marginal cost of banking permits is equal to the discounted
marginal abatement costs. Especially, marginal abatement costs are the same for
all the regulated companies that are emitting.
(b) B˜t > 0 implies
∂u˜t
∂t
= 0 . In other words, if marginal costs of banking are not
constant, banks will not bank.
Lemma 3.1.15
(a) A solution of the joint cost minimization problem satisfies the conditions of a market
equilibrium.
(b) A solution that satisfies the conditions of a market equilibrium is a solution of the
joint cost minimization problem.
Proof :
Follows from Theorem 3.1.13 and 3.1.14. See Rubin (1996). ♦
Results
In the model of Rubin (1996)
• the permit price equals marginal abatement costs
• the market equilibrium is equivalent to the joint cost optimum
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3.1c Model of Kling and Rubin (1997)
Introduction
Kling and Rubin (1997) extend the work of Rubin (1996). The aim of their work is to
highlight that it has to be distinguished between cost optimality and social optimality.
Montgomery (1972) and Rubin (1996) show that emissions trading leads to a least-cost
solution. Kling and Rubin (1997) include a so-called damage function into the optimiza-
tion problem of the central planner and analyze whether emissions trading is also socially
optimal.
The following subsection presents the most important definitions and results in the model
of Kling and Rubin (1997). Mathematical derivations are not included as the basic idea
is similar to the proof in Section 3.1b.
Definitions
The main difference between the model of Kling and Rubin (1997) and the model of Rubin
(1996) is the introduction of a damage function in the central planner’s maximization
problem (cf. Definition 3.1.17). The convex damage function
D(Q, t)
describes the costs that the emission quantity Q imposes on the society.
The formulation of the maximization problem for an individual profit maximizing firm is
also different in the framework of Kling and Rubin (1997):
• In addition to the costs from producing and abating, Kling and Rubin (1997) include
the revenues from producing a good into the optimization problem. It is assumed
that the firm i produces yit quantities of output and that the time-t price for one
unit of the good is denoted by Gt . Instantaneous revenues from the production of
the good at time are given by
Rigood(y
i
t) = Gty
i
t.
• Kling and Rubin (1997) model the costs of producing and adopting a given emission
level instead of directly including the abatement cost function in the optimization
problem like Rubin (1996). The cost function Cigood(Q, y) describes the total costs
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of producing the output quantity y when adopting the emission level Q . It is
assumed that Cigood(Q, y) is strictly convex in (Q, y) , i.e.
∂Cigood
∂y
> 0,
∂Cigood
∂Q
< 0,
∂2Cigood
∂y∂Q
< 0,
∂2Cigood
∂y2
> 0,
∂2Cigood
∂Q2
> 0.
Definition 3.1.16 (Firm i’s profit maximization problem)
Given the permit price S¯t , firm i chooses an optimal emission level Q¯
i
t ≥ 0 , buys or sells
an optimal number of permits θ¯it and produces an optimal quantity of output y¯
i
t :
max
Qit,θ
i
t,y
i
t
{∫ T
0
e−rt
[
Rigood(y
i
t)− Cigood(Qit, yit)− S¯tθit
]
dt
}
subject to the constraints of each firm for each t ∈ [0, T ]
B˙it :=
∂Bit
∂t
= N it + θ
i
t −Qit,
Bi0 = 0, B
i
T ≥ 0,
Qit ≥ 0.
Remark:
(a) Similar to the model of Rubin (1996), the following technical constraint must hold
−λit ≤ θit ≤ Λit, λit > 0, Λit > 0.
(b) The target function is similar to the one used in the model of Carmona et al. (2009b).
Only the penalty payment is missing in the target function of Definition 3.1.16.
Definition 3.1.17 (Central planner’s optimization problem)
The central planner chooses optimal emission levels Q¯t = (Q¯
1
t , . . . , Q¯
n
t ) ≥ 0 and output
quantities y¯t = (y¯
1
t , . . . , y¯
n
t ) :
max
Q1t ,...,Q
n
t ,y
1
t ,...,y
n
t
{∫ T
0
e−rt
[
n∑
i=1
Rigood(y
i
t)−
n∑
i=1
Cigood(Q
i
t, y
i
t)−D
(
n∑
i=1
Qit, t
)]}
subject to the constraints of each firm for each t ∈ [0, T ]
B˙t :=
∂Bt
∂t
=
n∑
i=1
(N it −Qit),
B0 = 0, BT ≥ 0,
Qit ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n
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Remark:
The target function of the central planner’s optimization problem are the firm’s aggregated
revenues minus costs. In addition, the damage resulting from emissions is subtracted.
Therefore, the central planner’s optimization problem in the framework of Kling and
Rubin (1997) differs from the one in the framework of Rubin (1996) w.r.t. the definition
of revenues and costs and the inclusion of the convex damage function D(Qt, t) .
Results
Kling and Rubin (1997) show that
• The permit price is equal to the marginal abatement costs
S¯t = −∂C
1
∂Q1t
(Q¯1t , y¯
1
t ) = . . . = −
∂Cn
∂Qnt
(Q¯nt , y¯
n
t ).
• Emissions trading does not necessarily lead to a socially optimal solution (in the
sense of Definition 3.1.17).
However, under the assumption that social damages are linear and stationary, a so-
cial optimum is achieved by the introduction of modified banking rules that penalize
borrowing by the discount rate. Borrowing one unit of emissions means that the
firm emits one unit using an emission permit for compliance that is earmarked for
the use in the future.
Under the banking regulations of Rubin (1996) a firm has to hand in one permit per
unit of emission independent of when emissions took place. This banking regulations
are described by the constraint
B˙t :=
∂Bt
∂t
=
n∑
i=1
(N it −Qit). (3.35)
The proposed modified banking rules of Kling and Rubin (1997) oblige firms that
borrow one unit of emission for a time period of length t to hand in ert(> 1) permits
at time t. The modified banking rules can be translated into the following constraint
B˙t :=
∂Bt
∂t
= e−rt
n∑
i=1
(N it −Qit). (3.36)
The modified banking rules of Kling and Rubin (1997) differ from the original bank-
ing rules by the discount factor (cf. Equation (3.35) and (3.36)).
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3.1d Model of Cronshaw and Kruse (1996)
Introduction
The model of Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) is the discrete-time version of the models
of Rubin (1996) and Kling and Rubin (1997). A mathematical derivation of the cost
optimality of emissions trading in the model of Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) is not provided
in this subsection. Except for mathematical technicalities the idea of the proof is the same
as in the model of Rubin (1996). The models of Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) and Rubin
(1996) have in common that both are concerned with the cost-optimality of emissions
trading whereas the model of Kling and Rubin (1997) rather addresses the issue of social
optimality of emissions trading. However, when comparing the target functions of the
optimization problems it can be seen that both the models of Cronshaw and Kruse (1996)
and Kling and Rubin (1997) maximize profits from the production of goods whereas the
model of Rubin (1996) focuses on abatement costs.
Definitions
The modelling assumptions of Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) are the following
• The model of Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) is the only equilibrium model that ex-
plicitly specifies input variables. It is assumed that input choices for production xi
and abatement choices zi are transformed by the functions f iOutput and f
i
Emissions
into the output quantity yi and the emission level Qi .
• Firms are maximizing their profits from the production of goods and from emissions
trading by choosing optimal input quantities, producing an optimal number of goods
yi , choosing an optimal emission volume Qi , buying and selling permits optimally
(choosing θi optimally). Firms are subject to borrowing constraints and are obliged
to comply with their emission target. This can be translated into an optimization
problem with the following target function
max
θi,xi,zi
{
T∑
t=1
e−rt
[
Rigood(y
i
t)− Cigood(xit, zit)− Sitθit
]}
.
This optimization problem is too complex and therefore, Cronshaw and Kruse (1996)
split it up into two parts that are solved sequentially.
In the first step, given the emission volume Qi and the number of traded permits θi ,
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the firm is choosing optimal production and abatement inputs (xi , zi ) and optimal
output quantities for the produced good yi . This yields the following definition:
Πi(Qi, θi) denotes the maximum profit of firm i from the production of goods given
the emission level Qi and the number of traded permits θi , i.e.
Πi(Qi, θi) = max
xi,zi
{
T∑
t=1
e−rt
[
Rigood(y
i
t)− Cigood(xit, zit)
]}
subject to the constraints
yit = f
i
Output(x
i
t) for all i = 1, . . . , n,
f iEmissions(x
i
t, z
i
t) ≤ Qit for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Definition 3.1.18 (Firm i’s profit maximization problem)
Given the permit price S , firm i chooses an optimal emission level Qi and buys or sells
an optimal number of permits θi :
max
Qi,θi
{
Πi(Qi, θi)−
T∑
t=1
e−rtSitθ
i
t
}
(3.37)
subject to the constraints of each firm for each t = 1, . . . , T
Bit+1 −Bit = N it + θit −Qit,
Bi1 = 0, B
i
t ≥ 0 for all t = 2, . . . , T,
Qit ≥ 0.
Remark:
In the market equilibrium consisting of the permit price S and the associated optimal
strategies (θ¯1, . . . , θ¯n) and (Q¯1, . . . , Q¯n) all the firms are maximizing their profits and
the following market clearing condition holds
T∑
t=1
θ¯it = 0 for t = 1, . . . , T.
Definition 3.1.19 (Joint optimization problem)
The central planner chooses optimal emission levels Q1, . . . , Qn :
max
Q1,...,Qn
{
n∑
i=1
Πi(Qi)
}
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subject to the constraints of each firm for each t ∈ [0, T ]
Bt+1 −Bt =
n∑
i=1
(N it −Qit),
Bt ≥ 0 for all t = 1, . . . , T,
Qit ≥ 0.
Results
• Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) show that the market equilibrium is equivalent to the
joint cost optimum.
• The permit price equals marginal abatement costs.
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3.2 Stochastic equilibrium models
3.2a Model of Seifert et al. (2008)
Introduction
The model of Seifert et al. (2008) is the first paper that addresses the issue of permit
price dynamics. Two other papers have been developed almost at the same time: the
model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) and the model of Carmona et al. (2009b). All
these stochastic equilibrium models include the costs from a possible penalty payment in
the target function of the optimization problem. Therefore, stochastic equilibrium models
capture the main characteristics of an ordinary scheme (cf. Section 1.1).
Two minor aspects of the approach of Seifert et al. (2008) are different from the modelling
approaches of the other equilibrium models:
1. Emissions are broken down into emissions before abatement activities and abated
emissions (in the other models emissions are not split up).
2. Permit price dynamics are derived for a representative agent with the aim to sim-
plify the notation (in the other models the permit price formula follows directly
from the individual and joint optimization problem).
This subsection is split up into two parts:
• It is shown that the market equilibrium is equivalent to the joint cost optimum. A
by-product of this proof is that the permit price equals marginal abatement costs
(cf. Subsection “Cost optimality of emissions”).
• The dynamics of the permit price are derived by solving the cost minimization prob-
lem of a so-called representative agent. The introduction of a representative agent
significantly simplifies the notation and is justified by the equivalence of the market
equilibrium and the joint cost optimum (cf. Subsection “Permit price dynamics”).
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Cost optimality of emissions trading
The model of Seifert et al. (2008) assumes that there are n companies. Interest rates, r,
are deterministic.
Emissions of firm i are modelled by
• βit (stochastic process): emission rate before abatement activities
Seifert et al. (2008) assume that for constant βi0 and σ
2
i , the emission rate β
i
t either
follows
– a White-Noise process, i.e. βt ∼ N(β0, σ2) or
– an arithmetic Brownian motion of the form βt = β0 + σWt .
• αit (stochastic process): abatement rate
Emissions trading is taken into account by
• θit (stochastic process): instantaneous amount of permits bought from or sold to
other companies. Positive/Negative values correspond to buying/selling.
The ability to comply at the end of the compliance period depends both on the expected
number of emissions in the interval [0, T ] , the abatement volume and on the number of
purchased permits:
qit = E
[∫ t
0
βisds | Ft
]
−
∫ t
0
αisds−
∫ t
0
θisds.
This means that qit is equal to total cumulative emissions minus the number of permits
bought from other companies.
Before the start of the compliance period, the regulator defines the following two param-
eters
• N i : number of permits allocated to firm i at the beginning
• P : penalty that has to be paid for each unit of emission that is not covered by an
emission allowance at the end of the compliance period
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In the model of Seifert et al. (2008), an agent faces three different types of costs:
1. Abatement costs
Seifert et al. (2008) model marginal abatement costs as a deterministic function that
is increasing in the abatement volume. More precisely, instantaneous abatement
costs at time t are modelled by
Ci(αit) =
1
2
ci(α
i
t)
2,
where ci is a positive constant.
The main difference between the models of Carmona et al. (2009b) and Seifert et al.
(2008) is the different treatment of abatement costs: the model of Carmona et al.
(2009b) assumes stochastic abatement costs that do not explicitly depend on the
abated volume whereas the model of Seifert et al. (2008) assumes that there is a
deterministic relationship between abatement costs and the abated volume.
2. Costs from permit purchases
Firm i has the option to buy permits instead of abating or to sell permits to other
companies if it is able to reduce emissions at low costs. Instantaneous costs/profits
from emissions trading at time t are equal to
Stθ
i
t,
where St is the permit price at time t.
3. Penalty payment
At the end of the compliance period, firm i has to pay the penalty P per unit of
emission that is not covered by a permit, i.e. the total penalty equals
P
(
qiT −N i
)+
.
Definition 3.2.1 (Firm i’s optimization problem)
Given the permit price St , firm i minimizes its expected costs by choosing an optimal
abatement strategy and buying or selling an optimal number of permits, i.e.
max
αit,θ
i
t
E
[
−
∫ T
0
e−rtCi(αit)dt−
∫ T
0
e−rtStθit − e−rTP (qiT −N i)+
]
(3.38)
= max
αit,θ
i
t
E
[
−
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
1
2
ci(α
i
t)
2
)
dt−
∫ T
0
e−rtStθit − e−rTP (qiT −N i)+
]
.
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Lemma 3.2.2 (SDE for firm i’s cumulative “emissions” qit )
Assume that the emission rate before abatement activities, βit , follows (i) a White-Noise
process or (ii) an arithmetic Brownian motion.
Then the SDE of firm i’s cumulative emissions are given by
dqit = −(αit + θit)dt+H itdWt,
where H it is given in case (i) by H
i
t = σi and in case (ii) by H
i
t = σi(T − t) .
Proof :
See online appendix of Seifert et al. (2008). ♦
Lemma 3.2.3 (First order conditions of firm i’s optimization problem)
Let V i(t, qit) be the expected value of an optimal policy for firm i’s cost minimization
problem (cf. Definition 3.2.1) between time t and T given qit . Denote its partial derivatives
by V it , V
i
q , V
i
qq . Then the first order conditions of this optimization problem are given
by
αit = −
1
c
ertV iq
St = − ertV iq = ciαit = −
∂Ci(αit)
∂αit
Proof (Idea):
The proof is an adaption of the proof in Chapter 12.4 of Sethi and Thompson (1981).
By the principle of optimality
V i(t, qit) = max
αit,θ
i
t
E
[−e−rtCi(αit)dt− e−rtStθitdt+ V i(t+ dt, qit + dqit)] . (3.39)
Applying Itoˆ’s lemma to V i(t, qit) , we have
V i(t+ dt, qit + dq
i
t)− V i(t, qit) = V it dt+ V iq dqit +
1
2
V iqqdq
i
tdq
i
t
= V it dt− V iq (αit + θit)dt+H itV iq dWt +
1
2
(H it)
2V iqqdt
=
(
V it − V iq (αit + θit) +
1
2
(H it)
2V iqq
)
dt+H itV
i
q dWt.
This implies
E[V i(t+ dt, qit + dqit)− V i(t, qit) | Ft] =
(
V it − V iq (αit + θit) +
1
2
(H it)
2V iqq
)
dt.
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Subtracting V i(t, qit) on both sides of Equation (3.39) yields
0 = max
αit,θ
i
t
[
−e−rtCi(αit)− e−rtStθit + V it − V iq (αit + θit) +
1
2
(H it)
2V iqq
]
, (3.40)
with boundary condition
V i(T, qiT ) = −e−rTP (qiT −N i)+.
Maximizing the right hand side of Equation (3.40) by taking the partial derivatives with
respect to αit and θ
i
t and setting it to zero yields
αit = −
1
ci
ertV iq
St = − ertV iq = ciαit =
∂Ci(t, αit)
∂αit
.
♦
Definition 3.2.4 (Market equilibrium)
A market equilibrium with associated optimal strategies, consisting of S¯t , (α¯
1
t , . . . , α¯
n
t )
and (θ¯1t , . . . , θ¯
n
t ) , solves the firms’ individual cost optimization problems as given in Def-
inition 3.2.1 and satisfies the market clearing condition
n∑
i=1
θ¯it = 0.
Definition 3.2.5 (Global optimization problem)
The central planner minimizes joint costs of the firms by choosing optimal abatement
strategies:
max
α1t ,...,α
n
t
E
[
−
∫ T
0
e−rt
n∑
i=1
(
1
2
ci(α
i
t)
2
)
dt− e−rTP
n∑
i=1
(qiT −N i)+
]
. (3.41)
Remark:
Seifert et al. (2008) show that the market equilibrium is also a solution of the joint cost
problem and vice versa (cf. online appendix of their paper). This equivalence enables us
to focus on the cost optimization problem of a representative agent in the following.
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Permit price dynamics
The price dynamics result from the cost minimization problem of a so-called representative
agent. The notation in the framework of the representative agent is almost the same as
the notation of the previous subsection. The only minor difference is the variable qt . In
the previous subsection, qt was defined as total cumulative emissions minus the number
of permits bought from other companies whereas in the framework of the representative
agent qt equals total cumulative emissions:
qt = E
[∫ t
0
βsds | Ft
]
−
∫ t
0
αsds.
The dynamics of the total cumulative emissions are given in Lemma 3.2.6. A characteristic
partial differential equation (PDE) and an analytical expression for the permit price is to
be found in Theorem 3.2.8.
Lemma 3.2.6 (SDE for emissions of the representative agent qt )
Assume that the emission rate before abatement activities, βt , follows
(i) the White-Noise process βt ∼ N(β0, σ2) or
(ii) the arithmetic Brownian motion βt = β0 + σWt .
Then the SDE for the cumulative emissions of the representative agent are given by
dqt = −αtdt+HtdWt,
where Ht is given in case (i) by Ht = σ and in case (ii) by Ht = σ(T − t) .
Proof :
See online appendix of Seifert et al. (2008). ♦
Definition 3.2.7 (Optimization problem of the representative agent)
Given the permit price S , the representative agent minimizes its expected costs by choosing
an optimal abatement strategy:
max
αt
E
[
−
∫ T
0
e−rtC(αt)dt− e−rTP (qT −N)+
]
(3.42)
= max
αt
E
[
−
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
1
2
c(αt)
2
)
dt− e−rTP (qT −N)+
]
.
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Theorem 3.2.8 (Permit price dynamics)
Let V (t, qt) be the expected value of an optimal policy for the optimization problem in
Definition 3.2.7 between time t and T given qt .
Denote its partial derivatives by Vt , Vq , Vqq .
(a) Assume that the emission rate before abatement activities is given by the arithmetic
Brownian motion in Lemma 3.2.6.
Then the characteristic PDE of the permit price is given by
Vt +
1
2
σ2(T − t)2Vqq + 1
2c
ert (Vq)
2 = 0,
with boundary condition
V (T, qT ) = e
rtP (qT −N)+ ,
and the permit price is given by
St = −ertVq.
(b) Assuming that the emission rate before abatement activities is given by the White-
Noise process in Lemma 3.2.6. Then the characteristic PDE of the permit price is given
by
Vt +
1
2
σ2Vqq +
1
2c
ert (Vq)
2 = 0,
and there is an analytical formula for the permit price:
S(t, qt) = P · 1
1−
exp
{−P [P (T−t)+2c(N−qt)]
2c2σ2
}(
−2+erfc
(
N−qt
σ
√
2(T−t)
))
erfc
(
P (T−t)+c(N−qt)
σ
√
2(T−t)
)
,
where erfc(x) = 1− erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫∞
x
e−t
2
dt is the complementary error function.
Proof (Idea):
Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2.3, Itoˆ’s lemma and Lemma 3.2.6 imply
V (t+ dt, qt + dqt)− V (t, qt) =
(
Vt − αtVq + 1
2
(Ht)
2Vqq
)
dt+HtVqdWt,
E[V (t+ dt, qt + dqt)− V (t, qt) | Ft] = Vtdt− αtVqdt+ 1
2
(Ht)
2Vqqdt.
By the principle of optimality
V (t, qt) = max
αt
E
[−e−rtC(αt)dt+ V (t+ dt, qt + dqt)] . (3.43)
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Subtracting V (t, qt) on both sides of Equation (3.43) yields
0 = max
αt
{
−e−rtC(αt) + Vt − αtVq + 1
2
(Ht)
2Vqq
}
. (3.44)
Maximizing the expression within the curly brackets by deriving it with respect to αt
and setting it to zero yields
αt = −1
c
ertVq, or cαt = −ertVq. (3.45)
The characteristic PDE is obtained by setting the expression within the curly brackets in
Equation (3.44) to zero and by inserting the formula for αt into this equation:
− e−rtC(αt)dt+ Vt − αtVq + 1
2
(Ht)
2Vqq = 0
⇔ − e−rt1
2
c(αt)
2 + Vt − αtVq + 1
2
(Ht)
2Vqq = 0
⇔ − 1
2c
ert(Vq)
2 + Vt +
1
c
ert(Vq)
2 +
1
2
(Ht)
2Vqq = 0
⇔ Vt + 1
2c
e−rt(Vq)2 +
1
2
(Ht)
2Vqq = 0. (3.46)
The spot price equals marginal abatement costs as shown in Lemma 3.2.3, i.e.
St =
∂C(αt)
∂αt
= cαt
(3.45)
= −e−rtVq.
(a) The proof is completed by using Lemma 3.2.6 (ii).
(b) The characteristic PDE follows directly from Equation (3.46) by using part (i) of
Lemma 3.2.6. A solution of this PDE is derived by Seifert et al. (2008). ♦
Remark:
If the emission rate follows an arithmetic Brownian motion, it is not possible to derive a
closed-form solution due to the more complex PDE. Seifert et al. (2008) present graphical
illustrations of the permit price in this case.
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Results
The graphical illustrations of Seifert et al. (2008) show that the permit price in the model
of Seifert et al. (2008) is similar to the value of P binary call options with underlying
qT , strike price N and expiry time T. Figure 3.1 illustrates the payoff of a binary call
option at expiry time and the value of this option before expiry time. A definition of a
binary option is to be found in Definition 3.2.9. As the value of a binary option can be
interpreted as the probability that the price of the underlying at time T is greater than
the strike price, the permit price in the model of Seifert et al. (2008) can be interpreted as
the penalty P multiplied by the probability that cumulative emissions in the compliance
period are greater than the number of allowances, N .
Moreover, Seifert et al. (2008) show that the permit price equals marginal abatement costs.
Combining this equality and the discussion about digital options yields an extremely
interesting result: permit prices can be interpreted both as the penalty multiplied by
the probability of permit shortage and as marginal abatement costs. In other words,
the concept of probability of permit shortage is an extension of the concept of marginal
abatement costs that explicitly takes the dependency of the permit price on the penalty
fee, the number of allocated permits and on the expectation of future emissions into
account. Therefore, the paper of Seifert et al. (2008) links approaches from two different
fields:
• Environmental Economics (marginal abatement costs)
• Financial Mathematics (probability of permit shortage).
Definition 3.2.9 (Binary option)
A binary call option (also known as digital call option) with expiry time T and strike
price K pays 1 Euro at time T if the price of the underlying ST is greater than the
strike price K. The payoff at time T in mathematical notation is given by
1{ST>K}.
Remark:
The value of the binary call option before expiry time is equal to the probability that the
price of the underlying at time T is greater than the strike price.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of a binary call option with strike price K = 100 : bold line is the
payoff at expiry time and the fine line is the contract value some time before expiry.
Source: Wilmott (2007).
3.2b Model of Carmona et al. (2009b)
Introduction
The stochastic equilibrium model of Carmona et al. (2009b) is of special interest because:
• The model captures the main characteristics of an ordinary scheme and
• Within the general framework of Carmona et al. (2009b), it is possible to derive
analytically tractable permit price formulae as shown in Section 3.2c and 3.2d and
• The model of Carmona et al. (2009b) is the basis for the reduced-form models that
can be used for parameter estimation in practice.
Definitions
The model of Carmona et al. (2009b) assumes that there are n companies. Note that
the optimization problems of Carmona et al. (2009b) are all formulated in a way such
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that profits and costs are expressed in time-T currency. This has the advantage that no
discount factors appear in the lengthy formulae of the optimization problems.
It is assumed that firms maximize their profits by producing an optimal amount of goods
and choosing an optimal permit trading strategy.
The target function of the optimization problem consists of three parts
1. Production of goods
Firm i’s profit from producing goods over the time period [0, T ] is equal to
Rigood(y
i)− Cigood(yi) =
T−1∑
t=0
(∑
j,k
Gkt y
i,j,k
t
)
−
T−1∑
t=0
(∑
j,k
κi,j,kt y
i,j,k
t
)
,
where
• yi,j,kt (stochastic process) models firm i’s output quantity of good k at time t
when using technology j
• Gkt (stochastic process) models the price of one unit of good k at time t. Prices
are expressed in time-T currency.
• κi,j,kt (stochastic process) models firm i’s marginal costs of producing one unit
of good k when using technology j. Costs are expressed in time-T currency. It
is assumed that marginal costs are given exogenously.
2. Trading of emission allowances
Gain or loss from trading of emission allowances is equal to
T i(Θi) =
T−1∑
t=0
Θit (At+1 − At)−ΘiTAT ,
where
• Θi,j,kt (stochastic process) models the total number of permits that firm i
bought from or sold to other companies until time t. Positive/Negative values
indicate that firm i is a net buyer/seller in the period [0, t] .
• At (stochastic process) models the time-t price of the futures on the emission
allowance maturing at time T
3. Penalty payment at the end of the compliance period
The total penalty of firm i is given by
P · (qi(yi) + ∆i −N i −ΘiT )+
and it depends both on
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(a) firm i’s cumulative emissions in the time period [0, T ]
qi(yi) + ∆i =
T−1∑
t=0
Qit + ∆
i =
T−1∑
t=0
(∑
j,k
ei,j,kyi,j,kt
)
+ ∆i,
where
• ei,j,k (constant) is the emission factor measuring the emissions that are
caused when firm i is producing one unit of good k with technology j
• ∆i (random variable) models emissions that firm i cannot control
(b) parameters of the scheme as defined by the regulator
• P (constant) is the penalty fee per unit of emission that is not covered by
an emission allowance at the compliance time T
• N i = ∑T−1t=0 N it (random variable) models the number of allowances that
the regulator allocates to firm i in the compliance period [0, T ]
Remark:
(a) Production of goods has to satisfy the following two constraints
1. Production cannot exceed capacity:
0 ≤ yi,j,kt ≤ Ki,j,k.
2. Demand is always smaller than the total production capacity:
0 ≤ Dkt ≤
∑
i
∑
j
Ki,j,k,
where
• Dkt (stochastic process) models the demand for good k at time t
• Ki,j,k (constant) models firm i’s capacity constraint to produce good k with tech-
nology j
(b) The optimization problem of Carmona et al. (2009b) models trading with the help of
Θit , the total number of traded permits that firm i holds at time t, instead of the number
of permits that firm i buys or sells at time (denoted by θit ). The reason is that it is easier
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to compute the penalty in terms of Θit than in terms of θ
i
t . However, it is possible to
transform Θit into θ
i
t :
θi0 = Θ
i
0,
θit = Θ
i
t −Θit−1.
Gain or loss from trading activities can be expressed as follows
T i(Θi) = −
T∑
t=0
θitAt
= −Θi0A0 −
T∑
t=1
(
Θit −Θit−1
)
At
= −Θi0A0 + Θi0A1 −Θi1A1 + Θi1A2 −Θi2A2 + . . .+ ΘiT−2AT−1 −ΘiT−1AT−1
+ ΘiT−2AT −ΘiTAT
= Θi0(A1 − A0) + Θi1(A2 − A1) + . . .+ ΘiT−1(AT − AT−1)−ΘiTAT
=
T−1∑
t=0
Θit (At+1 − At)−ΘiTAT .
(c) The uncontrollable emissions have to satisfy the following condition: conditional on
the information available at time T − 1 , the sum of all uncontrollable emissions, ∑i ∆i ,
must have a continuous distribution. This technical assumption is introduced in order to
avoid pathological situations concerning the equilibrium prices.
Optimization problems
Definition 3.2.10 (Firm i’s optimization problem)
Given the forward permit price A and the prices of the produced goods G , firm i maxi-
mizes its expected terminal wealth by buying or selling an optimal number of permits and
producing an optimal quantity of goods, i.e.
sup
Θi,yi
E
[
Li
(
Θi, yi | A,G)] (3.47)
where the terminal wealth is given by
Li
(
Θi, yi | A,G)
=
[
Rigood(y
i | G)− Cigood(yi) + T i(Θi | A)− P ·
(
qi(yi) + ∆i −N i −ΘiT
)+]
. (3.48)
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Definition 3.2.11 (Global optimization problem)
A fictitious central planner minimizes expected total costs by producing an optimal quantity
of goods, i.e. it faces the following optimization problem
inf
y
E
[
Cgood(y) + P (q(y) + ∆−N)+
]
, (3.49)
where
Cgood(y) =
∑
i
Cigood(y
i),
q(y) =
∑
i
qi(yi),
∆ =
∑
i
∆i,
N =
∑
i
N i.
Relationship between market equilibrium and global optimum
Definition 3.2.12 (Market equilibrium)
( A¯, G¯ ) is a market equilibrium in emission permits with associated strategies Θ¯ and y¯
if for given
• A¯ (one-dimensional stochastic process for forward price on permits)
• G¯ (multi-dimensional stochastic process for the prices of the products)
the associated optimal strategies
• Θ¯ (multi-dimensional stochastic process of optimal trading strategies)
• y¯ (multi-dimensional stochastic process of optimal production strategies)
lead to a situation where all the firms (“maximize” their profits) are satisfied by their
strategy in the sense that for all i
E
[
Li
(
Θ¯i, y¯i | A¯, G¯)] ≥ E [Li (Θi, yi | A¯, G¯)] for all (Θi, yi)
and the following two conditions hold
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• Market clearing condition on permits∑
i
Θ¯it = 0
• Supply meets demand for each good∑
i,j
y¯i,j,kt = D
k
t
Lemma 3.2.13 (Market equilibrium and joint optimization problem)
If (A¯, G¯) is a market equilibrium with associated strategies (Θ¯, y¯) then
(a) the permit price and the prices of the goods are almost surely given by
A¯t = P · P (q(y¯) + ∆ ≥ N | Ft) ,
G¯t = max
i,j
{(
κi,j,kt + e
i,j,kA¯t
)
1{y¯i,j,kt >0}
}
.
(b) y¯ is a solution of the global optimization problem.
Remark:
(a) In the business as usual scenario (i.e. P = 0 ), the equilibrium prices of the goods are
given by
G¯t = max
i,j
{
κi,j,kt 1{y¯i,j,kt >0}
}
.
This means that equilibrium prices correspond to a merit-order type equilibrium in which
• all the production means of the economy are ranked by increasing production costs,
κi,j,kt
• demand is met by producing from the cheapest production means
• the equilibrium price of good k is equal to the marginal cost of production of the
most expensive production means used to meet demand Dkt
(b) In the presence of a penalty P > 0 , the equilibrium prices of the goods are given by
G¯t = max
i,j
{(
κi,j,kt + e
i,j,kA¯t
)
1{y¯i,j,kt >0}
}
.
This means that equilibrium prices correspond to a merit-order type equilibrium with
adjusted costs κi,j,kt + e
i,j,kA¯t .
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Lemma 3.2.14 (Joint optimization problem and market equilibrium)
(a) There exists a solution y˜ of the global optimization problem.
(b) If y˜ is a a solution of the global optimization problem then
(i) the permit price and the prices of the goods are almost surely given by
A˜t = P · P (q(y˜) + ∆ ≥ N | Ft) ,
G˜t = max
i,j
{(
κi,j,kt + e
i,j,kA˜t
)
1{y˜i,j,kt >0}
}
.
and the allowance price process is almost surely unique.
(ii) (A˜, G˜) is a market equilibrium.
Results
In the model of Carmona et al. (2009b)
• The market equilibrium is equivalent to the joint cost optimum.
• The futures permit price is equal to the penalty multiplied by the probability of
permit shortage at the end of the compliance period. The event of permit shortage
is defined as the situation that cumulative emissions (after abatement activities)
of all regulated companies in the compliance period exceed the total number of
permits.
• Prices of the produced goods correspond to a merit-order type equilibrium with
adjusted costs. This means that products are becoming more expensive in the
presence of an emissions trading scheme. The price increase is equal to the value of
the permits that are needed for the production of the good.
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3.2c Model of Chesney and Taschini (2008)
Introduction
Even though the model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) was developed independently
from the model of Carmona et al. (2009b), it can be categorized as a model in the general
framework of Carmona et al. (2009b). The model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) specifies
the process for the cumulative emissions in the framework of Carmona et al. (2009b).
Notation
The following notation is used in the model of Chesney and Taschini (2008), in the
extended model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) and in the model of Gru¨ll and Kiesel
(2009) (cf. Section 3.2c).
• q[0,T ] is the random variable that denotes the aggregated cumulative emissions of
all regulated companies at time T .
• P is the penalty fee that has to be paid for each emission unit not covered by an
emission allowance at the compliance time T .
• N is the total amount of permits allocated by the policy regulator to relevant
companies, i.e. the cap.
Allowing for stochastic production costs, revenues from selling produced goods and emis-
sion quantities, Carmona et al. (2009b) prove in a general setting that the time-t futures
price (with maturity T) for emission permits is given by the penalty multiplied by the
probability of a permit shortage at the end of the compliance period, i.e.
F (t, T ) = P · P (q[0,T ] > N |Ft) , (3.50)
Assuming that interest rates r are deterministic and that there is no convenience yield
as shown by Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007) the theoretical permit price is given by
St = Pe
−r(T−t) · P (q[0,T ] > N |Ft)
=
{
Pe−r(T−t) if q[0,t] ≥ N
Pe−r(T−t) · P (q[t,T ] > N − q[0,t]|Ft) if q[0,t] < N (3.51)
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Original model of Chesney and Taschini (2008)
The model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) specifies the process for the cumulative emis-
sions in the framework of Carmona et al. (2009b) by assuming that the firms’ emission
rate, Qt , follows a geometric Brownian motion, i.e.
Qt = Q0 exp
{(
µ− σ
2
2
)
t+ σWt
}
. (3.52)
Therefore, the cumulative emissions in [0, t] are given by
q[0,t] =
∫ t
0
Qsds. (3.53)
This means that the cumulative emissions are described by the integral over a geometric
Brownian motion for which no closed-form density is available. The model of Chesney and
Taschini (2008) approximates the cumulative emissions in the time interval [t1, t2] ⊆ [0, T ]
by the following linear approximation
q[t1,t2] ≈ q˜Lin[t1,t2] = Qt2(t2 − t1). (3.54)
Lemma 3.2.15 (Cumulative emissions in the model of Chesney and Taschini)
Let µ and σ be the parameters of the geometric Brownian motion modelling the emission
rate. Let t ∈ [0, T ] , τ = T − t and Z ∼ N(0, 1) .
Then the cumulative emissions in the interval [t, T ] are given by
q˜Lin[t,T ] = Qt exp
{
ln(τ) +
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
τ + σ
√
τZ
}
. (3.55)
Proof :
q˜Lin[t,T ]
(3.54)
= (T − t) ·QT = τ ·QT
(3.60)
= τ ·Qt exp
{(
µ− σ
2
2
)
τ + σWτ
}
= Qt exp
{
ln(τ) +
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
τ + σ
√
τZ
}
.
♦
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Lemma 3.2.16 (Permit price - Linear approximation)
The permit price at time t < T is given by
SLint =

Pe−rτ if q[0,t] ≥ N
Pe−rτ · Φ
(
− ln
(
1
τ
[
N−q[0,t]
Qt
])
+
(
µ−σ2
2
)
τ
σ
√
τ
)
if q[0,t] < N
(3.56)
where τ = T − t is the time to compliance.
Remark:
The permit price at time T is given by
SLinT = P · 1{q[0,T ]≥N}.
Proof :
SLint
(3.51),(3.54)
=
{
Pe−rτ if q[0,t] ≥ N
Pe−rτ · P (τ ·QT > N − q[0,t]|Ft) if q[0,t] < N
Let Z ∼ N(0, 1) . Then,
P
(
τ ·QT > N − q[0,t]|Ft
)
(3.60)
= P
(
τ ·Qt exp
{(
µ− σ
2
2
)
τ + σ
√
τZ
}
> N − q[0,t]|Ft
)
Qt>0
= P
(
exp
{(
µ− σ
2
2
)
τ + σ
√
τZ
}
>
1
τ
[
N − q[0,t]
Qt
]
|Ft
)
N>q[0,t]
= 1− Φ
 ln
(
1
τ
[
N−q[0,t]
Qt
])
−
(
µ− σ2
2
)
τ
σ
√
τ

= Φ
− ln
(
1
τ
[
N−q[0,t]
Qt
])
+
(
µ− σ2
2
)
τ
σ
√
τ

completes the proof. ♦
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Extended model of Chesney and Taschini (2008)
The extended model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) was introduced by Gru¨ll and Taschini
(2009) to analyze the relationship between stochastic equilibrium models and the reduced-
form model of Carmona et al. (2009a).
In the extended model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) it is assumed that the firm’s
emission rate, Qt , follows a geometric Brownian motion with time-dependent drift and
volatility, i.e.
Qt = Q0 exp
{∫ t
0
(
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s)dWs
}
. (3.57)
This means that the cumulative emissions, q[0,t] =
∫ t
0
Qsds , are described by an integral
over a geometric Brownian motion with time-dependent drift and volatility for which
no closed-form density is available. Similar to the original model of Chesney and Tas-
chini (2008), cumulative emissions are approximated linearly (cf. Equation (3.54)). The
resulting process is given in Lemma 3.2.17.
Lemma 3.2.17 (Cumulative emissions in the extended model of CT)
Assume that the emission rate, Qt , is modelled by a geometric Brownian motion with
time-dependent deterministic drift, µ(s) , and volatility, σ(s) .
Let t ∈ [0, T ] and Z ∼ N(0, 1) .
Then the cumulative emissions in the interval [t, T ] are given by
q˜Lin−Ext[t,T ] = Qt exp
ln(T − t) +
∫ T
t
(
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)
)
ds+
√∫ T
t
σ2(s)ds · Z
 . (3.58)
Proof :
q˜Lin−Ext[t,T ]
(3.54)
= (T − t) ·QT
(3.57)
= (T − t) ·Qt exp
{∫ T
t
(
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)
)
ds+
∫ T
t
σ(s)dWs
}
= Qt exp
{
ln(T − t) +
∫ T
t
(
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)
)
ds+
∫ T
t
σ(s)dWs
}
= Qt exp
ln(T − t) +
∫ T
t
(
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)
)
ds+
√∫ T
t
σ2(s)ds · Z
 .
♦
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Lemma 3.2.18 (Permit price in the extended model of Chesney and Taschini)
The permit price at time t < T is given by
SLin−Extt =

Pe−rτ if q[0,t] ≥ N
Pe−rτ · Φ
(
− ln
(
N−q[0,t]
τ ·Qt
)
+
∫ T
t (µ(s)− 12σ2(s))ds√∫ T
t σ
2(s)ds
)
if q[0,t] < N
(3.59)
where τ = T − t is the time to compliance.
Proof :
SLin−Extt
(3.51),(3.54)
=
{
Pe−rτ if q[0,t] ≥ N
Pe−rτ · P (τ ·QT > N − q[0,t]|Ft) if q[0,t] < N
Let Z ∼ N(0, 1) . Using Equation (3.57) yields
P
(
Qt exp
{
ln(τ) +
∫ T
t
(
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)
)
ds+
∫ T
t
σ(s)dWs
}
> N − q[0,t]|Ft
)
= P
(
exp
{
ln(τ) +
∫ T
t
(
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)
)
ds+
∫ T
t
σ(s)dWs
}
>
N − q[0,t]
Qt
|Ft
)
= P
(∫ T
t
(
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)
)
ds+
∫ T
t
σ(s)dWs > ln
(
N − q[0,t]
τ ·Qt
)
|Ft
)
= P
√∫ T
t
σ2(s)ds · Z > ln
(
N − q[0,t]
τ ·Qt
)
−
∫ T
t
(
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)
)
ds|Ft

= Φ
− ln
(
N−q[0,t]
τ ·Qt
)
+
∫ T
t
(
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)
)
ds√∫ T
t
σ2(s)ds

which completes the proof. ♦
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3.2d Model of Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009)
Introduction
The model of Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) is an extension of the model of Chesney and Taschini
(2008). An overview of the notation can be found at the beginning of Section 3.2c. Both
models specify the process for the cumulative emissions in the framework of Carmona
et al. (2009b) by assuming that the firms’ emission rate, Qt , follows a geometric Brownian
motion, i.e.
Qt = Q0 exp
{(
µ− σ
2
2
)
t+ σWt
}
. (3.60)
Therefore, the cumulative emissions in [0, t] are given by
q[0,t] =
∫ t
0
Qsds. (3.61)
This means that the cumulative emissions are described by the integral over a geometric
Brownian motion for which no closed-form density is available. The models of Chesney
and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) differ in the way the cumulative emis-
sions are approximated. The linear approximation approach of Chesney and Taschini
(2008) (cf. Equation (3.54) in Section 3.2c) has the shortcoming that the moments of the
approximated cumulative emissions do not match the true ones. Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009)
overcome this over-simplification by applying a moment matching approach.
The method of moment matching is chosen because it was successfully applied to a simi-
lar problem in a completely different area of financial mathematics. Milevsky and Posner
(1998) price Asian options by using a moment matching approach. An Asian option is a
path-dependent option involving the average price of the underlying in the time period
[t1, t2] . If the price of the underlying St is modelled by a geometric Brownian motion
(common assumption in the framework of Black Scholes), the average price of the under-
lying,
1
t2 − t1
∫ t2
t1
Stdt,
involves the integral over a geometric Brownian motion for which no closed-form density
is available. The basic idea is to approximate this integral and to compute the price of
the Asian option using the approximating random variable.
In the moment-matching approach the random variable of interest is approximated by a
well-known and analytically tractable random variable. The parameters of the approxi-
mating random variable are chosen such that its first few moments match the moments
of the random variable for which no closed-form density is available.
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In the following we discuss two different moment-matching approaches for the cumulative
emissions:
(a) Log-normal (moment matching)
q[t1,t2] ≈ q˜Log[t1,t2] = logN
(
µL(t1, t2), σ
2
L(t1, t2)
)
(3.62)
(b) Reciprocal gamma (moment matching)
q[t1,t2] ≈ q˜IG[t1,t2] = IG(αIG, βIG) (3.63)
where the parameters µL(t1, t2) , σL(t1, t2) and αIG and βIG are chosen such that the
first two moments of q˜Log[t1,t2] and q˜
IG
[t1,t2]
, respectively, match those of q[t1,t2] .
The derivation of the permit prices for the different approximation approaches is split up
into three parts:
1. Compute the first two moments of q[t1,t2] =
∫ t2
t1
Qsds (cf. Lemma 3.2.19)
2. Derive the parameters of the random variables that are used to approximate the
cumulative emissions (cf. Lemma 3.2.21)
3. Derive the permit price formulae for the two different moment matching approaches
(cf. Lemma 3.2.22 and 3.2.23)
The derivation makes use of the properties of log-normal, Gamma and Reciprocal Gamma
distributed random variables (cf. Lemma 3.2.24 - 3.2.26).
Numerical illustrations of the permit pricing formulae and interesting properties of the
theoretical permit prices are presented in Section 4.1.
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Moments of the cumulative emissions
Milevsky and Posner (1998) prove the following lemma for the integral over a geometric
Brownian motion.
Lemma 3.2.19 (Moments of q[t1,t2] )
Let Qs = Q0 exp
{(
µ− σ2
2
)
s+ σWs
}
be a geometric Brownian motion.
Then the first two moments of q[t1,t2] =
∫ t2
t1
Qsds are given by
m1(t1, t2) := E
[
q[t1,t2]
]
= Qt1αt2−t1 , (3.64)
m2(t1, t2) := E
[(
q[t1,t2]
)2]
= 2Q2t1βt2−t1 , (3.65)
where
αt2−t1 =
{
1
µ
(
eµ(t2−t1) − 1) if µ 6= 0
t2 − t1 if µ = 0
(3.66)
βt2−t1 =

µe(2µ+σ
2)(t2−t1)+µ+σ2−(2µ+σ2)eµ(t2−t1)
µ(µ+σ2)(2µ+σ2)
if µ 6= 0
1
σ4
(
eσ
2(t2−t1) − 1− σ2 (t2 − t1)
)
if µ = 0
(3.67)
Corollary 3.2.20 (Approximated moments of q[t1,t2] )
For µ 6= 0 the Taylor expansions up to the third order are given by
αt2−t1 ≈ (t2 − t1) +
µ
2
(t2 − t1)2 + µ
2
6
(t2 − t1)3,
βt2−t1 ≈
1
2
(t2 − t1)2 + 3µ
2 + σ4 + 4µσ2
6(µ+ σ2)
· (t2 − t1)3,
E
[
q[t1,t2]
]
= Qt1αt2−t1 ≈ Qt1
[
(t2 − t1) + µ
2
(t2 − t1)2 + µ
2
6
(t2 − t1)3
]
,
V ar(q[t1,t2]) = Q
2
t1
(
2βt2−t1 − α2t2−t1
) ≈ Q2t1 · σ23 (t2 − t1)3.
Remark:
Corollary 3.2.20 shows that αt2−t1 is approximately linear and that βt2−t1 is approxi-
mately a quadratic function for small µ and σ . Therefore, expected cumulative emissions
are approximately linear.
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Parameters of approximating random variables
Lemma 3.2.21 (Cumulative emissions in the model of Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009))
Let µ and σ be the parameters of the geometric Brownian motion modelling the emission
rate. Let t ∈ [0, T ] , τ = T − t and Z ∼ N(0, 1) .
Then the cumulative emissions in the interval [t, T ] are given by
(a) Log-normal (moment matching)
q˜Log[t,T ] = Qt exp
{
ln
(
α2τ√
2βτ
)
+
√
ln
(
2βτ
α2τ
)
Z
}
, (3.68)
where ατ and βτ are given in Lemma 3.2.19.
(b) Reciprocal gamma (moment matching)
q˜IG[t,T ] = Qt · IG(αIG(τ), βIG(τ)), (3.69)
where
αIG(τ) =
4βτ − α2τ
2βτ − α2τ
, βIG(τ) =
2βτ − α2τ
2ατβτ
,
and ατ and βτ are given in Lemma 3.2.19.
Remark:
Cumulative emissions in the model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) are given by (cf.
Lemma 3.2.17)
q˜Lin[t,T ] = Qt exp
{
ln(τ) +
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
τ + σ
√
τZ
}
.
Proof :
(a): The parameters µL(t, T ) and σL(t, T ) are chosen such that the first two moments
of q˜Log[t,T ] = logN(µL(t, T ), σ
2
L(t, T )) match those of q[t,T ] .
Hence by Lemma 3.2.19 and Lemma 3.2.24
σ2L(t, T ) = ln
(
m2(t, T )
m21(t, T )
)
= ln
(
2Q2tβT−t
Q2tα
2
T−t
)
= ln(2βT−t)− 2 ln(αT−t),
µL(t, T ) = ln (m1(t, T ))− 1
2
σ2L(t, T ) = ln(QtαT−t)−
1
2
σ2L(t, T )
= ln(Qt) + 2 ln(αT−t)− 1
2
ln(2βT−t).
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Note that σ2L(t, T ) is independent of Qt , µL(t, T ) not.
(b): The parameters αIG and βIG are chosen such that the first two moments of q˜
IG
[t,T ]
match those of q[t,T ] . Hence by Lemma 3.2.19 and Lemma 3.2.26
αIG =
2m2(t, T )−m21(t, T )
m2(t, T )−m21(t, T )
=
4Q2tβτ −Q2tα2τ
2Q2tβτ −Q2tα2τ
=
4βτ − α2τ
2βτ − α2τ
,
βIG =
m2(t, T )−m21(t, T )
m1(t, T )m2(t, T )
=
2Q2tβτ −Q2tα2τ
(Qtατ )(2Q2tβτ )
=
1
Qt
· 2βτ − α
2
τ
2ατβτ
.
Equation (3.75) and (3.76) complete the proof. ♦
Permit pricing formulae
Lemma 3.2.22 (Permit price - Log-normal moment matching)
The permit price at time t < T is given by
SLogt =

Pe−rτ if q[0,t] ≥ N
Pe−rτ · Φ
(
− ln
(
N−q[0,t]
Qt
)
+2 ln(ατ )− 12 ln(2βτ )√
ln(2βτ )−2 ln(ατ )
)
if q[0,t] < N
(3.70)
where τ = T − t is the time to compliance and ατ , βτ are given in Lemma 3.2.19.
Remark:
The permit price at time T is given by
SLinT = P · 1{q[0,T ]≥N}.
Proof :
Let Z ∼ N(0, 1) . Then,
SLogt
(3.51),(3.68)
=
 Pe−rτ if q[0,t] ≥ NPe−rτ · P(q˜Log[t,T ] > N − q[0,t]|Ft) if q[0,t] < N
where q˜Log[t,T ] is given in Lemma 3.2.21. Assuming that N > q[0,t] we have
P
(
q˜Log[t,T ] > N − q[0,t]|Ft
)
= P
(
Qt exp
{
ln
(
α2τ√
2βτ
)
+
√
ln
(
2βτ
α2τ
)
Z
}
> N − q[0,t]|Ft
)
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= P
Z > ln
(
N−q[0,t]
Qt
)
− ln
(
α2τ√
2βτ
)
√
ln
(
2βτ
α2τ
) |Ft

= Φ
− ln
(
N−q[0,t]
Qt
)
+ ln
(
α2τ√
2βτ
)
√
ln
(
2βτ
α2τ
)

= Φ
− ln
(
N−q[0,t]
Qt
)
+ 2 ln(ατ )− 12 ln(2βτ )√
ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ )
 .
♦
Lemma 3.2.23 (Permit price - Reciprocal gamma moment matching)
The permit price at time t < T is given by
SIGt =
 Pe−rτ if q[0,t] ≥ NPe−rτ ·G( Qt
N−q[0,t] |
4βτ−α2τ
2βτ−α2τ ,
2βτ−α2τ
2ατβτ
)
if q[0,t] < N
(3.71)
where τ = T − t is the time to compliance and ατ , βτ are given in Lemma 3.2.19.
G(x|α, β) denotes the c.d.f. of a gamma distributed random variable with location param-
eter α and scale parameter β .
Remark:
The permit price at time T is given by
SLinT = P · 1{q[0,T ]≥N}.
Proof :
By Equation (3.51) and (3.69)
SIGt =
 Pe−rτ if q[0,t] ≥ NPe−rτ · P(q˜IG[t,T ] > N − q[0,t]|Ft) if q[0,t] < N
where q˜IG[t,T ] ∼ IG(αIG(τ), βIG(τ)) . αIG(τ) and βIG(τ) are given in Lemma 3.2.21.
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Thus for N > q[0,t] we have
P
(
q˜IG[t,T ] > N − q[0,t]|Ft
)
= 1− P (q˜IG[t,T ] ≤ N − q[0,t]|Ft)
(3.76)
= 1−
(
1−G
(
Qt
N − q[0,t] |αIG(τ), βIG(τ)
))
= G
(
Qt
N − q[0,t] |αIG(τ), βIG(τ)
)
= G
(
Qt
N − q[0,t] |
4βτ − α2τ
2βτ − α2τ
,
2βτ − α2τ
2ατβτ
)
.
♦
Relevant distributions
Lemma 3.2.24 (Log-normal distribution)
Let X ∼ logN(µ, σ2) . Then
(a) The kth moment of X is given by
µ
(X)
k = e
kµ+k2 σ
2
2 .
(b) Let X ∼ logN(µ, σ2) be a log-normal random variable with E(X) = m1 and
E(X2) = m2 . Then
σ2 = ln
(
m2
m21
)
, µ = ln(m1)− 1
2
σ2.
Proof :
(b) The first two moments of X ∼ logN(µ, σ2) are given by
E(X) = eµ+
σ2
2 ,
E(X2) = e2(µ+σ2) = (E(X))2eσ2 .
By assumption m2 = m
2
1e
σ2 and m1 = e
µ
√
eσ2 . ♦
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Lemma 3.2.25 (Gamma and Reciprocal Gamma distribution)
(a) The probability density function (p.d.f.) of a Gamma distributed random variable with
shape parameter α and scale parameter β is
g(x | α, β) = 1
Γ(α)
β−αxα−1 exp
{
−x
β
}
∀x > 0. (3.72)
The p.d.f. and the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of X ∼ Γ(α, β) , denoted by
g(x | α, β) and G(x | α, β) , respectively, have the following properties
g(x | α, β) = x
β(α− 1)g (x | α− 1, β) ∀α > 1, (3.73)
g(x | α, β) = 1
β
g
(
x
β
| α, 1
)
, (3.74)
G(x | α, β) = G
(
x
β
| α, 1
)
. (3.75)
(b) If X ∼ Γ(α, β) then 1
X
∼ IG(α, β) .
Denote the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of 1
X
∼ IG(α, β) by GR(x | α, β) and gR(x | α, β) ,
respectively. They are related to G(·) and g(·) as follows:
GR(x | α, β) = 1−G
(
1
x
| α, β
)
, (3.76)
gR(x | α, β) = 1
x2
g
(
1
x
| α, β
)
∀x > 0. (3.77)
Hence the p.d.f. of 1
X
is
gR(x | α, β) = 1
Γ(α)
β−αx−α−1 exp
{
− 1
βx
}
∀x > 0. (3.78)
Lemma 3.2.26 (Moments of reciprocal gamma distribution)
The first two moments of X ∼ IG(α, β) are
M1 =
1
β(α− 1) , M2 =
1
β2(α− 1)(α− 2) . (3.79)
and the parameters α and β can be expressed in terms of the first two moments
α =
2M2 −M21
M2 −M21
, β =
M2 −M21
M1M2
. (3.80)
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3.3 Reduced-form models
3.3a Reduced-form model of Carmona et al. (2009a)
Motivation
Reduced-form models have been introduced by Carmona et al. (2009a) in a recent paper
that addresses the problem of pricing option contracts on emission permits. Following the
definition of Carmona et al. (2009a), we call simplified equilibrium models reduced-form
models.
The basic assumption in the model of Carmona et al. (2009a) is that the permit price is
described by the following risk-neutral price dynamics, i.e. under the risk-neutral measure
Q, the futures permit price F (t, T ) is modelled as
F (t, T ) = P ·Q (ΓT > 1 | Ft) = P ·Q
(
Γ0 exp
{∫ T
0
σsdWs − 1
2
∫ T
0
σ2sds
}
> 1 | Ft
)
,
(3.81)
where Γ0 ∈ (0,∞), and σ(·) is a continuous square integrable deterministic function.
Carmona et al. (2009a) do not provide an explanation of the relationship between their
reduced-form model and the existing stochastic equilibrium models. Probably, the main
motivation of their definition is that those dynamics yield a tractable option pricing model
and that the dynamics take the specific permit price characteristics into account.
Carmona et al. (2009a) derive an explicit permit pricing formula for their reduced-form
model. In order to simplify the notation the formula is derived for the normalized permit
prices as given in Definition 3.3.1. Based on the permit pricing formula, a stochastic
differential equation (SDE) for the normalized permit price is derived (cf. Lemma 3.3.2).
Parameter estimation of the reduced-form model can be carried out with the help of this
SDE (cf. Section 4.3).
Definition 3.3.1 (Normalized permit price)
Let F (t, T ) be the permit price given in Equation (3.50) and let P be the penalty. Then
the permit price divided by the penalty is defined as
at =
F (t, T )
P
.
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Permit price formulae
Lemma 3.3.2 (Permit price in the model of Carmona et al. (2009a))
Assume that the permit price is given by Equation (3.81) for Γ0 ∈ (0,∞) and a deter-
ministic function σs .
Then under the risk-neutral measure the permit price is given by
at = Φ
Φ−1(a0)
√∫ T
0
σ2sds+
∫ t
0
σsdWs√∫ T
t
σ2sds
 . (3.82)
Proof :
at
(3.81)
= Q (ΓT > 1 | Ft) = Q
(
Γt exp
{∫ T
t
σsdWs − 1
2
∫ T
t
σ2sds
}
> 1 | Ft
)
= Φ
 ln(Γt)− 12 ∫ Tt σ2sds√∫ T
t
σ2sds

= Φ
 ln(Γ0) + ∫ t0 σsdWs − 12 ∫ T0 σ2sds√∫ T
t
σ2sds

= Φ
 ln(Γ0)− 12 ∫ T0 σ2sds√∫ T
t
σ2sds
+
∫ t
0
σsdWs√∫ T
t
σ2sds

= Φ
 ln(Γ0)− 12 ∫ T0 σ2sds√∫ T
t
σ2sds
·
√∫ T
0
σ2sds√∫ T
0
σ2sds
+
∫ t
0
σsdWs√∫ T
t
σ2sds

= Φ
 ln(Γ0)− 12 ∫ T0 σ2sds√∫ T
0
σ2sds
·
√∫ T
0
σ2sds√∫ T
t
σ2sds
+
∫ t
0
σsdWs√∫ T
t
σ2sds

= Φ
Φ−1(a0) ·
√∫ T
0
σ2sds√∫ T
t
σ2sds
+
∫ t
0
σsdWs√∫ T
t
σ2sds
 .
♦
Lemma 3.3.3 (General SDE for the model of Carmona et al. (2009a))
The dynamics of the permit price under the historical measure are given by
dat = Φ
′(Φ−1(at))
√
σ2t∫ T
t
σ2sds
(dWt + hdt). (3.83)
Models 101
Proof :
First, the dynamics of the permit price under the risk-neutral measure are derived:
By Lemma 3.3.2,
at = Φ
Φ−1(a0)
√∫ T
0
σ2sds+
∫ t
0
σsdWs√∫ T
t
σ2sds
 := Φ (Xt) := Φ( zt√
nt
)
.
Applying Itoˆ’s lemma yields
dat = dΦ (Xt) = Φ
′(Xt)dXt +
1
2
Φ′′(Xt)d[X]t
= Φ′(Xt)dXt − 1
2
XtΦ
′(Xt)d[X]t
= Φ′(Xt)
[
dXt − 1
2
Xtd[X]t
]
,
where
dnt = − σ2t dt,
dzt = σtdWt,
dXt =
1√
nt
dzt − 1
2
Xt
nt
dnt =
1√
nt
σtdWt +
1
2
Xt
nt
σ2t dt,
d[X]t =
σ2t
nt
dt.
Thus
dXt − 1
2
Xtd[X]t =
1√
nt
σtdWt +
1
2
Xt
nt
σ2t dt−
1
2
Xt
σ2t
nt
dt =
1√
nt
σtdWt.
Therefore, the permit price dynamics under the risk-neutral measure are given by
dat = Φ
′(Φ−1(at))
√
σ2t∫ T
t
σ2sds
dWt.
Assuming that the market price of risk process is constant and deterministic with value
h, Carmona et al. (2009a) show that the dynamics under the historical measure are given
by Equation (3.83). ♦
Remark:
Even though, Carmona et al. (2009a) derive an SDE of the reduced-form model for an ar-
bitrary function σs , they only use a specific function σs for pricing options (cf. Corollary
3.3.4).
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Corollary 3.3.4 (SDE for reduced-form model of Carmona et al. (2009a))
Under the historical measure the permit price dynamics for
σ2t = β(T − t)β−1T−β
are given by
dat = Φ
′(Φ−1(at))
√
β
T − t(dWt + hdt) (3.84)
= Φ′(Φ−1(at))
[√
β
T − tdWt + h
√
β
T − tdt
]
. (3.85)
Proof :
Follows directly from Lemma 3.3.3. ♦
3.3b Reduced-form model of Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009)
A by-product of deriving a parameter estimation method for the stochastic equilibrium
models of Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) is the definition of
the following reduced-form model. Readers interested in the motivation of the SDE given
in Lemma 3.3.5 are referred to the proof in Section 4.3.
Definition 3.3.5 (Reduced-form model of Gru¨ll and Taschini)
Assume that the permit price divided by the penalty is described by the following SDE
d
(
Φ−1(at)
√
T − t
)
= adt+ bdWt,
where a, b ∈ R are the parameters of the reduced-form model under the historical measure.
In the following Corollary we derive an SDE for the reduced-form model of Gru¨ll and
Taschini (2009) in order to compare it to the model of Carmona et al. (2009a).
Corollary 3.3.6 (SDE for the reduced-form model of Gru¨ll and Taschini)
The permit price dynamics are given by
dat =
Φ′(Φ−1(at))√
T − t
[(
a+
1− b2
2
√
T − tΦ
−1(at)
)
dt+ bdWt
]
.
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Proof :
Let Xt = Φ
−1(at)
√
T − t . Thus at = Φ
(
Xt√
T−t
)
:= f(Xt, t) and
fx(x, t) = Φ
′
(
x√
T − t
)
· 1√
T − t ,
fxx(x, t) = Φ
′′
(
x√
T − t
)
· 1
T − t = −
x√
T − tΦ
′
(
x√
T − t
)
· 1
T − t ,
ft(x, t) =
1
2
xΦ′
(
x√
T − t
)
· (T − t)− 32 .
By Definition 3.3.5, we have
dXt = adt+ bdWt,
d[X]t = b
2dt.
By Itoˆ’s lemma, we obtain
dat = df(Xt, t) = fx(Xt, t)dXt + ft(Xt, t)dt+
1
2
fxx(Xt, t)d[X]t
= Φ′
(
Xt√
T − t
)
· 1√
T − t
[
adt+ bdWt +
Xt
2(T − t)dt−
Xt
2(T − t) · b
2dt
]
=
Φ′(Φ−1(at))√
T − t
[(
a+
1− b2
2
√
T − tΦ
−1(at)
)
dt+ bdWt
]
.
♦
Remark:
The SDE for the reduced-form model of Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009) differs from the SDE
for the model of Carmona et al. (2009a) by the additional term 1−b
2
2
√
T−tΦ
−1(at)dt.
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3.4 Relationship between deterministic and stochas-
tic equilibrium models
Deterministic and stochastic equilibrium models are developed for analyzing permit prices
and properties of emissions trading schemes from a theoretical point of view. All the
models in Section 3.1 and 3.2 derive permit prices and prove cost-optimality of emissions
trading with the help of optimization problems. The basic assumption is that regulated
companies are maximizing their profits by choosing optimal strategies of emitting green-
house gases and buying or selling permits. Moreover, in the joint optimization problem
a fictitious central planner is maximizing aggregated profits of all firms by choosing opti-
mal emission quantities for each firm. The most important variables of the optimization
problems are deterministic/stochastic in a deterministic/stochastic equilibrium model.
However, the structure of the optimization problems is similar for all the discussed mod-
els (cf. Section 3.1 and 3.2). Readers interested in a detailed comparison are referred to
Table 3.2 - 3.7.
A by-product of solving the profit maximization problems in the different settings is that
we obtain a convenient interpretation of the permit price. In a deterministic equilibrium
model the permit price is equal to the marginal abatement costs (cf. Section 3.1) whereas
in a stochastic equilibrium model the permit price is equal to the penalty multiplied by
the probability of a permit shortage at the end of the compliance period (cf. Section 3.2).
In a deterministic framework the permit price (i.e. the marginal abatement costs) does
neither explicitly depend on the regulations of an emissions trading scheme such as the
penalty fee and the number of allocated permits nor on the expected future emissions
of the regulated companies. Permit prices in a stochastic equilibrium model capture
these dependencies. At a fixed point in time the probability of permit shortage can be
interpreted as the marginal abatement costs that depend on the expected cumulative
emissions in the compliance period and on the total number of permits functional for
compliance. This interpretation is the link between the two concepts: the concept of
marginal abatement costs and the concept of probability of permit shortage.
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Paper Single- or
Multi-step
model
Discrete- or
Continuous-
time
Deterministic
or Stochastic
variables
Contains
proof of cost
optimality
Montgomery
(1972)
Single Discrete Deterministic Yes
Cronshaw and
Kruse (1996)
Multi Discrete Deterministic Yes
Rubin (1996) Multi Continuous Deterministic Yes
Kling and
Rubin (1997)
Multi Continuous Deterministic No1
Seifert et al.
(2008)
Multi Continuous Stochastic Yes
Carmona et al.
(2009)
Multi Discrete Stochastic Yes
Chesney and
Taschini (2008)
Multi Continuous Stochastic No
Gru¨ll and Kiesel
(2009)
Multi Continuous Stochastic No
Table 3.2: Survey on the general framework of deterministic and stochastic equilibrium
models.
1No, but contains proof of social optimality of emissions trading.
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Model Costs/Profits in the target function of the
optimization problem
Montgomery (1972) (i) Abatement costs defined as the difference between
the maximum unconstrained profits from the pro-
duction of goods and the maximum profits when
the firms have to adopt to a specific emission level
(ii) Costs/Profits from emissions trading
Rubin (1996) (i) Abatement costs as defined by Montgomery (1972)
(ii) Costs/Profits from emissions trading
Kling and Rubin (1997) (i) Revenues from the production of goods
(ii) Production costs depending on the number of pro-
duced goods and on the emissions
(iii) Costs/Profits from emissions trading
Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) (i) Maximum profits from the production of goods de-
pending on the emissions and on the number of
traded permits
(ii) Costs/Profits from emissions trading
Seifert et al. (2008) (i) Abatement costs
(ii) Costs/Profits from emissions trading
(iii) Penalty payment
Carmona et al. (2009b) (i) Revenues from the production of goods depending
on the output volume and the production technol-
ogy
(ii) Production costs depending on the output volume
and on the production technology
(iii) Costs/Profits from emissions trading
(iv) Penalty payment
Table 3.3: Comparison of the optimization problems in the equilibrium models (Part 1).
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Model Cost optimization with
respect to the number
of traded permits and
Constraints of the opti-
mization problem
Montgomery (1972) Total emissions Firms comply at the end
Rubin (1996) Total emissions Firms comply at the end
and are not allowed to
borrow permits during the
compliance period
Kling and Rubin (1997) Total emissions and
Output of produced good
Firms comply at the end
Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) Total emissions Firms comply at the end
and are not allowed to
borrow permits during the
compliance period
Seifert et al. (2008) Abated emissions None
Carmona et al. (2009b) Output of produced goods
using different technologies
None
Table 3.4: Comparison of the optimization problems in the equilibrium models (Part 2).
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Model Literature used to prove cost-optimality of emis-
sions trading
Montgomery (1972) Well-known Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions - theorem
was originally derived by Karush (1939) and Kuhn and
Tucker (1951)
Rubin (1996) Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) or
Kamien and Schwartz (1991), Seierstad and Sydsaeter
(1987), Steinberg and Stalford (1973)
Kling and Rubin (1997) Kamien and Schwartz (1991)
Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) Takayama (1985)
Seifert et al. (2008) Sethi and Thompson (1981)
Carmona et al. (2009b) Tailor-made proof by Carmona et al. (2009b)
Chesney and Taschini (2008) Reference to the proof in Carmona et al. (2009b)
Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) Reference to the proof in Carmona et al. (2009b)
Table 3.5: Overview of the literature used to prove cost-optimality of emissions trading
in the different equilibrium models.
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Variable Description
α Abatement rate in the model of Seifert et al. (2008)
At Time-t futures permit price (maturity at time T ) in the model of Car-
mona et al. (2009b)
B Number of permits in the “bank” corresponding to the number of allo-
cated permits plus the purchased permits minus the emissions. Variable
is used in the models of Rubin (1996), Kling and Rubin (1997) and Cron-
shaw and Kruse (1996)
β Emission rate before abatement activities in the model of Seifert et al.
(2008)
C(·) Abatement costs in the models of Montgomery (1972) and Rubin (1996)
Cgood(·) Production costs in the models of Montgomery (1972), Rubin (1996),
Kling and Rubin (1997), Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) and Carmona et al.
(2009b)
D Demand for the goods in the model of Carmona et al. (2009b)
∆ Aggregated uncontrollable emissions in [0, T ] in the model of Carmona
et al. (2009b)
e Emission factor in the model of Carmona et al. (2009b)
G Prices of the produced goods in the model of Montgomery (1972), Rubin
(1996), Kling and Rubin (1997) and Carmona et al. (2009b)
i Superscript i is always referring to company i
K Production capacity in the model of Carmona et al. (2009b)
κ Marginal production costs in the model of Carmona et al. (2009b)
µ Parameter of the process modelling the emission rate in the models of
Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009)
N Number of allocated emission allowances in the models of Montgomery
(1972), Rubin (1996), Kling and Rubin (1997), Cronshaw and Kruse
(1996), Seifert et al. (2008), Carmona et al. (2009b), Chesney and Tas-
chini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009)
P Penalty per unit of emission that is not covered by an allowance at com-
pliance time. Variable is used in the models of Seifert et al. (2008),
Carmona et al. (2009b), Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and
Kiesel (2009)
Table 3.6: Survey on the variables of the different equilibrium models (Part 1).
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Variable Description
pi(·) Profit/Loss from the production of goods in the models of Montgomery
(1972) and Rubin (1996)
Π(·) Maximum profit from the production of goods in the model of Cronshaw
and Kruse (1996)
Q Emission rate (including abatement activities) in the models of Mont-
gomery (1972), Rubin (1996), Kling and Rubin (1997), Cronshaw and
Kruse (1996), Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009)
q Expected total cumulative emissions in [0, T ] in the model of Seifert et al.
(2008)
q(y) Cumulative emissions in [0, T ] (excluding uncontrollable emissions) in
the model Carmona et al. (2009b)
q[t1,t2] Total cumulative emissions in [t1, t2] in the models of Chesney and Tas-
chini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009)
Rgood(·) Revenues from the production of goods in the models of Montgomery
(1972), Rubin (1996), Kling and Rubin (1997), Cronshaw and Kruse
(1996) and Carmona et al. (2009b)
S Permit price in the models of Montgomery (1972), Rubin (1996), Kling
and Rubin (1997), Cronshaw and Kruse (1996), Seifert et al. (2008),
Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009)
σ Parameter of the process modelling the emission rate in the models of
Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009)
T End of the (compliance) period in the models of Rubin (1996), Kling and
Rubin (1997), Cronshaw and Kruse (1996), Seifert et al. (2008), Carmona
et al. (2009b), Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009)
θ Number of permits bought from/ sold to other companies at time t in the
models of Montgomery (1972), Rubin (1996), Kling and Rubin (1997),
Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) and Seifert et al. (2008)
Θ Number of permits bought from/ sold to other companies until time t in
the model of Carmona et al. (2009b)
y Output quantity of the produced good in the models of Montgomery
(1972), Rubin (1996), Kling and Rubin (1997), Cronshaw and Kruse
(1996) and Carmona et al. (2009b)
Table 3.7: Survey on the variables of the different equilibrium models (Part 2).
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3.5 Relationship between stochastic equilibrium mod-
els and reduced-form models
This section discusses how the reduced-form model of Carmona et al. (2009a) is related
with the stochastic equilibrium model of Carmona et al. (2009b) and with the extended
stochastic equilibrium model of Chesney and Taschini (2008).
Relationship between the reduced-form model of Carmona et al. (2009a) and
the stochastic equilibrium model of Carmona et al. (2009b)
The basic assumption in the reduced-form model of Carmona et al. (2009a) is that the
permit price is described by the following risk-neutral price dynamics, i.e. under the
risk-neutral measure Q, the futures permit price F (t, T ) is modelled as
F (t, T ) = P ·Q (ΓT > 1 | Ft) = P ·Q
(
Γ0 exp
{∫ T
0
σsdWs − 1
2
∫ T
0
σ2sds
}
> 1 | Ft
)
,
where Γ0 ∈ (0,∞), and σ(·) is a continuous square integrable deterministic function.
Carmona et al. (2009a) prove that the futures permit price under the historical measure
P for some fixed h ∈ R, is given by
F (t, T ) = P · P
(
Γ0 exp
{∫ T
0
σs(dWs + hds)− 1
2
∫ T
0
σ2sds
}
> 1 | Ft
)
= P · P
(
Γ0 exp
{∫ T
0
σsdWs − 1
2
∫ T
0
(σ2s − 2hσs)ds
}
> 1 | Ft
)
. (3.86)
Comparing Equation (3.50) and (3.86), shows that the reduced-form model of Carmona
et al. (2009a) is a stochastic equilibrium model with aggregated cumulative emissions as
given in Lemma 3.5.1.
Lemma 3.5.1 (Cumulative emissions in the model of Carmona et al. (2009a))
Let Γ0 ∈ (0,∞) , h ∈ R . σ(s) denotes a continuous square integrable deterministic func-
tion. Then the cumulative emissions in the interval [0, T ] are given by
q[0,T ] = N · Γ0 exp
{∫ T
0
σ(s)dWs − 1
2
∫ T
0
(σ2(s)− 2hσ(s))ds
}
. (3.87)
Remark:
It is important to note that the cumulative emissions of the reduced-form model of Car-
mona et al. (2009a) do not satisfy two important (and quite natural) properties of pollu-
tants such as greenhouse gases. In the reduced-form model cumulative emissions are
Models 112
• not additive in time (i.e. q[0,T ] 6= q[0,t] + q[t,T ] for t < T ) and
• they do not strictly increase over time.
However, this assumption makes computations in Carmona et al. (2009a) much easier and
yields a tractable option pricing model.
Relationship between the reduced-form model of Carmona et al. (2009a) and
the stochastic equilibrium model of Chesney and Taschini (2008)
The comparison of the models of Carmona et al. (2009a) and the extended model of
Chesney and Taschini (2008) is performed by deriving a stochastic differential equation
(SDE) for the extended model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) (cf. Lemma 3.5.4) and
then comparing it to the SDE of the reduced-form model of Carmona et al. (2009a) (cf.
Corollary 3.3.4).
Analogous to the proof in the paper of Carmona et al. (2009a), the derivation of the price
dynamics is done in two steps. First, we derive the theoretical price of emission permits
at time t in the extended framework of Chesney and Taschini (2008), assuming that we
know the emission rate at time t and the aggregated cumulative emissions until t (cf.
Lemma 3.5.2). The SDE for the price dynamics is obtained in a second step by treating
the emission rate and cumulative emissions in Lemma 3.5.2 as random variables.
Lemma 3.5.2 (Normalized permit price in the extended model of CT)
The time-t permit price divided by the penalty is given by
at = Φ
− ln
(
N−q[0,t]
τ ·Qt
)
+
∫ T
t
(
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)
)
ds√∫ T
t
σ2(s)ds
 .
In particular, we have
a0 = Φ
− ln
(
N
τ ·Q0
)
+
∫ T
0
(
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)
)
ds√∫ T
0
σ2(s)ds
 .
Proof :
Follows directly from at =
F (t,T )
P
and Lemma 3.2.18. ♦
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Definition 3.5.3 (“Longness” of the permit market)
The “longness” of the permit market is defined as the number of remaining permits divided
by the emissions in the remaining time period given the current emission rate, i.e.
N − q[0,t]
(T − t) ·Qt .
Remark:
The “longness” of the permit market has to be interpreted as follows: Values greater (less)
than 1 correspond to a situation where the emission market is long (short) in permits.
Theorem 3.5.4 (SDE for the extended model of Chesney and Taschini)
Assume that the emission rate follows a geometric Brownian motion with a deterministic
time-dependent drift µs and a diffusion coefficient σs .
(a) Approximate the “longness” of the permit market by
N − q[0,t]
(T − t) ·Qt ≈
N
T ·Q0 exp
{∫ t
0
(
µ˜s − σ˜
2
s
2
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σ˜sdWs
}
,
where µ˜s and σ˜s are deterministic functions. Then the dynamics of the permit
price in the extended model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) are given by
dat = −Φ
′ (Φ−1(at))√∫ T
t
σ2sds
µ˜t + µt − σ˜2t
2
− σ
2
t
2
+
1
2
σ˜2t − σ2t√∫ T
t
σ2sds
Φ−1(at)
 dt+ σ˜tdWt
 .
(b) The model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) with time-dependent emission rate can
be transformed into the model of Carmona et al. (2009a) as given in Corollary 3.3.4
by setting
σ˜t = − σt = −
√
β(T − t)β−1,
µ˜t = − µt + σt(σt − h).
Proof :
(a) The assumed approximation and Lemma 3.5.2 yield
at = Φ
− ln
(
N
T ·Q0 exp
{∫ t
0
(
µ˜s − σ˜2s2
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σ˜sdWs
})
+
∫ T
t
(
µs − σ2s2
)
ds√∫ T
t
σ2sds

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= Φ
− ln
(
N
T ·Q0
)
− ∫ t
0
(
µ˜s − σ˜2s2
)
ds− ∫ t
0
σ˜sdWs +
∫ T
t
(
µs − σ2s2
)
ds√∫ T
t
σ2sds

= Φ
− ln
(
N
T ·Q0
)
− ∫ t
0
(
µ˜s − σ˜2s2
)
ds− ∫ t
0
σ˜sdWs +
∫ T
0
(
µs − σ2s2
)
ds− ∫ t
0
(
µs − σ2s2
)
ds√∫ T
t
σ2sds

= Φ
Φ−1(a0)
√∫ T
0
σ2sds−
∫ t
0
(
µ˜s + µs − σ˜2s2 − σ
2
s
2
)
ds− ∫ t
0
σ˜sdWs√∫ T
t
σ2sds

:= Φ (Xt) := Φ
(
zt√
nt
)
.
We have
dat = dΦ (Xt) = Φ
′(Xt)dXt +
1
2
Φ′′(Xt)d[X]t
= Φ′(Xt)dXt − 1
2
XtΦ
′(Xt)d[X]t
= Φ′(Xt)
[
dXt − 1
2
Xtd[X]t
]
,
where
dnt = − σ2t dt,
dzt = −
(
µ˜t + µt − σ˜
2
t
2
− σ
2
t
2
)
dt− σ˜tdWt,
dXt =
1√
nt
dzt − 1
2
Xt
nt
dnt
= − 1√∫ T
t
σ2sds
(
µ˜t + µt − σ˜
2
t
2
− σ
2
t
2
)
dt− σ˜t√∫ T
t
σ2sds
dWt +
1
2
σ2t∫ T
t
σ2sds
Xtdt,
d[X]t =
σ˜2t∫ T
t
σ2sds
dt.
Thus
dXt − 1
2
Xtd[X]t = − 1√∫ T
t
σ2sds
(
µ˜t + µt − σ˜
2
t
2
− σ
2
t
2
)
dt− σ˜t√∫ T
t
σ2sds
dWt
− 1
2
σ˜2t − σ2t∫ T
t
σ2sds
Xtdt.
(b) The model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) can be transformed into the model of
Carmona et al. (2009a) equating the coefficients of “ dt ” and “ dWt ”
− σ˜t√∫ T
t
σ2sds
=
√
β
T − t , (3.88)
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and
− 1√∫ T
t
σ2sds
(
µ˜t + µt − σ˜
2
t
2
− σ
2
t
2
)
= h
√
β
T − t . (3.89)
By setting σ˜2t = σ
2
t and then rearranging Equation (3.88) we obtain the following PDE
σ˜2t ·
T − t
β
=
∫ T
t
σ˜2sds.
Hence for β > 0 we have σ˜2t = β(T − t)β−1 = σ2t . Thus
σ˜t = −σt = −
√
β(T − t)β−1.
Applying σ˜2t = σ
2
t to Equation (3.89) and then equating (3.88) and (3.89) yields
µ˜t + µt − σ˜2t = hσ˜t
which completes the proof. ♦
Chapter 4
Permit price dynamics (Ordinary
scheme)
4.1 Jumpy behaviour
4.1a Introduction
The permit price series of the EU ETS (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme)
is characterized, especially, during the first phase by a jumpy behaviour and a massive
price slump of about -50% within only two weeks (28 April 2006 - 15 May 2006). There-
fore, the following classes of processes have been used to describe the price dynamics:
jump-diffusion models (Wagner (2007), Daskalakis et al. (2009)), GARCH-models (Benz
and Tru¨ck (2008) and Wagner (2007)), regime-switching models (Wagner (2007), Benz
and Tru¨ck (2008)), Mix-Normal GARCH-models (Paolella and Taschini (2008)) and two-
factor models (Cetin and Verschuere (2008)). Other authors support the argument that
the permit price responds to macroeconomic fundamentals and try to explain the price
evolution of emission permits in terms of electricity, gas, oil and coal prices and weather
effects (cf. Hintermann (2009) and Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007)).
However, none of the papers is able to explain why permit prices are extremely jumpy.
Therefore, this question is discussed in the following subsections from a theoretical point
of view. The permit price models in Section 3.2c and 3.2d capture the main characteris-
tics of an ordinary scheme such as Phase I of the EU ETS . The models of Chesney and
Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) are of special interest as analytical permit
price formulae are available for these models.
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Therefore, the theoretical analysis of the jumpy permit price behaviour is performed in
the framework of Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009). Section 3.2c
and 3.2d presented three different permit price formulae in the models of Chesney and
Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009):
• Linear approximation (cf. Lemma 3.2.16 in Section 3.2c)
• Log-normal moment matching (cf. Lemma 3.2.22 in Section 3.2d)
• Reciprocal gamma moment matching (cf. Lemma 3.2.23 in Section 3.2d)
In Section 4.1b it is shown how the theoretical permit price is related to a random variable
that is very easy to interpret (cf. Definition 4.1.1). These results are illustrated in Section
4.1c. Section 4.1d provides a theoretical explanation for the jumpy price behaviour. The
derivation of this result makes use of the theorems in Section 4.1b.
4.1b Permit price properties
Definition 4.1.1 (Time needed to exhaust the remaining permits)
Let Qt be the emission rate at time t , q[0,t] the cumulative emissions until t and N the
number of allowances handed out by the regulator.
Then the time needed to exhaust the remaining permits at the current emission rate is
defined by
xt =
N − q[0,t]
Qt
. (4.1)
Lemma 4.1.2 (Permit price properties - Linear approximation)
The permit price for the linear approximation is given by
SLint =

Pe−rτ if q[0,t] ≥ N
Pe−rτ · Φ
(
− ln
(
1
τ
[
N−q[0,t]
Qt
])
+
(
µ−σ2
2
)
τ
σ
√
τ
)
if q[0,t] < N
(4.2)
where τ = T − t is the time to compliance.
(a) Let t ∈ [0, T ) , c > 0 and q[0,t] < N . Then
SLint ∈ (Pe−rτ · Φ(−c), P e−rτ · Φ(c)) iff xt ∈ (at, bt) where
at := τ exp
{
−cσ√τ +
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
τ
}
,
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bt := τ exp
{
cσ
√
τ +
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
τ
}
.
(b) Let t ∈ [0, T ) and q[0,t] < N . Then
dSLint
dxt
(xt) := −Pe
−rτ
σ
√
τ
· 1
xt
φ
− ln ( 1τ xt)+
(
µ− σ2
2
)
τ
σ
√
τ
 < 0.
(c) Let t ∈ [0, T ) and q[0,t] < N .
Then a change of h per cent in xt :=
N−q[0,t]
Qt
implies approximately a permit price change
of p per cent
p = −
φ
(
− ln( 1τ xt)+
(
µ−σ2
2
)
τ
σ
√
τ
)
Φ
(
− ln( 1τ xt)+
(
µ−σ2
2
)
τ
σ
√
τ
) · h
σ
√
τ
.
Proof :
(a) By Lemma 3.2.16
SLint < Pe
−rτ · Φ(c)⇔ Pe−rτ · Φ
− ln
(
1
τ
[
N−q[0,t]
Qt
])
+
(
µ− σ2
2
)
τ
σ
√
τ
 < Pe−rτ · Φ(c)
⇔
− ln
(
1
τ
[
N−q[0,t]
Qt
])
+
(
µ− σ2
2
)
τ
σ
√
τ
< c
⇔
ln
(
1
τ
[
N−q[0,t]
Qt
])
−
(
µ− σ2
2
)
τ
σ
√
τ
> −c
⇔ xt > τ exp
{
−cσ√τ +
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
τ
}
.
Analogous to the above proof we have
SLint > Pe
−rτ · Φ(−c)⇔ xt < τ exp
{
cσ
√
τ +
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
τ
}
.
(b) Follows from deriving Equation (4.2).
(c) The following expression
dSLint
dxt
(xt) ≈ S
Lin
t ((1 + h)xt)− SLint (xt)
hxt
is equivalent to
SLint ((1 + h)xt)− SLint (xt)
SLint (xt)
≈ hxt
dSLint
dxt
(xt)
SLint (xt)
.
Lemma 3.2.16 and part (a) complete the proof. ♦
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Lemma 4.1.3 (Permit price properties - Log-normal moment matching)
The permit price in the log-normal moment matching approach is given by
SLogt =

Pe−rτ if q[0,t] ≥ N
Pe−rτ · Φ
(
− ln
(
N−q[0,t]
Qt
)
+2 ln(ατ )− 12 ln(2βτ )√
ln(2βτ )−2 ln(ατ )
)
if q[0,t] < N
(4.3)
where τ = T − t is the time to compliance and ατ , βτ are given in Lemma 3.2.19.
(a) Let t ∈ [0, T ) , c > 0 and q[0,t] < N . Then
SLogt ∈ (Pe−rτ · Φ(−c), P e−rτ · Φ(c)) iff xt ∈ (at, bt) where
at := exp
{
−c
√
ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ ) + 2 ln(ατ )− 1
2
ln(2βτ )
}
,
bt := exp
{
c
√
ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ ) + 2 ln(ατ )− 1
2
ln(2βτ )
}
.
(b) Let t ∈ [0, T ) and q[0,t] < N . Then
dSLogt
dxt
(xt) := − Pe
−rτ√
ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ )
· 1
xt
φ
(
− ln (xt) + 2 ln(ατ )− 12 ln(2βτ )√
ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ )
)
< 0.
(c) Let t ∈ [0, T ) and q[0,t] < N .
Then a change of h per cent in xt :=
N−q[0,t]
Qt
implies approximately a permit price change
of p per cent
p = −
φ
(
− ln(xt)+2 ln(ατ )− 12 ln(2βτ )√
ln(2βτ )−2 ln(ατ )
)
Φ
(
− ln(xt)+2 ln(ατ )− 12 ln(2βτ )√
ln(2βτ )−2 ln(ατ )
) · h√
ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ )
.
Proof :
(a) By Lemma 3.2.22
SLogt < Pe
−rτ · Φ(c)⇔ Pe−rτ · Φ
− ln
(
N−q[0,t]
Qt
)
+ 2 ln(ατ )− 12 ln(2βτ )√
ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ )
 < Pe−rτ · Φ(c)
⇔
− ln
(
N−q[0,t]
Qt
)
+ 2 ln(ατ )− 12 ln(2βτ )√
ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ )
< c
⇔
ln
(
N−q[0,t]
Qt
)
− 2 ln(ατ ) + 12 ln(2βτ )√
ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ )
> −c
⇔ xt > exp
{
−c
√
ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ ) + 2 ln(ατ )− 1
2
ln(2βτ )
}
.
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Analogous to the above proof we have
SLogt > Pe
−rτ · Φ(−c)⇔ xt < exp
{
c
√
ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ ) + 2 ln(ατ )− 1
2
ln(2βτ )
}
.
(b) Follows from deriving Equation (4.3).
(c) Analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.2.16 (c). ♦
Lemma 4.1.4 (Permit price properties - Reciprocal gamma moment matching)
The permit price for the reciprocal gamma moment matching approach is given by
SIGt =
 Pe−rτ if q[0,t] ≥ NPe−rτ ·G( Qt
N−q[0,t] |
4βτ−α2τ
2βτ−α2τ ,
2βτ−α2τ
2ατβτ
)
if q[0,t] < N
(4.4)
where τ = T − t is the time to compliance and ατ , βτ are given in Lemma 3.2.19.
G(x|α, β) denotes the c.d.f. of a gamma distributed random variable with location param-
eter α and scale parameter β .
(a) Let t ∈ [0, T ) and q[0,t] < N . Then
dSIGt
dxt
(xt) := −Pe−rτgR
(
xt|4βτ − α
2
τ
2βτ − α2τ
,
2βτ − α2τ
2ατβτ
)
< 0.
(b) Let t ∈ [0, T ) and q[0,t] < N .
Then a change of h per cent in xt :=
N−q[0,t]
Qt
implies approximately a permit price change
of p per cent
p = −
gR
(
xt| 2βτ2βτ−α2τ ,
2βτ−α2τ
2ατβτ
)
G
(
1
xt
|4βτ−α2τ
2βτ−α2τ ,
2βτ−α2τ
2ατβτ
) · ατh.
Proof :
(a) For N > q[0,t] differentiating Sˆt(xt) yields
dSIGt
dxt
(xt) = − Pe−rτ 1
x2t
· g
(
1
xt
|4βτ − α
2
τ
2βτ − α2τ
,
2βτ − α2τ
2ατβτ
)
(3.77)
= − Pe−rτ · gR
(
xt|4βτ − α
2
τ
2βτ − α2τ
,
2βτ − α2τ
2ατβτ
)
(b) Analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.2.16 (c). Hereby we use Equation (3.73) and
(3.77) and the fact that 4βτ−α
2
τ
2βτ−α2τ > 1 . ♦
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4.1c Numerical illustrations of equilibrium permit price
The theoretical time-t permit price is a function of µ and σ (parameters of the emission
rate) and of xt , the time needed to exhaust the remaining permits. In case that we know
xt (equivalent to knowing q[0,t] ) the time-t permit price is deterministic. Otherwise
the permit price is a function of the random variable xt . The following graphs show
trajectories of the permit price for the different approximation approaches. In order to
make the prices for the different approximation approaches comparable we proceed as
follows: we create a sample path for the emission rate which yields a sample path for
the cumulative emissions and xt . Then, we compute the permit prices for the different
approximation approaches using the same emissions trajectory. Furthermore, we plot the
permit prices of the expected cumulative emissions E
(
q[0,t]
)
. Lower and upper bounds
are obtained by considering the permit prices of E
(
q[0,t]
) ± c√V ar (q[0,t]) which is the
confidence band for cumulative emissions. Figure 4.1 shows the trajectory of xt that is
used to compute the price trajectories in Figure 4.2. It is important to note that the
variance of the sample trajectory in Figure 4.1 is very small (almost behaving like an
affine function) but even minor changes in xt can lead to relatively large price jumps (cf.
Figure 4.2). This hints at permit prices that are inherently prone to jumps (resulting from
changes in the expected time needed to exhaust the remaining permits). Figure 4.2 and 4.3
illustrate that there is a difference between the price of the linear approximation approach
and the prices of the moment matching approaches. The prices of the log-normal and the
reciprocal gamma moment matching approach are very close to each other. Therefore,
we focus on the log-normal moment matching approach and the linear approximation
approach in Section 4.1d.
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Figure 4.1: Trajectory of xt =
N−q[0,t]
Qt
with confidence interval for xt (2 StDev).
t ∈ [0, 1] , N = Q0 = 100 , µ = 0.02 and σ = 0.05 .
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Figure 4.2: Trajectory of SLint (xt) (left), S
Log
t (xt) (middle) and S
IG
t (xt) (right) with
price path for expected cumulative emissions and its lower and upper confidence band.
t ∈ [0, 1] , N = Q0 = 100 , µ = 0.02 and σ = 0.05 .
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Figure 4.3: Price path for lower (Left) and upper (Middle) confidence band for cumulative
emissions and for expected cumulative emissions (Right). Moment matching approaches
(straight lines); Linear approximation (dashed line). t ∈ [0, 1] , N = Q0 = 100 , µ = 0.02
and σ = 0.05 .
4.1d Implied parameters
The preceding subsection illustrated the behaviour of the permit prices using simulated
data. With the aim to analyze the observed permit prices within a stochastic equilibrium
model we look at the following two useful implied parameters.
1. Implied time needed to exhaust the remaining permits ximplt
2. Implied adjustment of xt due to the announcement of verified emissions and the
observed resulting permit price change
The implied time needed to exhaust the remaining permits ximplt is obtained by equating
the observed permit price St and the theoretical permit price S
approx
t
(
ximplt |µ, σ
)
and
then solving for ximplt . Hereby we fix the parameters µ and σ of the emission rate.
Performing a scenario analysis by varying the parameters µ and σ allows us to relate
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the permit price level to xt , the time needed to exhaust the remaining permits. An
advantage of xt is that it is easy to interpret and that it can be used in the context
of crosschecks. Moreover, it is much handier than the interpretation of the permit price
as the discounted penalty times the probability of permit shortage at compliance time.
Based on the implied time needed to exhaust the remaining permits we define the following
random variable.
Definition 4.1.5 (Over-/Underallocation)
Let xt be the time needed to exhaust the remaining permits as defined in Definition 4.1.1
and let T − t be the time to compliance.
Then over-/underallocation is defined by
xt − (T − t). (4.5)
Remark:
Over-/underallocation is measured in years. Positive (negative) values correspond to
overallocation (underallocation).
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Figure 4.4: Implied over-/underallocation for first phase of EU ETS for fixed µ = 0.02 and
σ = 0.05 . Linear approximation approach (straight line), log-normal moment matching
(dashed line).
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Figure 4.4 shows the implied over-/underallocation for the first phase of the EU ETS
(May 2005 - December 2007). In the first time period (May 2005 - April 2006) the permit
prices implied that there was an overallocation of permits. However, the level of implied
overallocation declined and reached slight implied underallocation in March/April 2006.
Rumours of overallocation and the final official publication of the verified emission data
for 2005 on 15 May 2006 (overallocation of 2.5 per cent in 2005) lead to a jump from
slight implied underallocation to implied overallocation. In the time period from 15 May
2006 until compliance time at the end of 2007 the market sentiment did not change and
remained in the status of implied overallocation. Note that the two approximation ap-
proaches lead to different values of ximplt with the log-normal moment-matching approach
being more sensitive to changes in xt . Nevertheless, both approximation approaches lead
to the same interpretation of overallocation and underallocation during the first phase of
the EU ETS.
As the price slump of about -50% between 28 April 2006 and 15 May 2006 is one of
the main characteristics of the permit price time series of the first EU ETS phase we
extensively analyze the relationship of the permit price and the implied adjustment of the
time needed to exhaust the remaining permits xt (cf. Lemma 4.1.6 and Lemma 4.1.7).
Using the information of the announcement of the verified emissions and the permit prices
both before and after the publication of the verified emission data, Lemma 4.1.6 gives us
the implied percentage change of xt for fixed volatility σ of the emission rate.
Figure 4.5 shows that for reasonable values of σ the extreme permit price drop is caused
by a relatively small adjustment of xt . The log-normal moment matching approach is
even more sensitive towards a change of xt than the linear approximation approach as
already observed in Figure 4.4.
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Lemma 4.1.6 (Determining implied parameters)
Let x¯t =
(
N
q[0,t]
− 1
)
t be the estimator of xt on the day of the announcement of the
cumulative emissions.
Assume that we know the number of permits N , the cumulative emissions at time t,
q[0,t] , and the futures permit prices both at time t and t − ∆ denoted by F (t, T ) and
F (t−∆, T ) , respectively.
Moreover, assume that σ is given. Then
1. In the framework of the linear approximation approach
(a) the implied parameter µ(σ) is approximately
µ(σ) =
1
2
σ2 +
Φ−1
(
F (t,T )
P
)
√
τ
· σ + ln
(
x¯t
τ
)
τ
. (4.6)
(b) the implied time needed to exhaust the remaining permits before the announce-
ment of the remaining permits is approximately h per cent larger than x¯t :
h = − [F (t−∆, T )− F (t, T )]
Pφ
(
Φ−1
(
F (t,T )
P
)) · (σ√τ). (4.7)
2. In the framework of the log-normal moment matching approach
(a) the implied parameter µ(σ) is approximately the solution of
Φ−1
(
F (t, T )
P
)
=
− ln (x¯t) + 2 ln(ατ )− 12 ln(2βτ )√
ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ )
. (4.8)
(b) the implied time needed to exhaust the remaining permits before the announce-
ment of the remaining permits is approximately h per cent larger than x¯t :
h = − [F (t−∆, T )− F (t, T )]
Pφ
(
Φ−1
(
F (t,T )
P
)) ·√ln(2βτ )− 2 ln(ατ ), (4.9)
where ατ (µ(σ), σ) and βτ (µ(σ), σ) solve Equation (4.8).
Proof :
For small µ and σ the emission rate Qt can be approximated by Q0 . Thus
q[0,t] =
∫ t
0
Qsds ≈
∫ t
0
Q0ds = t ·Q0.
Hence
xt =
N − q[0,t]
Qt
≈ N − q[0,t]
Q0
≈
(
N
q[0,t]
− 1
)
· t := x¯t.
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As the proof for both approximation approaches is the same we only present the proof of
Equation (4.6) and (4.7).
(a): Assuming that the observed permit price St can be described by the equilibrium
price formula of the linear approximation approach in Lemma 3.2.16 and solving
St = S
Lin
t (x¯t|µ, σ) for µ yields Equation (4.6).
(b): Assuming that St−∆ = SLint−∆(x¯t(1 + h)|µ, σ) ≈ SLint (x¯t(1 + h)|µ, σ) and using
SLint (x¯t(1 + h)|µ, σ) ≈ SLint (x¯t|µ, σ) + hx¯t
dSLint
dxt
(x¯t|µ, σ)
yields
St−∆ − St ≈ hx¯tdS
Lin
t
dxt
(x¯t|µ, σ).
As the implied parameter µ(σ) satisfies the following equation
− ln ( x¯t
τ
)
+
(
µ(σ)− σ2
2
)
τ
σ
√
τ
= Φ−1
(
F (t, T )
P
)
Lemma 3.2.16 (c) completes the proof. ♦
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Figure 4.5: Before the revelation of the cumulative emissions the implied time to exhaust
the remaining permits was −h(σ) per cent smaller. Linear approximation approach (”1”),
log-normal moment matching (”2”).
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Lemma 4.1.7 (Determining implied parameter - emission rate is martingale)
Assume that the emission rate is a martingale, i.e. µ = 0 .
Let x¯t =
(
N
q[0,t]
− 1
)
t be the estimator of xt on the day of the announcement of the
cumulative emissions.
Assume that we know the number of permits N , the cumulative emissions at time t, q[0,t] ,
and the futures permit prices both at time t and at time t − ∆ denoted by F (t, T ) and
F (t−∆, T ) , respectively. Then the implied time needed to exhaust the remaining permits
before the announcement is approximately h per cent larger than x¯t :
h = − [F (t−∆, T )− F (t, T )]
Pφ
(
Φ−1
(
F (t,T )
P
)) γ.
where γ depends on the approximation approach and is given by the positive solution of
the following equation (in case it exists)
1. Linear approximation approach
γ = 2
−Φ−1(F (t, T )
P
)
±
√(
Φ−1
(
F (t, T )
P
))2
− 2 ln
( x¯t
τ
)
2. Log-normal moment matching
γ = 2
−Φ−1(F (t, T )
P
)
±
√(
Φ−1
(
F (t, T )
P
))2
− 2 ln(x¯t)

Proof :
Follows from Lemma 6 (b) and the equilibrium price formula of Lemma 3.2.16 and of
Lemma 3.2.22, respectively. ♦
Remark:
Lemma 4.1.7 cannot be used to explain the price drop in 2006 as there exists no solution
of γ for the permit price series of the first phase of the EU ETS.
4.1e Conclusion
The numerical illustrations in Section 4.1c and 4.1d show that the choice of the approxi-
mation approach for the cumulative emissions influences the resulting theoretical permit
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price level significantly. The prices of the log-normal and the reciprocal gamma moment
matching approach are very close to each other but there is a noticeable difference between
the prices of the moment matching approaches and the linear approximation approach as
used by Chesney and Taschini (2008). Therefore, it does not suffice to state the process
that models the emission rate. It is essential to specify both the process for the emission
rate and the applied approximation approach.
Nevertheless, all the three different approximation approaches have in common that the
permit price is inherently prone to jumps as shown in Section 4.1c - 4.1d. The extreme
price slump in 2006 can be explained in our equilibrium model by a relatively small
change in the market’s expectation for how long the remaining permits will suffice. It is
shown that the moment-matching approach is even more sensitive to changes in the mar-
ket’s sentiment of over-/underallocation than the linear approximation approach. Given
a permit price time series we can compute the market’s implied expectation of over- or
underallocation using our equilibrium price formulae. Therefore, the price drop in 2006 of
about -50% can be explained as follows: With the market being in slight implied under-
allocation in April 2006 (cf. Section 4.1d) rumours of a probable overallocation and the
final publication of the verified emission data for 2005 on 15 May 2006 by the European
Commission (overallocation of 2.5%) drove prices lower. Price jumps will occur as long as
the market’s ability to estimate the cumulative emission level is limited. A nearly exact
estimation must have been impossible until the publication of the first verified emission
data in May 2006. Even the regulator could not aggregate the data of all the countries
for the first emissions report - emission data for the Czech Republic, France, the Slovak
Republic and Spain was partly missing (cf. European Union (2006)). However, price
jumps of the magnitude of 2006 are unlikely to occur again as the measurement of the
emission data has been significantly improved.
The scheme design is not the only source of price volatility. Emissions trading schemes
are surrounded by regulatory risks. Changes in the regulation or even expected or feared
changes have a significant influence on prices. As pointed out in Section 2.2b and 2.2g
in detail, for instance the following two regulatory risks have been responsible for permit
price slumps in the EU ETS: (i) changes in the cap even during the compliance period
and (ii) influence of the reduction commitments of other countries on the reduction target
of the European Union.
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4.2 Convergence to zero
The concept of probability of shortage resulting from stochastic equilibrium models ex-
plains that prices in an emissions trading system without banking will always converge
to zero or to the penalty at the end of the compliance period.
At the end of the compliance period there is no uncertainty about the cumulative emis-
sions in the compliance period. Therefore, the probability of shortage only takes the
values zero or one at the end of the compliance period. Multiplying this probability with
the penalty yields the permit price in a stochastic equilibrium model.
In mathematical terms, this result follows from the permit price formula of Carmona et al.
(2009b) as given in Equation (3.51):
ST = Pe
−r(T−T ) · P (q[0,T ] > N |FT )
= P · P (q[0,T ] > N |FT )
= P · 1{q[0,T ]>N}
=
{
P if q[0,T ] > N
0 if q[0,T ] ≤ N
Analogous results hold in the framework of Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and
Kiesel (2009). In the model of Seifert et al. (2008) this property follows from Theorem
3.2.8.
4.3 Discussion of estimation methods
4.3a Estimation methods for stochastic equilibrium models
This subsection investigates estimation methods for stochastic equilibrium models. The
models of Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) are of special interest
because of the availability of analytical permit price formulae. Deriving an SDE for the
permit price in the models of Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009)
yields a very complicated expression that cannot be used for model calibration in practice.
Therefore, we investigate two different approaches for the approximation of the random
variable
N−q[0,t]
(T−t)·Qt (cf. Lemma 4.3.2, 4.3.3 and 4.3.4).
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Lemma 4.3.1 (Normalized permit price in the model of Chesney and Taschini)
The time-t permit price divided by the penalty is given by
at = Φ
− ln
(
N−q[0,t]
(T−t)·Qt
)
+
(
µ− σ2
2
)
(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
 .
In particular, we have
a0 = Φ
− ln
(
N
T ·Q0
)
+
(
µ− σ2
2
)
T
σ
√
T
 .
Proof :
Follows directly from at =
F (t,T )
P
and Lemma 3.2.16. ♦
Approximation 1:
A linear approximation in the nominator of
N−q[0,t]
(T−t)·Qt yields ln
(
N−q[0,t]
(T−t)·Qt
)
= ln
(
N−t·Qt
(T−t)·Qt
)
.
Now, approximating Qt in the nominator by its expected value E [Qt] = Q0eµt yields
ln
(
N − q[0,t]
(T − t) ·Qt
)
≈ ln
(
N − t · E [Qt]
(T − t) ·Qt
)
.
Theorem 4.3.2 (SDE for the model of Chesney&Taschini - Approximation 1)
Using the approximation ln
(
N−q[0,t]
(T−t)·Qt
)
≈ ln
(
N−t·E[Qt]
(T−t)·Qt
)
, the dynamics of the permit price
in the model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) are given by
dat = −Φ
′ (Φ−1(at))√
T − t
[(
(1 + µt)Q0e
µt
σ(N − t ·Q0eµt) −
1
T − t
)
dt+ dWt
]
.
Proof :
Using the approximation q[0,t] = t ·Qt , we get
at = Φ
− ln
(
N−t·Qt
(T−t)·Qt
)
+
(
µ− σ2
2
)
(T − t)
σ
√
T − t

= Φ
− ln (N − t ·Qt) + ln(T − t) + ln(Qt) +
(
µ− σ2
2
)
(T − t)
σ
√
T − t

= Φ
− ln (N − t ·Qt) + ln(T − t) + ln(Q0) +
(
µ− σ2
2
)
t+ σWt +
(
µ− σ2
2
)
(T − t)
σ
√
T − t

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= Φ
− ln (N − t ·Qt) + ln(T − t) + ln(Q0) + σWt +
(
µ− σ2
2
)
T
σ
√
T − t

= Φ
(
Φ−1(a0)σ
√
T + ln
(
N
T
)− ln (N − t ·Qt) + ln(T − t) + σWt
σ
√
T − t
)
.
Now, using the approximation Qt ≈ E [Qt] = Q0eµt and plugging in ln (N − t ·Qt) ,
yields
at = Φ
(
Φ−1(a0)σ
√
T + ln
(
N
T
)− ln (N − t ·Q0eµt) + ln(T − t) + σWt
σ
√
T − t
)
:= Φ (Xt) := Φ
(
z(t)√
n(t)
)
.
The differential of the normalized permit price is
dat = dΦ (Xt) = Φ
′(Xt)dXt +
1
2
Φ′′(Xt)d[X]t
= Φ′(Xt)dXt − 1
2
XtΦ
′(Xt)d[X]t
= Φ′(Xt)
[
dXt − 1
2
Xtd[X]t
]
,
where
dnt = − σ2dt,
dzt =
(
(1 + µt)Q0e
µt
N − t ·Q0eµt −
1
T − t
)
dt− σdWt,
dXt =
1√
nt
dzt − 1
2
Xt
nt
dnt
=
1
σ
√
T − t
(
(1 + µt)Q0e
µt
N − t ·Q0eµt −
1
T − t
)
dt− 1√
T − tdWt +
1
2
Xt
T − tdt,
d[X]t =
1
T − tdt.
Thus
dXt − 1
2
Xtd[X]t =
(
1
σ
√
T − t
(1 + µt)Q0e
µt
N − t ·Q0eµt −
1
T − t
)
dt− 1√
T − tdWt.
♦
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Approximation 2:
Bearing in mind that T−t is an affine function and that the number of remaining permits
is approximately an affine function in t, we can use the following approximation for small
positive ∆
N − q[0,t+∆]
N − q[0,t]
T − t
T − (t+ ∆) ≈ 1.
We apply approximation 2 both to the model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) (cf. Theorem
4.3.3) and to the model of Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) (cf. Theorem 4.3.4).
Theorem 4.3.3 (SDE for the model of Chesney&Taschini - Approximation 2)
Let
N−q[0,t+∆]
N−q[0,t]
T−t
T−(t+∆) ≈ 1 for small positive ∆ . Then the following difference is approxi-
mately standard normally distributed in the model of Chesney and Taschini (2008)
1√
∆
(
Φ−1(at+∆)
√
T − (t+ ∆)− Φ−1(at)
√
T − t
)
. (4.10)
Proof :
By Lemma 4.3.1
Φ−1(at)
√
T − t = 1
σ
·
(
− ln
(
N − q[0,t]
(T − t) ·Qt
)
+
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
(T − t)
)
.
Thus,
Φ−1(at)
√
T − t− Φ−1(at+∆)
√
T − (t+ ∆)
=
1
σ
·
(
ln
(
N − q[0,t+∆]
N − q[0,t] ·
T − t
T − (t+ ∆)
)
− ln
(
Qt+∆
Qt
)
+
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
∆
)
=
1
σ
·
(
ln
(
N − q[0,t+∆]
N − q[0,t] ·
T − t
T − (t+ ∆)
)
− σW∆
)
.
Assuming
N−q[0,t+∆]
N−q[0,t] ·
T−t
T−(t+∆) ≈ 1 completes the proof. ♦
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Theorem 4.3.4 (Discretized SDE for the model of Gru¨ll and Kiesel)
Let
N−q[0,t+∆]
N−q[0,t]
1
µ
(eµ(T−t)−1)
1
µ
(eµ(T−(t+∆))−1) ≈ 1 for small positive ∆ and let Z ∼ N(0, 1) . Then
1. The dynamics of the permit price in the model of Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) are de-
scribed by the following discretized SDE
zt := Φ
−1(at+∆)
√
T − (t+ ∆)− Φ−1(at)
√
T − t
∼ N
(
∆√
b(µ, σ2)
(
µ− σ
2
2
+
b(µ, σ2)
2
)
,
σ2∆
b(µ, σ2)
)
,
where
b(µ, σ2) =
µ(µ+ σ2)
(
e2µ+σ
2 − eµ
)
µe2µ+σ2 + µ+ σ2 − (2µ+ σ2) eµ − 2
µeµ
eµ − 1 .
2. Let m and s2 be the sample mean and the sample variance of the data set {zt} .
Then the parameter estimate σˆ2 is given by the solution of
b
(
m
s
√
∆
σˆ +
1
2
(
1− ∆
s2
)
σˆ2, σˆ2
)
=
∆
s2
σˆ2, (4.11)
and the estimate µˆ := µˆ(σˆ2) is given by
µˆ =
m
s
√
∆
σˆ +
1
2
(
1− ∆
s2
)
σˆ2. (4.12)
Proof :
(a) The permit price in the model of Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) is given by
at = Φ
− ln
(
N−q[0,t]
Qt
)
+ g(T − t)√
h(T − t)
 , (4.13)
where
g(T − t) = ln
(
α2T−t√
2βT−t
)
, and h(T − t) = ln
(
2βT−t
α2T−t
)
. (4.14)
Parameters αT−t and βT−t are given in Lemma 3.2.19.
The Taylor expansion around 1 yields
h(τ) = h(1) + h′(1)(τ − 1) + 1
2
h′′(ξ)(ξ − 1)2
for ξ between 1 and τ . It can be shown that the error term is sufficiently small for
parameter combinations (µ, σ2) that are in scope. Furthermore, it can be shown that
h(1)− h′(1) ≈ 0 . Therefore, in the following we work with the approximation
h(T − t) ≈ b(µ, σ2)(T − t),
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where
b(µ, σ2) = h′(1) =
β′1
β1
− 2α
′
1
α1
.
Thus
h(T − t) ≈ b(µ, σ2)(T − t)⇔ 2βT−t
α2T−t
≈ eb(µ,σ2)(T−t)
⇔
√
2βT−t ≈
√
eb(µ,σ2)(T−t)αT−t
⇔ α
2
T−t√
2βT−t
≈ αT−t√
eb(µ,σ2)(T−t)
⇔ g(T − t) ≈ ln(αT−t)− 1
2
b(µ, σ2)(T − t).
Inserting the approximation functions for g(·) and h(·) into Equation (4.13) yields
Φ−1(at) =
1√
b(µ, σ2)(T − t)
[
− ln
(
N − q[0,t]
Qt
)
+ ln(αT−t)− 1
2
b(µ, σ2)(T − t)
]
,
which is equivalent to
Φ−1(at)
√
T − t = 1√
b(µ, σ2)
[
− ln
(
N − q[0,t]
Qt
)
+ ln(αT−t)− 1
2
b(µ, σ2)(T − t)
]
.
For small positive ∆ we have
Φ−1(at+∆)
√
T − (t+ ∆)− Φ−1(at)
√
T − t
=
1√
b(µ, σ2)
[
ln
(
N − q[0,t]
N − q[0,t+∆] ·
αT−(t+∆)
αT−t
)
+ ln
(
Qt+∆
Qt
)
+
∆
2
b(µ, σ2)
]
=
1√
b(µ, σ2)
[
ln
(
N − q[0,t]
N − q[0,t+∆] ·
αT−(t+∆)
αT−t
)
+
(
µ− σ
2
2
+
b(µ, σ2)
2
)
∆ + σW∆
]
.
As both N − q[0,t] and αT−t are approximately affine functions, we can use the following
approximation
N − q[0,t]
N − q[0,t+∆] ·
αT−(t+∆)
αT−t
≈ 1
which completes the proof.
(b) We obtain the parameters µˆ and σˆ2 by solving
m =
∆√
b(µˆ, σˆ2)
(
µˆ− σˆ
2
2
+
b(µˆ, σˆ2)
2
)
, (4.15)
s2 =
σˆ2∆
b(µ, σˆ2)
. (4.16)
Solving Equation (4.16) for b(µˆ, σˆ2) and plugging the result into Equation (4.15) yields
µˆ(σˆ2) =
m
s
√
∆
σˆ +
1
2
(
1− ∆
s2
)
σˆ2.
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Inserting µˆ(σˆ2) into Equation (4.16) and solving for σˆ2 completes the proof. ♦
Unfortunately, all the estimation methods for the models of Chesney and Taschini (2008)
and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) (cf. Theorem 4.3.2 - 4.3.4) cannot be used in practice.
This can be explained as follows. All the discussed estimation methods have in common
that for parameter estimation one would have to compute for at1 , . . . , atn the values of
zti := Φ
−1(ati+1)
√
T − ti+1−Φ−1(ati)
√
T − ti , calculate the empirical mean and variance
of {zti} and then equate them to the theoretical mean and variance which is a function
of the model parameters µ and σ2 . A useful estimation method should ensure that the
equation can be solved for every possible combination of observed mean m ∈M ⊆ R and
variance v ∈ V ⊆ R+ . In other words, the set of possible mean-variance combinations
M × V should span R× R+ . However, this is not the case as the set of possible mean-
variance combinations in Theorem 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 are a line and a point, respectively.
In the case of Theorem 4.3.4, it is a two-dimensional set but it does not span R × R+ .
Therefore we introduce the following reduced-form model that overcomes this difficulty.
Considering the full parameter space R×R+ yields a so-called reduced-form model. This
means, that we assume that for a ∈ R , b2 ∈ R+ the difference of Theorem 4.3.2 - 4.3.4
is distributed as follows
Φ−1(at+∆)
√
T − (t+ ∆)− Φ−1(at)
√
T − t ∼ N (a∆, b2∆) .
This expression can be transformed into the following SDE
d
(
Φ−1(at)
√
T − t
)
= adt+ bdWt.
This SDE is referred to as the SDE of the reduced-form model of Gru¨ll and Taschini
(2009) (cf. Definition 3.3.5).
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4.3b Empirical analysis of reduced-form models
Introduction
Carmona et al. (2009a) introduced an option pricing model for permits using their reduced-
form model. However, an analysis of the empirical performance of reduced-form models
is not provided. Therefore the following subsection analyzes the empirical performance of
reduced-form models compared to standard stochastic continuous-time processes such as
GBM and NIG.
Description of the data
In 2005 European policy makers launched the EU ETS, the world’s largest emission
trading system which covers approximately 50% of the CO2 emissions in the European
Union. The EU ETS consists of three different phases. Phase I lasted until the end of
2007. Phase II started in 2008 and ends in 2012. A third phase will start in 2013. Due to
bankability restrictions between phase I and II, it is necessary to treat the price series of
each phase separately - see Alberola and Chevallier (2009). As the futures market is more
liquid than the spot market, in what follows we perform our model calibration analysis
with price series of futures contracts maturing in December 2007 and December 2012,
respectively. In the first phase the price of emission permits is characterized by a very
high volatility level. The significant market correction between the end of April and the
beginning of May 2006 (see Figure 4.6) occurred when emission data for the year 2005
became public showing that there was an overall overestimation of offending emissions. A
long-lasting futures December 2007 price decrease, characterized by a smaller volatility,
started in August 2006. Such a price behaviour is typical for permit prices at the end of
a compliance period. This has to do with the fact that at compliance time the permit
price can only take the values zero (overallocation) or the penalty fee (permit shortage).
As the reduced-form models also have this property one should expect that they excel in
capturing the observed price dynamics at the end of a compliance period. In order to test
this hypothesis we split up the futures December 2007 price series into two parts. We
take the period of the crash as a cutting point. Prices observed during the crash (i.e. 15
trading days) are not included into our analysis. Another effect that can be observed at
the end of the comliance period is that from May, 10th 2007 transaction volumes are very
low and the permit price hovers below 0.30 e remaining at the same price level for several
consecutive days. We consider this special effect by performing our analysis both on the
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full post-crash price series and on the series that is truncated on May, 10th 2007. Finally,
for phase II we consider futures contracts with maturity December 2012 from January,
2nd 2008 until August, 31th 2009. The futures permit price in this period exhibits a lower
volatility level hinting at a relatively more mature market. As observable in Figure 4.6,
futures December 2012 prices range from 10 e to 35 e, peaking on July, 1st 2008 at 34.38
e. So, in summing, we analyze the following four data series:
1. pre-crash phase I ( 22 April 2005 - 24 April 2006)
2. post-crash phase I (15 May 2006 - 17 December 2007)
3. truncated post-crash phase I (15 May 2006 - 10 May 2007)
4. phase II (2 January 2008 - 31 August 2009)
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Figure 4.6: Left: EUA-Dec07 futures price (22 April 2005 - 17 December 2007), right:
EUA-Dec12 futures price (2 January 2008 - 31 August 2009)
Performed analyses
Besides comparing performances of the reduced-form models of Carmona et al. (2009a)
and Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009), we calibrate other continuous-time stochastic processes
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and undertake an extensive model comparison. In particular, we restrict ourselves to
widely known stochastic processes, such as geometric Brownian motion (GBM) and nor-
mal Inverse Gaussian (NIG). The latter is an extensively used and more complex process
that overcomes some of the drawbacks of the GBM. For instance, it captures the presence
of fat tails.
Because residuals of the reduced-form models and of the GBM are normally distributed,
whereas residuals of the NIG process are not normally distributed, we consider two differ-
ent types of analysis. We first run normality tests to all models with normally distributed
residuals providing an investigation of the goodness-of-fit of reduced-form models and the
GBM (cf. Table 4.2 - 4.5). Second, we assess in-sample performances of NIG, GBM and
the reduced-form models of Carmona et al. (2009a) and Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009) by
comparing Q-Q-plots (cf. Figure 4.7 - 4.10) and computing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-
distance (cf. Table 4.1).
As expected, our empirical analysis shows that reduced-form models exhibit their strength
at the end of a compliance period. Taking the full post-crash price series into account the
reduced-form models outperform both GBM and NIG (cf. Figure 4.8 and Table 4.1 and
4.3). However, the Q-Q-plots in Figure 4.8 reveal that even reduced-form models cannot
completely capture the price dynamics in this particular period. Excluding the special
effect of very high volatility due to prices very close to zero and low trading volume at the
very end of the first compliance period (after May, 10th 2007) we get a slightly different
picture. Reduced-form models still outperform GBM but perform worse than the more
complex process NIG (cf. Figure 4.9 and Table 4.1 and 4.4). At the beginning of a com-
pliance period the price dynamics are by far captured better by NIG than the tailor-made
reduced-form models. Compared to GBM, the reduced-form models perform slightly
worse at the beginning of the first phase (cf. Table 4.2) and similarly at the beginning
of the second phase (cf. Table 4.5). Finally, the two competing reduced-form models of
Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009) and Carmona et al. (2009a) have a similar performance whereby
the model of Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009) slightly outperforms the model of Carmona et al.
(2009a) at the very end of the first compliance period (cf. Table 4.2 - 4.5). Summarizing,
reduced-form models perform relatively well at the end of a compliance period compared
to standard stochastic processes. However, they are clearly outperformed by complex
standard stochastic processes, especially, at the beginning of the two compliance periods.
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Summarized results
Using futures prices in the EU ETS with maturity December 2007 and December 2012,
we calibrate reduced-form models and assess the in-sample performances of the models
of Carmona et al. (2009a) and Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009). With the aim of providing a
comprehensive comparison among potentially competing models, we also calibrate and
compare two quite popular continuous-time stochastic processes (GBM and NIG). In
a perfect competitive equilibrium framework with no-banking options, futures permit
prices are characterized by the fact that they tend to either zero or the penalty fee at
the end of a compliance period. As reduced-form models capture this characteristic,
we split up the permit price series in order to analyze the performance both at the
beginning and at the end of a compliance period. In the current price-evolution, we
observe that reduced-form models perform relatively well at the end of a compliance period
compared to standard stochastic processes. However, they are clearly outperformed by
complex standard stochastic processes such as NIG, especially, at the beginning of the two
compliance periods. GBM and reduced-form models perform similarly at the beginning of
a compliance period. However, reduced-form models describe the price dynamics at the
end of the first compliance period much better than GBM. Finally, the two competing
reduced-form models of Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009) and Carmona et al. (2009a) have a
similar performance whereby the model of Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009) slightly outperforms
the model of Carmona et al. (2009a) at the very end of the first compliance period.
The evaluation of the price of emission permits in the coming years will show whether, in
a more mature permit market, complex standard stochastic processes such as NIG still
outperform reduced-form models that take into account peculiar characteristics of permit
markets.
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NIG GBM Carmona & Hinz Gru¨ll & Taschini
Phase 1 - Pre-Crash Period
KS-Distance 0.0321 0.0928 0.1207 0.1179
Phase 1 - Post-Crash Period
KS-Distance 0.1716 0.2188 0.1645 0.1037
Phase 1 - Post-Crash Period (truncated)
KS-Distance 0.0683 0.144 0.0951 0.0994
Phase 2
KS-Distance 0.0257 0.0757 0.0816 0.0785
Table 4.1: Comparison of goodness-of-fit.
Selected tables and plots
The residuals of GBM and the reduce-form models of Carmona et al. (2009a) and Gru¨ll
and Taschini (2009) are all standard normally distributed. Therefore we can apply nor-
mality tests to the log-returns in the case of GBM, to the data transformed according
to the discretized version of Equation (3.85) in the case of the model of Carmona et al.
(2009a) and to the data transformed according to the discretized version of Definition
3.3.5 in the case of the model of Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009). We omit the usual footnotes
concerning the significance of the normality tests as the null hypothesis that the data is
normally distributed is rejected throughout at the 5% significance level. The tables show
the test statistics of the performed normality tests. The most favourable test statistic for
normality (i.e. the lowest) is marked bold in each row.
Normality test GBM Carmona & Hinz Gru¨ll & Taschini
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.0928 0.1207 0.1179
Anderson-Darling 5.2260 7.5697 7.1298
Pearson 39.594 67.106 67.255
Jarque-Bera 1734.8 3458.7 2792.4
Cramer-von-Mises 0.8326 1.2122 1.1363
Table 4.2: Comparison of goodness-of-fit (Pre-Crash).
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Normality test GBM Carmona & Hinz Gru¨ll & Taschini
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.2188 0.1645 0.1037
Anderson-Darling ∞ 13.213 9.800
Pearson 1048.5 689.3 136.15
Jarque-Bera 50059 406 233
Cramer-von-Mises 8.6221 2.6040 1.7628
Table 4.3: Comparison of goodness-of-fit (Post-Crash).
Normality test GBM Carmona & Hinz Gru¨ll & Taschini
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.1440 0.0951 0.0994
Anderson-Darling 10.581 3.887 4.277
Pearson 171.93 113.28 58.53
Jarque-Bera 387.94 82.39 78.14
Cramer-von-Mises 2.0310 0.7166 0.7889
Table 4.4: Comparison of goodness-of-fit (Post-Crash truncated).
Normality test GBM Carmona & Hinz Gru¨ll & Taschini
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.0757 0.0816 0.0785
Anderson-Darling 3.2396 3.3747 3.0556
Pearson 46.741 44.896 43.377
Jarque-Bera 72.644 212.838 140.951
Cramer-von-Mises 0.5395 0.5381 0.4884
Table 4.5: Comparison of goodness-of-fit (Second Phase).
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Figure 4.7: Log-returns, transformed data and Q-Q-plots of different models for pre-crash-
period
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Figure 4.8: Log-returns, transformed data and Q-Q-plots of different models for post-
crash-period
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Figure 4.9: Log-returns, transformed data and Q-Q-plots of different models for post-
crash-period (truncated)
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Figure 4.10: Log-returns, transformed data and Q-Q-plots of different models for second
phase
Chapter 5
Permit price dynamics (Hybrid
schemes)
5.1 Current and Proposed Scheme Design Mecha-
nisms
In this section we concentrate on the most relevant scheme alternatives proposed by policy
regulators to keep the permit price from rising or falling to an inordinate degree. Among
suggested mechanisms, relaxing the amount of usable offsets (so-called safety-valve), in-
troducing a subsidy to ensure a minimum price level, setting a price ceiling and price
floor (so-called price collar), and creating a permit reserve to be deployed when permit
prices are too high, are the most popular hybrid systems. A hybrid system is generally
considered as a tailored combination of price (tax) and quantity (permit) instruments.
The idea of creating a hybrid system by combining these two policy tools was first intro-
duced by the seminal papers of Weitzman (1974) and Roberts and Spence (1976).1 In
any cap-and-trade scheme, there will be always a penalty for non-compliance. If payment
of the penalty is an alternative to compliance, as in the framework of 5.1a, the penalty is
effectively a price ceiling in a hybrid scheme as discussed by Jacoby and Ellerman (2004).
In contrast, if payment of the penalty does not amount to compliance and the company
is still obliged to comply as soon as possible, then the scheme is not directly equivalent to
a conventional hybrid scheme. In the following subsections we consistently compare cap-
and-trade schemes supplied with a specific mechanism (hereafter hybrid systems) to the
1We refer to Hepburn (2006) for a recent overview on the possible combination of price and quantity
instruments.
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cap-and-trade system described in Section 5.1a (hereafter ordinary system). Our analysis
is performed in the one-period framework of Carmona et al. (2009b) where banking and
borrowing are not allowed. Banking and borrowing options have been proposed by envi-
ronmental economists with the aim of enforcing the credibility of cap-and-trade schemes
and allowing a greater flexibility over time. Past literature on the analysis of how banking
and borrowing mechanisms affect the price formation of emission permits is extensive. We
refer to Rubin (1996) and Schennach (2000) for an analysis of the consequences of banking
and borrowing on the inter-temporal trading of emission permits. In this paper we do not
explicitly account for those features that would simply complicate formulae and distract
the reader. However, the statements derived for the hybrid and for the ordinary systems
also hold in a setting where banking is allowed.
By distinguishing the mechanisms under investigation with respect to the use of external
offsets for controlling the permit price in the market, we classify the hybrid systems under
study into two main groups. The first group encompasses those cap-and-trade schemes
that recognize offsets as functional for compliance purposes. In particular, we study a
mechanism where the amount of offsets is a function of the permit price observed in
the market. The higher the permit price, the larger the amount of offsets that can be
employed for compliance purposes. Conversely, the second group of scheme mechanisms
relies on the ability of each policy regulator to purchase or sell an (un)limited amount of
emission permits. The remainder of the hybrid systems under study belongs to this group.
Neglecting possible interdependence with any offset market for the ease of exposure, we
investigate these systems from Section 5.1c to Section 5.1f.
5.1a Ordinary cap-and-trade scheme
An ordinary cap-and-trade system is defined as an emissions trading scheme with the
following three characteristics (cf. Section 1.1):
• At the beginning of the compliance period the regulator allocates emission al-
lowances to the emitters for free. The number of allowances is related to the
emissions of each emitter in the baseline year. This allocation method is called
grandfathering.
• Allowances are freely tradeable in the compliance period.
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• At the end of the compliance period emitters have to hand in one allowance per
unit of emission. To enforce the cap, a penalty is levied for each unit of pollutant
emitted outside the limits of a given compliance period.
Allowing for stochastic production and abatement costs, revenues from selling produced
goods and emission quantities, Carmona et al. (2009b) derived the theoretical futures
price of permits in the EU ETS framework, where the total pollution net of abatement
reductions (the so-called aggregated cumulative emissions) in [0, t] is measured by the
stochastic process q[0,t] . Let us define P as the penalty that has to be paid for each
emission unit that is not covered by a permit at the compliance date T . Also, N is the
total amount of permits allocated by the policy regulator to relevant companies, i.e. the
cap. Both P and N are known values. We can then express a stylized version of the
Carmona et al. (2009b) equilibrium price formula at time t in terms of the demand ( q[0,t] )
and supply (N ) of permits, and the enforcement level (P ) in monetary units:
F (t, T ) = P · P (q[0,T ] > N |Ft) , (5.1)
where, after abatement reductions, P
(
q[0,T ] > N |Ft
)
measures the probability of the total
amount of emissions exceeding the initial amount of permits. In other words, it is the
probability of the event of a shortage of permits.
In what follows, we refer to the permit price in the ordinary system by F (t, T ), as given
in Equation (5.1). The specific variables needed to describe each hybrid system will be
introduced separately in every subsection.
5.1b Safety-valve with offsets
A popular mechanism which aims to keep the price of emission permits from rising too
high is the so-called safety-valve. This mechanism works by relaxing the limitations on
the amount of offsets that can be used for compliance purposes. This mechanism is
implemented in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the United States.
The RGGI is the first mandatory, market-based scheme in the United States to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Under the RGGI ten Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states
agreed to cap and reduce their CO2 emissions from the power sector by 10% by 2018.
The RGGI allows power companies to buy offsets to meet their compliance.2 However,
2A RGGI offset permit represents a project-based greenhouse gas emission reduction outside the capped
electric power generation sector. The RGGI participating states limit the award of offset permits only
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the use of these offsets is constrained to 3.3 percent of a power plant’s total compliance
obligation. The safety-valve expands this limit to 5 percent and 10 percent if given CO2
permit price thresholds are reached in the market.
The rest of this subsection is structured as follows:
First, the framework of Carmona et al. (2009b) is extended to a situation where offsets
are functional for compliance purposes (cf. Definition 5.1.1). Second, it is shown how
restrictions on the use of offsets influence the permit price (cf. Theorem 5.1.2). Finally,
using this extended model, we derive the theoretical pattern of the price of permits in the
presence of a safety-valve with offsets, discuss the effectiveness of the safefty-valve and
quantify the corresponding expected enforcement costs for regulated companies.
Definition 5.1.1 (Permit price in the presence of offsets)
Assume that P is the penalty level and that N is the number of allowances handed out
by the regulator.
Let λ ·N be the maximum amount of offsets functional for compliance purposes.
Let the stochastic variable c[0,T ] represent the total number of offsets that regulated com-
panies purchase in the presence of unrestricted offset-use.
Then the stylized permit price in the presence of offsets is given by
F¯ (t, T ) = P · P (q[0,T ] −min{c[0,T ], λN} > N |Ft) . (5.2)
We now derive the theoretical price bounds (lower and upper) for emission permits in the
presence of restrictions on the use of offsets. This theorem is used when investigating the
theoretical permit price behaviour.
Theorem 5.1.2 (Bounds for emission permit price)
Let λ ∈ [0,∞) . Let c[0,T ] be a continuous random variable on [0, C) ⊆ [0,∞) . Then
(a) F¯ (t, T ) ∈ [F¯l(t, T ), F¯u(t, T )] where
F¯l(t, T ) = P · P
(
q[0,T ] > (1 + λ)N |Ft
)
, (5.3)
F¯u(t, T ) = P · P
(
q[0,T ] > N |Ft
)
. (5.4)
to five project categories. Furthermore, all offset projects must be located within one of the RGGI
participating states.
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(b) F¯ (t, T ) is a non-increasing function in λ for λ ∈ [0, C
N
) and constant in λ for
λ ≥ C
N
.
Proof :
(a) The lower and upper bound are derived by using
min{c[0,T ], λN} ≤ λN,
min{c[0,T ], λN} ≥ 0.
(b) Let c[0,T ] be a random variable on [0, C) . If λ ≥ CN , then
min{c[0,T ], λN} = c[0,T ].
Thus for λ ≥ C
N
the permit price is equal to: P · P (q[0,T ] − c[0,T ] > N |Ft) . Let 0 <
λ < Λ < C
N
. Then we have that min{c[0,T ], λN} ≤ min{c[0,T ],ΛN} almost surely which
completes the proof. ♦
Assuming that the price of the offsets is solely determined by the level of emission of
relevant companies, and using Equation (5.2) with time-dependent λ , the permit price
is given by:
F¯ (t, T ) = P · P (q[0,T ] −min{λ(t)N, c[0,T ]} > N |Ft) , (5.5)
where λ(t) be an increasing step function, taking the values 0 < λ0 < λ1 < λ2 <
. . . < λn . As in the RGGI scheme, at each instant t the regulator allows utilities to use
λ(t) · N offsets for compliance. Let {F¯1, . . . , F¯n} be the increasing ordered constants
corresponding to permit price thresholds set by the policy regulator at the beginning of
the scheme. In this framework, ti = inf
{
t, F¯ (t, T ) = F¯i
}
, where i = 1, . . . , n defines the
instant when the permit price F¯ (t, T ) hits the price threshold F¯i . Especially, we have
that λ(ti) = λi . This means that the amount of offsets that can be used for compliance
at time t depends on the permit price F¯ (t, T ) observed on the market. Such a system
implies that, as soon as the permit price reaches a pre-specified price barrier F¯i , λ(·)
jumps from λi−1 to λi .3 This additional amount of offsets functional for compliance
results in an immediate increase in the supply base of the permits and, possibly, causes
a permit price drop. Looking at the price level around each instant ti , we can observe
that at time t < ti the permit price is:
F¯ (t, T ) = P · P (q[0,T ] −min{λi−1N, c[0,T ]} > N |Ft) .
3It is interesting to observe that the EU ETS implements a specific case of this mechanism. There the
function λ(t) is constant, i.e. λ(t) ≡ λEU , whereas in the RGGI it is an increasing step function where
the step values are λ0 = 0.033, λ1 = 0.05, λ2 = 0.1 .
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By definition, at time t = ti the permit price is equal to:
F¯ (t, T ) = F¯i.
At time t > ti, after the safety-valve has been used and the amount of offset that can be
used has been increased, the permit price equals:
F¯ (t, T ) = P · P (q[0,T ] −min{λiN, c[0,T ]} > N |Ft) .
Similarly to the proof in Theorem 5.1.2, it can be shown that F¯ (t, T ) is a non-increasing
function in λ(t) . However, the response of the permit price to the increase in λ(·) heav-
ily depends on the random variable q[0,T ] . A larger amount of usable offsets, therefore,
does not necessarily lead to a permit price decrease. As such, the effectiveness of this
safety-valve in terms of capping a permit price increase is rather limited.
We now quantify the financial burden imposed on regulated companies by this hybrid
system and compare it with an ordinary system. Let us assume that the amount λ of
offsets functional for compliance purposes in the ordinary cap-and-trade system corre-
sponds to λ ≡ λ0 > 0, and λ0 < λ1 < λ2 < . . . < λn . As we have already shown (cf.
Theorem 5.1.2) that the emission permit price is a non-increasing function in λ , it is
trivial to show that prices of emission permits in a hybrid system with safety-valve are
lower than in an ordinary cap-and-trade system. This statement clearly implies lower
expected enforcement costs for regulated companies. In other words, the overall financial
burden for relevant companies in a situation of high permit prices is lowered by the pres-
ence of a mechanism that literally functions as a relief-valve for the cap-and-trade scheme.
The advantage of such a safety-valve is that it reduces expected enforcement costs for
regulated companies without imposing an extra cost on the policy regulator. Furthermore,
reducing the restrictions on the use of offsets is relatively easy to implement. However, as
mentioned above, this mechanism does not guarantee an effective price ceiling under all
circumstances. Also, and more remarkably, its success depends highly on the ability of the
policy regulator to set correct price thresholds F¯i . This requires good skills in modeling
and forecasting the supply (c[0,T ]) and demand (q[0,T ]) of permits. Finally, the fact that
the amount of offsets useful for compliance purposes is a function of the (stochastic) price
of emission permits, is a disadvantage for offsets project developers because it increases
the overall project uncertainty.
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5.1c Price Floor using a Subsidy
A severe permit price drop, followed by a price hovering above zero for more than five
months during the first phase of the EU ETS, persuaded several policy makers that new
cap-and-trade schemes would need additional safety-valve features. Apart from the usual
presence of banking and borrowing options, therefore, policy makers have been discussing
the introduction of additional mechanisms to reinforce economic incentives at the basis
of market-based instruments. In particular, policy makers have been concerned about
permit prices that are either too low or too high. The most obvious provision to limit
such price variations is to set a price floor or ceiling. This type of mechanism will be
investigated in the next section. Instead of a direct intervention on the permit price path,
some economists envisage the possibility of eliminating the unfortunate consequences of
extremely low permit prices by a proper combination of price (subsidy) and quantity
(permit) instruments. Roberts and Spence (1976), for instance, propose to remunerate
virtuous companies, i.e. companies able to massively reduce their pollution emission below
their permits allocation, by means of a subsidy.
Similar to situations involving an ordinary system, a company with a permit shortage at
compliance date faces a penalty P . On the contrary, when a company ends up with an
excess of permits, it receives a subsidy S per unit of permit. Let 0 < S ≤ P and let N
be the initial amount of permits allocated to relevant companies. We first prove that the
permit price is indeed bounded by S from below. We show that the introduction of a
subsidy in fact creates a price floor equal to the subsidy. In particular, the futures permit
price denoted by F˜ (t, T ) in this hybrid system stays in the interval [S, P ] :
F˜ (t, T ) = P · P (q[0,T ] > N | Ft)+ S · P (q[0,T ] ≤ N | Ft)
= P · P (q[0,T ] > N | Ft)+ S · (1− P (q[0,T ] > N | Ft))
= S + (P − S) · P (q[0,T ] > N | Ft) = S + P − S
P
· P · P (q[0,T ] > N | Ft)
= S +
P − S
P
· F (t, T ) = F (t, T ) + S
(
1− F (t, T )
P
)
,
where F (t, T ) = P · P (q[0,T ] > N | Ft) is the futures permit price in an ordinary system.
The subsidy S , ensured by the policy regulator at the end of the compliance period,
plays effectively the role of a price-floor. More interestingly, we can disentangle this hy-
brid scheme, emerging with an ordinary system and a European-style put option with
strike price S .4
4These calculations are an alternative derivation for pricing European call and put options written on
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We now quantify the financial impact on regulated companies of this hybrid system as
opposed to the standard one. Let us define fq as the probability density function of
the cumulative emissions q[0,T ] in the entire regulated period. The expected enforcement
costs for relevant companies in an ordinary system are described by:
EEC = P
∫ ∞
N
(x−N)fq(x)dx ≥ 0. (5.6)
Similarly, the expected enforcement costs for regulated companies in this hybrid system
are:
EECPF = P
∫ ∞
N
(x−N)fq(x)dx− S
∫ N
0
(N − x)fq(x)dx. (5.7)
Because S ≤ P , a lower bound for EECPF is given by P (E[q[0,T ]]−N) . Indeed,
EECPF ≥ P
∫ ∞
N
(x−N)fq(x)dx− P
∫ N
0
(N − x)fq(x)dx = P (E[q[0,T ]]−N).
Considering Equations (5.6) and (5.7), the total expected enforcement costs for regu-
lated companies under this hybrid system are lower than under an ordinary system. In
particular, the difference between these costs is:
EEC − EECPF = S
∫ N
0
(N − x)fq(x)dx ≥ 0.
A price floor ensured by the presence of a subsidy is relatively easy to implement and has
the further advantage of lowering the expected enforcement costs for regulated companies.
Furthermore, the presence of the subsidy could induce a higher stimulus in technology
and abatement investments, favoring the achievement of emission reduction targets. How-
ever, the implementation of such a hybrid system might result in a significant financial
burden for the environmental policy regulator. The magnitude of this burden is hardly
quantifiable a priori.
emission permits with maturity corresponding to the end of the compliance period. We refer to Chesney
and Taschini (2008) for the derivation of a closed-form pricing formula for European-style options on
emission permits.
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5.1d Price collar
The experience of the first phase of the EU ETS, and the threat of an extremely volatile
price of emission permits, have persuaded several policy makers about the need for a more
stable market, ideally enforceable by a strict price control mechanism. Policy makers,
therefore, have been discussing the possible introduction a fixed price-range (the so-called
price collar) within which the permit price can fluctuate.5 This mechanism has long been
discussed and was recently endorsed by some economists in their recommendations for
a US cap-and-trade program. The rationale behind the introduction of a price collar is
that the presence of a minimum (floor) and a maximum (ceiling) price of permits would
lower the volatility of the price, potentially providing a higher level of price predictabil-
ity. According to policy makers, such a hybrid scheme can reduce the price risk faced by
innovating firms, possibly promoting higher investments in abatement technologies.
We now investigate the implications of a price collar on the trading strategies of relevant
companies and on the pattern of the permit price. We use the framework of Carmona
et al. (2009b) for illustration. However, the results can also be extended to more complex
settings. Let P be again the penalty fee; pmax the price ceiling, i.e. the price at which
the policy regulator sells an unlimited amount of permits; and pmin the price floor,
i.e. the price at which the policy regulator buys an unlimited amount of permits.6 Such
a hybrid system can be broken down into a combination of an ordinary cap-and-trade
system and a sum of free-of-charge American-style call and put options. In fact, when
the permit price moves above a pre-specified pmax level, regulated companies can (have
the right to) purchase at pmax as many permits as they need. This optionality can be
quantified by summing up the values of all exercised American call options with strike price
pmax . Similarly, when the permit price moves below a pre-specified pmin level, regulated
companies can (have the right to) sell at pmin their extra permits. This optionality can
be quantified by summing up the values of all exercised American put options with strike
price pmin . However, since the amount of options on offer is unlimited, it is difficult for a
policy regulator to foresee the quantity of permits needed to inject into or withdraw from
the market when the permit price is respectively above pmax or below pmin . Breaking
this hybrid system down into an ordinary system plus free-of-charge American options
5It should be noted that a price collar can be implemented also by means of a proper combination of
price (tax) and quantity (permit) instruments - see Roberts and Spence (1976).
6When the price collar is set symmetrically around a certain permit price level p¯ , where p¯ = 12 (p
min +
pmax) , we have the so-called symmetric price collar.
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maturing at compliance time, we argue that it is complex to quantify the amount of
exercised American options a priori. Let Nt− and Nt be, respectively, the amount of
outstanding permits before ( t− ) and after ( t ) the intervention of the policy regulator on
the market for permits. Let αt = Nt−Nt− denote the amount of permits added (αt > 0)
or subtracted (αt < 0) to the market at time t . At each instant of time t = 0, . . . , T we
can identify three possible situations:
1. If the permit price is between the price collar, F (t, T ) ∈ (pmin, pmax) , then αt = 0
and there is no market intervention by the regulator on the amount of outstanding
permits, i.e. Nt = Nt− .
2. If the permit price exceeds pmax , the policy regulator is then ready to supply an
unlimited amount of additional permits. This means that regulated companies
that buy permits at the price ceiling are in fact exercising American call options
with a strike price pmax . Therefore, relying on standard arbitrage arguments, the
theoretical amount of permits αt > 0 (corresponding to the exercised amount of
American call options) that drives the market price of permits back to pmax is:
P · P (q[0,T ] > Nt− + αt|Ft) = pmax
The rationale behind this equality is based on a standard supply-demand mech-
anism: a larger supply of permits increases the downside pressure on the permit
market price. However, as described below, the extra amount αt has further po-
tential side effects.
3. If the permit price drops below pmin , the policy regulator is then ready to buy
an unlimited amount of permits at the price floor. This means that regulated
companies that sell permits at the price floor are exercising American put options
with strike price pmin . Similarly to the previous case, and relying on the same
arbitrage arguments, the theoretical amount of permits αt < 0 (corresponding to
the exercised amount of American put options) that drives the market price of
permits up to pmin is:
P · P (q[0,T ] > Nt− + αt|Ft) = pmin
The supply-demand mechanism is exactly the same, but works in the opposite di-
rection.
In an ordinary emission trading system, Equation (5.1) shows the manifest relationship
between the permit price and cumulative emissions. As such, a desirable feature of the
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price of emission permits is that they convey most of the relevant information concerning
expectations of the market about the cumulative emissions of relevant companies. This is
the basic rationale behind market-based instruments: the market sets the price for scarce
resources. Based on this concept, Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) justify the permit price slump
in 2006 in the EU ETS market that followed the publication of the verified emission data
by the European Commission.7 Intuitively, the (unknown) amount αt has a clear impact
on such a price formation mechanism. Blending in with expectations on cumulative
emissions, the extra stochastic factor αt , enhances uncertainty on the supply side and,
consequently, on the permit price level. When F (t, T ) > pmax , the amount of additional
permits αt that would drive the permit price back below the price ceiling in unknown
prior to the compliance time. In practice regulated companies will never exercise their
American call options before maturity.8 The rationale behind such a strategy is based
on the fact that companies do not physically need the permits to produce and, more
importantly, they have to achieve compliance only at time T . As in the case of an
American call option written on a financial underlying that pays no dividends, it is never
optimal to exercise American call before maturity. Similarly, when F (t, T ) < pmin , an
advisable trading strategy for regulated companies is to wait until the permit price is
sufficiently small, and then exercise their American put options. In such a way their put
options will be more valuable or, in the financial terminology, deep in the money. So,
in contrast to American call options, it makes sense to exercise American put options
before maturity. Yet, the amount αt is hardly foreseeable a priori as it depends on the
option-exercising strategies of regulated companies.
Therefore, a possible side effect of αt is intimately related to a larger uncertainty level
about the net amount of permits available on the market. When F (t, T ) > pmax, rele-
vant companies with extra permits would be better off by selling their permits as soon
as possible, before the regulator intervenes on the market. This action, in addition to
the extra permits offered by the regulator, might result in an excessive over-supply and,
consequently, in a permit price collapse. Otherwise, these companies might prefer to hold
on to their permits, and wait for market price developments. This action might result in
a severe decrease of permit trading volumes, possibly leading to a deadlocked market. A
similar situation might occur when F (t, T ) < pmin . Relevant companies would be better
off holding on to their permits while the permit price stays below the price floor. Because
7The sudden expectation of a permit market severely in excess of permits caused an immediate price
adjustment and, backed by the banking limitations in phase I, accelerated the price decrease.
8Because regulated companies never exercise their American call options prior to maturity, the penalty
level is effectively reduced from P to pmax .
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the price floor corresponds to American put options, as time goes by the situation cannot
get worse. If the price does not recover above pmin , American put options will be exer-
cised for a (guaranteed minimum) strike price equal to pmin . Either way, F (t, T ) > pmax
or F (t, T ) < pmin , the permit price will no longer reflect the real expectations of the
market about the cumulative emissions of relevant companies.
The expected enforcement costs for regulated companies in a hybrid system with a price
collar are lower than in an ordinary system. Intuitively, this system corresponds to an
ordinary scheme with American call and put options with strike price pmax and pmin ,
respectively. Unfortunately, the difference in the expected enforcement costs is hardly
quantifiable a priori because the regulator offers an unlimited number of additional per-
mits at the price ceiling. However, offering an unlimited number of American call options
does not result in a financial burden for the regulator. When an American call option is
exercised, the regulator creates the corresponding permit (loosening its original environ-
mental targets) and sells it for pmax . Conversely, the regulator faces a financial burden
by offering American put options for free. When an American put option is exercised,
the regulator buys back permits (leaving unaffected its original environmental targets)
at a price pmin . As with expected enforcement costs, the determination of an a priori
financial burden for the regulator is then quite complicated. As the policy regulator can
at most by back the total amount of initial permits, the lower bound of the cost of this
hybrid scheme can be trivially quantified as N · pmin .
The price collar is a hybrid system whose objectives (setting a minimum and a maximum
permit price) are always achieved. Therefore, the expected enforcement costs for regulated
companies compared to an ordinary system are lower. However, this scheme has three
major disadvantages. First, after the regulator market intervention, the permit price
no longer reflects the real market expectations on the cumulative emissions of relevant
companies. Second, the policy regulator might face severe expenses that are unquantifiable
a priori or, conversely, its original environmental targets might be significantly loosened.
This last consequence might be difficult to justify to public stakeholders.
Permit price dynamics (Hybrid schemes) 159
5.1e Allowance Reserve
Another common mechanism proposed by economists to manage the economic (and un-
popular) consequences of excessively high permit prices is to set a permit (or allowance)
reserve.9 This hybrid scheme has again been proposed by Murray et al. (2009).10 The
allowance reserve is very similar to the mechanism of the price collar. The main difference
is that the maximum amount of permits available in the market equals Nmax . In other
words, the regulator sets the allowance reserve η equal to Nmax−N , where Nmax > N .
Similar to the price collar, the allowance reserve can be broken down into an ordinary
cap-and-trade system and a limited sum of free-of-charge American-style call options. In
practice, when the permit price moves above a pre-specified pmax level, regulated com-
panies can (have the right to) purchase permits at pmax up to a limited amount η . This
optionality can be quantified as the value of η American call options with strike price
pmax .
Unlike the price collar, the finite nature of the reserve η cannot guarantee the price ceiling
once the reserve has been completely exploited. As opposed to the previous hybrid system,
the limitation in the available extra amount of permits allows us to quantify expected
enforcement costs. In particular, the difference between the expected enforcement costs
of an ordinary system and the hybrid system with allowance reserve equals:
EEC − EECAR = (Nmax −N)P c ≥ 0, (5.8)
where P c is the price of an American call option with strike price pmax . We can quantify
an upper bound for the difference of the expected enforcement costs relying on the fact
that P c ≤ P − pmax :
EEC − EECAR = η · P c ≤ η · (P − pmax) .
The smaller the price ceiling, the lower the expected enforcement costs of this hybrid sys-
tem. Conversely, and unsurprisingly, EECAR = EEC when pmax tends to the penalty
level P .11
The major disadvantage of the allowance reserve is its inability to guarantee the price
ceiling once the reserve has been completely exploited. Similar to the price collar, the
9Here we consider situations, where the permit reserve is solely employed to control excessively high
permit prices.
10For a comprehensive discussion of the merits of the allowance reserve, we refer to Murray et al. (2009).
11This corresponds to the case discussed by Jacoby and Ellerman (2004).
Permit price dynamics (Hybrid schemes) 160
intervention of the regulator on the market affects the expectations of market participants
regarding the cumulative emissions of relevant companies. Finally, in order to implement
this scheme and partially lower the expected enforcement costs for regulated companies,
the policy regulator faces new costs. Unlike the price collar, these costs are bounded. Yet,
price control is possible at the expense of original environmental targets.
5.1f Plain-vanilla Options offered by the Regulator
The final mechanism under investigation concerns the offering of European- and American-
style options at the inception of the compliance period for a certain price. This hybrid
scheme has been proposed by Unold and Requate (2001), although they do not specify
the type of options under discussion. This mechanism is closely related to the previous
mechanisms (the price floor with a subsidy, the price collar and the allowance reserve).
Accordingly, all these mechanisms belong to the group of hybrid systems that rely on the
faculty of the policy regulator to create or withdraw permits. As described in Section
5.1c, a price floor which has been enforced using a subsidy is equivalent to an ordinary
cap-and-trade system coupled with European put options. The price collar and the al-
lowance reserve described in Sections 5.1d and 5.1e can be broken down into an ordinary
system coupled with an unlimited or limited amount of American-style options. By of-
fering standard American and/or European options at the beginning of the compliance
period, a policy regulator can replicate the results enforced by a subsidy, or a price col-
lar, or an allowance reserve. More importantly, this mechanism avoids the undesirable
manipulation of expectations about the net amount of emission permits which is caused
by the other hybrid systems. Clearly, as in any standard financial market, an extremely
large amount of outstanding options, perhaps concentrated in the hands of few compa-
nies, might result again in undesired market price manipulation. Such an event, however
unlikely, can be prevented by the policy regulator employing necessary corrective actions,
such as screening options buyers.
Under the assumption that the regulator offers the options at a fair market price, the
expenses borne by the regulator to implement this scheme are zero, as concluded by Unold
and Requate (2001).12 Furthermore, the permit price bounds are guaranteed for regulated
12More precisely, the policy regulator bears the typical risks related to writing option contracts. As a
consequence, Unold and Requate (2001) raise the delicate question of whether the state or a private
institution should offer these options.
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companies that require this protection and are willing to pay for this optionality. Yet, the
price of emission permits reflects the real expectations of market participants about the
cumulative emissions of relevant companies.
5.2 Comparison of hybrid schemes
Using a stylized equilibrium permit price, we analyze five different cap-and-trade schemes
characterized by specific price mechanisms. These hybrid systems are implemented by
the policy regulators in order to prevent the permit price from rising too high or falling
too low.
A summary of the main results is provided in Table 5.1 - 5.3. Readers preferring written
text to tables are referred to 3a-3d in Section 6.1.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Results of the thesis
1 Investigation of equilibrium models and reduced-form models
1a Marginal abatement costs and probability of permit shortage
The concept of marginal abatement costs and the concept of probability of permit shortage
are closely related and the latter can be seen as an extension of the concept of marginal
abatement costs.
Interpreting the permit price either as the marginal abatement costs or as the penalty
multiplied by the probability of permit shortage is the result of a deterministic and a
stochastic optimization problem that have a very similar structure. Regulated companies
are maximizing their profits by choosing optimal strategies for emitting greenhouse gases
and buying or selling permits. A by-product of solving the profit maximization problems
in the different settings is that we obtain a convenient interpretation of the permit price.
In a deterministic equilibrium model the permit price is equal to the marginal abatement
costs (cf. Section 3.1) whereas in a stochastic equilibrium model the permit price is
equal to the penalty multiplied by the probability of a permit shortage at the end of the
compliance period (cf. Section 3.2). In a deterministic framework the permit price (i.e.
the marginal abatement costs) does neither explicitly depend on the regulations of an
emissions trading scheme such as the penalty fee and the number of allocated permits
nor on the expected future emissions of the regulated companies. Permit prices in a
stochastic equilibrium model capture these dependencies. At a fixed point in time the
probability of permit shortage can be interpreted as the marginal abatement costs that
165
Conclusion 166
depend on the expected cumulative emissions in the compliance period and on the total
number of permits functional for compliance. This interpretation is the link between the
two concepts.
1b New equilibrium model
Based on the models of Carmona et al. (2009b) and Chesney and Taschini (2008) we
develop a new equilibrium model, the model of Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009).
Chesney and Taschini (2008) specify the process for the cumulative emissions in the
framework of Carmona et al. (2009b). The emission rate of the representative agent
follows a geometric Brownian motion. This implies that the total amount of pollution
is described by the integral over a geometric Brownian motion. The models of Chesney
and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) differ in the way such an integral is
approximated. The linear approximation approach of Chesney and Taschini (2008) has
the shortcoming that the moments of the approximated cumulative emissions do not
match the true ones. Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) solve this problem by applying a moment
matching approach.
1c Relationship of stochastic equilibrium models and reduced-form models
We show how the stochastic equilibrium model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) with time-
dependent emission rate can be transformed into the reduced-form model of Carmona
et al. (2009a).
The approximation of cumulative emissions in the model of Chesney and Taschini (2008)
yields the reduced-form model of Carmona et al. (2009a). Choosing a more natural
approximation we develop a new reduced-form model, referred to as the model of Gru¨ll
and Taschini (2009). The model of Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009) differs slightly from the
model of Carmona et al. (2009a).
2 Analysis of the price dynamics in an ordinary scheme
2a Theoretical explanation of jumpy behaviour
Permit prices are inherently prone to jumps. Apart from the scheme design, regulatory
risks are also responsible for a high price volatility.
Analyzing permit price dynamics in the models of Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Gru¨ll
and Kiesel (2009) shows that permit prices are inherently prone to jumps. The extreme
price slump in the EU ETS in 2006 can be explained in the equilibrium models by a
relatively small change in the market’s expectation for how long the remaining permits will
suffice. Given a permit price time series we can compute the market’s implied expectation
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of over-/underallocation using our equilibrium price formulae. Therefore, the price drop
in 2006 of about -50% can be explained as follows: With the market being in slight implied
underallocation in April 2006 (cf. Section 4.1d) rumours of a probable overallocation and
the final publication of the verified emission data for 2005 on 15 May 2006 by the European
Commission (overallocation of 2.5%) drove prices lower. Price jumps will occur as long as
the market’s ability to estimate the cumulative emission level is limited. A nearly exact
estimation must have been impossible until the publication of the first verified emission
data in May 2006. Even the regulator could not aggregate the data of all the countries
for the first emissions report - emission data for the Czech Republic, France, the Slovak
Republic and Spain was partly missing (cf. European Union (2006)). However, price
jumps of the magnitude of 2006 are unlikely to occur again as the measurement of the
emission data has been significantly improved.
The scheme design is not the only source of price volatility. Emissions trading schemes
are surrounded by regulatory risks. Changes in the regulation or even expected or feared
changes have a significant influence on prices. As pointed out in Section 2.2b and 2.2g
in detail, for instance the following two regulatory risks have been responsible for permit
price slumps in the EU ETS: (i) changes in the cap even during the compliance period
and (ii) influence of the reduction commitments of other countries on the reduction target
of the European Union.
2b Price convergence at the end of the compliance period
The concept of probability of shortage resulting from stochastic equilibrium models ex-
plains that prices in an emissions trading system without banking will always converge
to zero or to the penalty at the end of the compliance period.
At the end of the compliance period there is no uncertainty about the cumulative emis-
sions in the compliance period. Therefore, the probability of shortage only takes the
values zero or one at the end of the compliance period. Multiplying this probability with
the penalty yields the permit price in a stochastic equilibrium model.
2c Estimation methods for stochastic equilibrium and reduced-form models
Reduced-form models exhibit their strength at the end of a compliance period but are
outperformed by complex standard-stochastic processes at the beginning of a compliance
period.
We derive estimation methods for the stochastic equilibrium models of Chesney and Tas-
chini (2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) and for the reduced-form model of Gru¨ll and
Taschini (2009). The resulting estimation methods for the models of Chesney and Taschini
(2008) and Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2009) cannot be used in practice. This has to do with the
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fact that the obtained Stochastic Differential Equations (SDE) do not possess sufficient
free parameters for model-calibration and, therefore, are not flexible enough to capture
the historical permit price evolution. The reduced-form models can be used in practice.
Applying the reduced-form models to the historical permit price of the EU ETS shows
that the reduced-form models exhibit their strength at the end of a compliance period.
However, they are clearly outperformed by complex standard stochastic processes such as
NIG (Normal Inverse Gaussian) at the beginning of a compliance period. GBM (geomet-
ric Brownian motion) and reduced-form models perform similarly at the beginning of a
compliance period.
3 Analysis of the permit prices in the proposed hybrid schemes
3a Breakdown of hybrid systems into an ordinary system with options
With the exception of the safety-valve, all the other hybrid systems that we have investi-
gated can be translated into an ordinary cap-and-trade scheme combined with European-
style put options (price floor with a subsidy); with an unlimited amount of American-style
call and put options (price collar); with a limited amount of American-style call and put
options (allowance reserve); with a limited amount of European- and American-style call
and put options (standard options offered by the regulator).
3b Effectiveness of price bounds
Price bounds of emission permits can be always guaranteed in a hybrid system with a
subsidy or in a system with price collar. A system where the regulator sells options
to regulated companies guarantees price bounds for those companies that are willing to
pay for such a protection. The two other systems under study (safety-valve with offset
and allowance reserve) cannot guarantee that the permit price will be capped under all
possible circumstances.
3c Permit price volatility
By breaking down hybrid systems into an ordinary system with plain-vanilla options, we
assess the price collar and the allowance reserve to be unable to guarantee a reduction
in the volatility of the market price of emission permits. On the contrary, they might
enhance the permit price volatility. After an intervention of the regulator in the permit
market took place, the price of emission permits will not reflect the real expectation of
market participants regarding the cumulative emissions of regulated companies. More
precisely, the unknown quantity of permits released into or withdrawn from the market
alters this information.
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3d Enforcement costs and environmental targets
We show that all proposed hybrid systems reduce the expected economic burden of the
cap-and-trade for relevant companies. By implementing these schemes the regulator faces
substantial costs (price collar), limited costs (price floor, allowance reserve), or no costs
at all (safety-valve with offsets). At the same time, the original environmental targets
are severely loosened (price collar), or lowered (allowance reserve and safety-valve). The
hybrid scheme with standard options keeps the environmental targets under control but
does not impose extra costs on the policy regulator.
6.2 Key findings of the thesis
(A) Stochastic equilibrium models and reduced-form models are very useful tools in
modelling permit prices and providing theoretical explanations for permit price char-
acteristics observed in the EU ETS (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme),
the world’s largest emissions trading scheme.
(B) Market participants should be aware of the following peculiarities
(i) Permit prices in an ordinary cap-and-trade system are inherently prone to
jumps
(ii) Permit prices in an emissions trading system without banking will always con-
verge to zero or to the penalty at the end of a compliance period
(C) Hybrid systems cannot avoid the two permit price characteristics (B-i, B-ii) without
creating unwanted side-effects (cf. 3b - 3d in Section 6.1). However, a cap-and-trade
system where plain-vanilla options are available (written by either the regulator or
by private institutions) can replicate the intentional results of the hybrid systems
under investigation and at the same time can avoid their undesirable effects. We
recommend, therefore, implementing an ordinary cap-and-trade system where pri-
vate institutions write options on permits. The challenge in the coming years will
be the creation of properly designed option contracts on emission permits backed
by sufficiently liquid option markets.
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6.3 Future research
This thesis focuses on explaining the major permit price characteristics of the EU ETS
(especially in Phase I between 2005 and 2007) and on analyzing the permit price dy-
namics in proposed hybrid schemes (safety-valve, price floor with a subsidy, price collar,
allowance reserve, standard options offered by the regulator). Based on the results of
the thesis my future research activity will focus on analyzing permit price dynamics of
emissions trading systems where the possibility of banking and the availability of options
significantly influence the permit price. Furthermore, I plan to investigate in which way
the linking of different emissions trading systems influences the permit price.
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